Government have invited Italy to accede to the new Straits Convention, notwithstanding her non-participation in the Montreux Conference; and at the same time they are reported to have informed her that, in their view, the Anglo-Turkish mutual assistance agreement under Article XVI of the Covenant has lapsed with the abandonment of the application of Article XVI against Italy. Italy is thus 'sitting pretty'. She can put her goodwill up to auction; and either Germany on the one hand, or the Franco-Russian group on the other, will bid for it."

(See Embassy's despatch No. 1267, July , 1936).

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

THE UNDER SECRETARY
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DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

August 5, 1936.

Copy sent to Chargé Istanbul 8/14 RRH-FMC

The Turkish Ambassador called on me this afternoon by appointment to say that he had been instructed by his Government to inform the Department that, in accordance with the provisions of a protocol attached to the new Straits Convention signed on July 20, last, at Montreux, the Convention is to take effect on August 15, 1936. The Ambassador added that this information as well as copies of the text of the new Convention were being conveyed to the interested foreign diplomatic representatives in Turkey.

I thanked the Ambassador for his courtesy in bringing this information to the Department's attention and told him that due note thereof would be taken.

Wallace Murray.

WSM/GC

767.68119/971

FILED
AUG 17 1936

August 14 1936

No. 62

To the American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim,

Istanbul.

The Secretary of State transmits for the information of the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim a copy of a memorandum regarding a call of the Turkish Ambassador to inform the Department of the date on which the Convention with regard to the Régime of the Straits signed at Montreux on July 20, last, is to take effect.

Enclosure:
Memorandum dated August ~~6~~ 5, 1936.

NE:RAH:FMC:SS 8/14

CB
AUG 14 1936.

A true copy of the signed original

767.68119/971

TURKISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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AUG 28 1936

August 25 1936

767.68119/972

The Turkish Ambassador presents his compliments to the Honorable Secretary of State and has the honor to transmit herewith, in pursuance of the instruction of his Government, the new rules to be applied provisionally from the date of August 15th, 1936, in the Straight of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora, and the Bosphorus comprised under the general term of the "Straits."

TÜRKIYE CUMHURIYETI
WASINGTON
BÜYÜKELCILIĞI

August 20, 1936.

FILED
JUN 24 1937

Enclosure:

The Honorable Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

RÉPUBLIQUE TURQUE

MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGÈRES

Ankara, le 5 août 1936

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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Conformément au Protocole annexé à la Convention concernant le régime des Détroits signée à Montreux le 20 juillet 1936, le Gouvernement de la République Turque devant appliquer provisoirement, à partir du 15 août 1936, le régime spécifié dans ladite Convention, vient de prescrire les dispositions suivantes qui seront appliquées provisoirement, à dater du 15 août 1936, dans le Détroit des Dardanelles, la Mer de Marmara et le Bosphore compris sous la dénomination générale de "Détroits".

Les stations de signaux mises à l'usage des bâtiments de guerre et des bâtiments auxiliaires lors de la traversée des Détroits.

1.- Les stations de signaux désignées ci-après seront mises à la disposition des bâtiments de guerre et des bâtiments auxiliaires étrangers, lors de leur passage dans les Détroits, pour les communications qu'ils devront faire, conformément à l'article 13 de la Convention concernant le Régime des Détroits signé à Montreux le 20 juillet 1936.

A l'entrée des Dardanelles: La station de signaux de Seddülbahir (Poste de T.S.F. de Seddülbahir.)

A l'entrée du Bosphore: La station de signaux de la Mer Noire (Poste de T.S.F. de Büyükliman).

2.- Le Commandant des bâtiments de guerre et des bâtiments auxiliaires étrangers devant passer par les Détroits communiquera, à 50 milles de l'entrée des Détroits, par T.S.F., auxdites stations, la composition exacte de la force se trouvant sous ses ordres.

3.- Les bâtiments de guerre et les bâtiments auxiliaires étrangers, lors de leur passage dans les Détroits, doivent hisser leurs noms, au moyen de signaux à l'usage international, tant qu'ils se trouveront à une distance visible desdites stations.

4.- Les bâtiments de guerre et les bâtiments auxiliaires étrangers qui auraient subi une avarie lors de leur traversée, devront../.

conformément au dernier alinéa de l'article 14 de la Convention du 20 juillet 1936, communiquer immédiatement, par T.S.F., aux stations de signaux ci-dessus mentionnées, l'endroit où ils se trouvent (avec indication de la longitude et de la latitude) et la nature de leur avarie.

Ces bâtiments se serviront en même temps desdites stations pour connaître la ligne de conduite qu'il leur sera désignée par la Turquie conformément au même alinéa de l'article susdit.

Batteries de salut destinées aux cérémonies militaires.

Pour les saluts réciproques à échanger entre les places fortes du Bosphore et des Dardanelles et les bâtiments de guerre et les bâtiments auxiliaires étrangers, une batterie de salut sera disposée à Anadolu Kavağı, à l'entrée du Bosphore, ainsi qu'une autre à l'endroit dit de Çimenlik à Çanakkale, à l'entrée des Dardanelles.

Postes de Pilotage

- - - - -

Pour le service de pilotage, fonctionneront les postes dont le désignement suit :

A l'entrée des Dardanelles : (Poste de Morto) (Poste de Gelibolu

A l'entrée du Bosphore : (Poste de Büyükliman) (Poste de Haydarpaşa

Routes aériennes

Les aéronefs civils suivront les lignes suivantes pour leur passage entre la Méditerranée et la Mer Noire :

Les avions. - Pour le passage de la Méditerranée à la Mer Noire, la ligne aérienne : Enos - Midiya.

Pour le passage de la Mer Noire à la Méditerranée, la ligne aérienne : Midiya - Enos.

Les hydravions. - Suivront les mêmes lignes ci-haut indiquées et pourront, en cas de nécessité, survoler Ereğli (en Marmara).

Zones interdites dans les Détroits.

Le Gouvernement de la République Turque fera connaître incessamment les zones interdites qui seront instituées dans les Détroits.

TRANSLATION

THE TURKISH REPUBLIC

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS Ankara, August 5, 1936.

In accordance with the Protocol annexed to the Convention concerning the Régime of the Straits signed at Montreux July 20, 1936, the Government of the Turkish Republic having to apply provisionally, beginning August 15, 1935, the régime specified in the said Convention, has prescribed the following provisions which will be applied provisionally, on and after August 15, 1936, in the Strait of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and the Bosporus, included under the general denomination of the "Straits".

x x x x

Signal stations placed at the disposal of warships and auxiliary vessels when passing through the Straits.

1. The signal stations designated below shall be placed at the disposal of foreign warships and auxiliary vessels, on their passing through the Straits, for the communications that they have to make, in accordance with article 13 of the Convention concerning the Régime of the Straits signed at Montreux July 20, 1936.

At the entrace to the Dardanelles: the signal station of Seddülbahir (Seddülbahir Wireless Station).

At the entrance to the Bosporus: the Black Sea signal station

station (Büyükliman wireless station).

2. The commanding officer of foreign warships and auxiliary craft, which are to pass through the Straits shall communicate, while 50 miles from the entrance to the Straits, by wireless, to the said stations, the exact composition of the force under his orders.

3. Foreign warships and auxiliary craft, when passing through the Straits, must hoist their names, by means of signals internationally used, while they are within sight of the said stations.

4. Foreign warships and auxiliary craft which have suffered damages during their voyage must, in conformity with article 14 of the Convention of July 20, 1936, communicate immediately, by wireless, to the stations above mentioned, the place where they are (with indication of the longitude and latitude) and the nature of their damages.

The said vessels will at the same time make use of the said stations to learn the line of conduct which will be designated to them by Turkey in accordance with the same paragraph of the above mentioned article.

x x x x

Salute batteries destined for military ceremonies.

For the reciprocal salutes to be exchanged between the forts of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles and foreign

warships

warships and auxiliary vessels, a salute battery shall be placed at Anadolu Kavağı, at the entrance to the Bosporus as well as another at the place called Çimenlik at Çanakkale, at the entrance to the Dardanelles.

Pilotage Stations.

For the pilotage service, the stations whose designations follows shall function:

At the entrance to the Dardanelles: Morto Station
Gelibolu Station.

At the entrance to the Bosporus: Büyükliman Station
Haydarpaşa Station.

x x x x

Air Routes

Civil aircraft shall follow the following lines for their passage from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea:

Airplanes: For the passage from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea, the Enos-Midiya air line.

For the passage from the Black to the Mediterranean Sea: the Midiya - Enos air line.

Hydroplanes. Shall follow the same lines above indicated and may, in case of necessity, fly over Ereğli (in Marmora).

x x x x

Forbidden

Forbidden zones in the Straits.

The Government of the Turkish Republic will make known without delay the forbidden zones which will be instituted in the Straits.

TR: :mcs.

NE

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of Turkey and has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the Ambassador's note of August 20, 1936, transmitting new regulations for the navigation of the Straits to be applied provisionally beginning August 15, 1936.

767.68119/972

Department of State,

Washington. August 25 1936

767.68119/972

NE:RAH/LS-FMC

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A true copy of the signed original.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FEB 25 1941
DIVISION OF
NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

August 13, 1936.

Straits Convention Signed at Montreux on July 20, 1936.

On June 22, 1936, representatives of Great Britain, France, Japan, the Soviet Union, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey met at Montreux, Switzerland, to discuss the proposal made by the Turkish Government for the abrogation of the Straits Convention signed at Lausanne on July 24, 1923, and its replacement by a new convention. Italy was the only country signatory to the Convention of 1923 not represented at the Conference. On July 20 the new Convention was signed. It will go into effect on August 15, 1936.

There follows a summary of the new Convention, article by article, together with comments thereon. A discussion of the Convention as it regards American interests specifically is included in a separate memorandum.

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Article 1.

> "The High Contracting Parties recognize and affirm the principle of freedom of transit and navigation by sea in the Straits.
>
> "The exercise of this freedom shall henceforth be regulated by the provisions of the present Convention."

Comment: The declaration with reference to freedom of navigation of the Straits is of particular interest inasmuch as

as it was the historic policy of Turkey from the time of the occupation of Constantinople in 1453 until the World War to regard the Straits as being completely under Turkish jurisdiction, such freedom of navigation as was conceded to foreign powers being regarded as a matter of privilege rather than right. According to the Treaty of Lausanne of July 24, 1923, however, "the principle of freedom of transit and of navigation, by sea and by air, in time of peace as in time of war, in the Strait of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora, and the Bosphorus" was recognized. It will be observed that the new Convention reaffirms this principle with two exceptions: omission of mention of (1) freedom by transit by air and (2) freedom of navigation in time of both peace and war. Both of these omissions are, of course, tied up with the question of Turkish remilitarization of the Straits.

It is interesting to note in this connection that the draft Convention proposed by the Turks contained no such general declaration with regard to freedom of navigation.

As regards the second paragraph quoted above, it is inferred therefrom that the terms of the present Convention shall prevail exclusively in the regulation of the navigation of the Straits and that no changes in regulations outside the framework of the Convention will be made.

Commercial Vessels

Article 2.

In time of peace, merchant vessels of all nations shall

enjoy

enjoy complete freedom of navigation by day and night and regardless of the type of cargo carried. No taxes or charges other than those prescribed in Annex I of the Convention shall be assessed.

Comment: The charges prescribed are .075 French gold francs (3 piasters, or $0.24) per net registered ton for Sanitary Control Stations; .42 francs (16.8 piasters or $1.344) per registered ton for lighthouses, light and channel buoys up to 800 tons and 1/2 that rate over 800 tons; and .10 francs (4 piasters or $0.32) for life saving services. Formerly the charges for these same services were 4 piasters for Sanitary Control Stations, or 1 piaster ($0.08) more per ton than now. The charge for lighthouses, light and channel buoys was the same as at present except that it was stated in piasters. The charge for life saving services was also the same. These charges are for round-trip voyages and apply to vessels of all nations, and it is stipulated that any reductions made must be generalized to apply to ships of all nations.

It may be observed in this connection that the Embassy at Istanbul reported in its despatch No. 22 of April 23, 1936, that the charges previously levied were considered by the various shipping interests concerned to be "unduly high and, in the case of vessels merely passing through the Straits, unwarranted", and expressed the hope that the negotiations of the new Convention might be made an occasion for securing

appropriate

appropriate reductions. However, the new charges would appear to remain the same as before except for Sanitary Control Stations, the fee for which is reduced from 4 to 3 piasters per registered ton. (The LONDON TIMES of July 21, in commenting on the results of the Conference states: "The British succeeded in gaining better conditions for commercial shipping passing through the Straits, an important point." No intimation was given, however, as to the nature of such concessions.)

Article 3.

Tells of manner in which sanitary control shall be enforced.

Comment: These provisions appear to be reasonable and not to require comment.

Article 4.

In time of war, Turkey not being a belligerent, merchant vessels of all nations will enjoy the same freedom of navigation as in time of peace.

Comment: This provision is essentially the same as that contained in the former Convention. It is interesting to note that the additional provision in the Turkish draft to the effect that "this liberty of passage is subject to commitments arising under the Covenant and incumbent on Turkey as a member of the League of Nations" was omitted in the final draft.

Article 5.

Article 5.

In time of war, Turkey being a belligerent, vessels of nations not at war with Turkey shall enjoy freedom of navigation on condition of not assisting the enemy. Transit at such times shall only be by day and by such route as the Turkish authorities may prescribe.

Comment: These provisions are essentially the same as those contained in the previous Convention and the Turkish draft.

Article 6.

Should Turkey consider herself threatened by war the provisions of Article 2 would continue to be applied except that entrance to the Straits could only be by day and by such route as the Turkish authorities may prescribe.

Comment: This provision was not included in the original Straits Convention nor in the Turkish draft. Its inclusion, however, is in line with Article 21 of the new Convention concerning special measures which may be taken in case of threat of war.

Article 7.

Defines merchant vessels as all vessels not defined as vessels of war.

Vessels of War

Article 8.

Refers to definition of war vessels in the Annex.

Comment:

Comment: This section is detailed and technical and could only be commented on competently by the Navy Department. It was not included in the original Turkish draft nor in the old Straits Convention.

Article 9.

Defines status of auxiliary naval vessels.

Comment: Same as for Article 8.

Article 10.

In time of peace, light surface vessels, minor war vessels and auxiliary vessels, whether belonging to Black Sea or non-Black Sea Powers, and whatever their flag shall enjoy freedom of transit subject to conditions laid down in Article 13. Other vessels of war shall enjoy the right of transit under Articles 11 and 12.

Comment: References to preceding and following articles are made in such a disconnected manner in this and the eight following articles that it would seem advisable to summarize them first and then comment on them as a whole.

Article 11.

Provides that Black Sea Powers may send ships through the Straits of a tonnage greater than that prescribed in Article 14 provided that they proceed singly and are not escorted by more than two destroyers.

Article 12.

Black Sea Powers may bring in submarines purchased or constructed

constructed outside the Black Sea. Submarines of these Powers may also be allowed to pass through the Straits for repairs.

Article 13.

Prescribes conditions for giving notification of intended transit of war vessels through the Straits.

Article 14.

The maximum aggregate tonnage of all foreign naval vessels which may be in transit through the Straits at any one time shall not exceed 15,000 tons except in cases provided in Article 11 and Annex III (which concerns certain Japanese training ships).

Vessels paying courtesy calls (See Article 17) to a port in the Straits would not be included in this tonnage, nor would vessels under repair.

Article 15.

Warships in transit through the Straits should not use aircraft which they may be carrying.

Article 16.

Warships in transit through the Straits should remain therein only long enough to effect passage, except in the event of damage or peril of the sea.

Article 17.

The preceding provisions shall not prevent a naval force

force of any tonnage or composition from paying a courtesy visit in the Straits on the invitation of the Turkish Government.

Article 18.

The aggregate tonnage which non-Black Sea Powers may have in that Sea in time of peace is 30,000 tons, of which no one Power may have more than two-thirds that amount. However, should the tonnage of the strongest Black Sea Power exceed by 10,000 tons its present strength, the 30,000 limitation would be increased correspondingly up to 45,000 tons.

Naval forces not to exceed 8,000 tons may be sent into the Black Sea by non-Black Sea Powers for a "humanitarian purpose". If the despatch of such forces does not cause the total non-Black Sea tonnage to exceed the limits prescribed above, Turkey will give permission directly. However, if the above limit has already been reached Turkey must first consult the other Black Sea Powers.

Vessels belonging to non-Black Sea Powers shall not remain in the Black Sea more than 21 days.

Comment: Stated simply, the preceding articles may be summarized as follows:

A. Non-Black Sea Powers may only send light surface vessels, minor war vessels and auxiliary vessels into the Black Sea and only upon the following conditions:

1. Prior notification to the Turkish authorities.
2. The maximum tonnage of all foreign war vessels in

in transit through the Straits not to exceed 15,000 tons at any one time nor to consist of more than nine units.

3. The total tonnage of all non-Black Sea Powers in the Black Sea not to exceed 30,000 tons unless the tonnage of the strongest Black Sea Power should be increased by 10,000 tons, in which case the limit should be increased correspondingly up to 45,000. However, forces of 8,000 tons might be sent in addition for "humanitarian purposes", which is understood to mean for the Red Cross or other relief expeditions.

4. Courtesy visits to a port of the Straits may be made at the invitation of the Turkish Government without any limitations as to the tonnage or composition of such forces.

B. Black Sea Powers, on the other hand, while being subject to restrictions with regard to prior notification and to limitation on tonnage in transit at one time (although a concession is made to them in the case of capital ships), are not subject to restrictions on the total tonnage which they may move in or out of the Straits. The effect of this is to give the Russian fleet complete liberty of action as regards the Straits on condition of not having too many vessels in the Straits at one time (except for courtesy calls at the invitation of the Turkish Government).

It

It may be observed that the only restriction imposed by the old Convention was to the effect that the maximum force which any one Power might send through the Straits was not to be greater than the most powerful Black Sea Power. Such transit was regulated by the Straits Commission and Turkey had no responsibility in that connection.

In the Turkish draft proposal virtually the same stipulations were made with regard to war vessels of non-Black Sea Powers except that conditions with regard to total tonnage and duration of visits in the Black Sea were slightly more stringent. The Turkish draft was considerably less lenient, moreover, with regard to Russian war vessels which could only move out of the Black Sea into the Mediterranean and back rather than having the more complete liberty of action which they now enjoy of being able to move their ships (except for aircraft and submarines) to and from any point. This concession was a major victory for the Soviet Union which can now coordinate the movements of its fleets in the Black Sea and the Baltic.

It may also be observed that the Turkish draft made no mention of "courtesy visits" to Turkish ports.

Article 19.

In time of war, Turkey not being a belligerent, freedom of navigation to non-belligerents shall be accorded in accord-

ance

ance with Articles 10 to 18. Belligerent warships will not use the Straits except in cases arising out of the application of Article 25 (rights and obligations arising out of the League Covenant) or in cases of assistance rendered to a state victim of aggression in virtue of a treaty of mutual assistance binding Turkey, concluded within the framework of the Covenant.

Comment: It is interesting to note in this connection that this Article is more stringent than that originally proposed by the Turks which provided for liberty of passage for belligerent war vessels as well as non-combatants on condition that no hostile act should be committed in the Straits.

It will be remembered that one of the most hard-fought discussions of the Montreux Conference was on this point, the Russians insisting on the principle of closing the Straits to belligerents and the British demanding "belligerent rights" for belligerents outside the Black Sea area to enter that sea when warring on a Black Sea Power, Turkey being neutral (NEW YORK TIMES, July 15, 1936). The final result was a complete victory for the Russians.

Another interesting point in this connection is that this prohibition placed on the use of the Straits by belligerents applies equally to Black Sea and non-Black Sea Powers. As a consequence the liberty of action which the Soviet Union enjoys in peace times would be forfeited in the

event

event that it should become a belligerent.

Article 20.

In time of war, Turkey being a belligeremt, the passage of warships through the Straits shall be left entirely to the discretion of the Turkish Government.

Comment: According to the previous Convention freedom of passage for neutral warships was provided even when Turkey was at war but now all navigation of the Straits under such circumstances depends entirely upon the decision of the Turkish Government.

Article 21.

Should Turkey consider herself threatened by imminent danger of war she shall have the right of applying Article 20 on condition that the High Contracting Parties and the League should be notified and on the understanding that two-thirds of the members of the Council and the majority of the High Contracting Parties should agree that such action is justified.

Comment: In the Turkish draft it was only proposed to advise the League and the High Contracting Parties. The final form of this Article is seen as a concession to the anti-Russian group, particularly, and Japan.

Aircraft

Article 23.

The Turkish Government will indicate air routes outside forbidden zones which may be established in the Straits for civil

civil aircraft. Prior authorization will be necessary.

Comment: No reference is made as to military airplanes which by inference will not be permitted to fly over the Straits. It will be remembered in this connection that Article 1 of the present Convention proclaims the principle of freedom of navigation by sea but, unlike the old Convention, makes no similar specification for navigation by air.

General Provisions

Article 24.

The functions of the International Commission set up under the previous Convention are transferred to the Turkish Government which will furnish the League and the High Contracting Parties with all necessary information regarding commercial and military navigation of the Straits.

Article 25.

Nothing in the present Convention shall affect the rights or obligations of Turkey or the High Contracting Parties under the League Covenant.

Comment: Japan has reserved full liberty of interpretation of this Article as well as Article 19.

Article 26.

Ratifications are to be deposited at Paris. Special provision is made for Japanese notification of ratification (presumably to avoid loss of time in awaiting the arrival of formal ratification by mail).

Article 27.

Provision is made for accession by any Power signatory to the Treaty of Lausanne.

Comment: The intent of this provision is obviously to leave accession open to Italy, the only signatory to the Lausanne Treaty not represented at Montreux.

It is significant to note in this connection that this reservation of accession to a single power is in marked contrast to Article 19 of the old Convention which provided that "the High Contracting Parties will use every possible endeavor to induce non-signatory Powers to accede to the present Convention".

Article 28.

The Convention will remain in force for twenty years and even beyond that time if notice of its denunciation is not given. The principle of freedom of transit and navigation affirmed in Article 1 of the Convention, however, shall continue without limit of time.

Article 29.

Provides machinery for possible alteration or amendment.

Signature

In signing the Convention the Japanese made the following self-explanatory specification:

> "The undersigned, Plenipotentiaries of Japan, declare, in the name of their Government, that the provisions of the present Con-

vention

vention do not in any sense modify the position of Japan as a State not a member of the League of Nations, whether in relation to the Covenant of the League of Nations or in regard to treaties of mutual assistance concluded within the framework of the said Covenant, and that in particular Japan reserves full liberty of interpretation as regards the provisions of Articles 19 and 25 so far as they concern the Covenant and those treaties."

Although the main purpose of the Turkish Government in calling the Montreux Conference was to secure permission to remilitarize the Straits, it will be observed that no reference to this point is made in the new Convention. Such permission is, however, clearly deducible from the omission in the new Convention of the clauses regarding demilitarization contained in the old.

RAH/LS

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Augus. 26 1936

No. 1764 Moscow, August 3, 1936.

Subject: The Montreux Conference and the Soviet Attitude with Respect to the Rearmament of the Dardanelles.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
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AUG 28 1936
DIVISION OF EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
SEP 1 - 1936
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Copy to Navy 8/26
MBB-FMC
FILED
SEP 16 1936

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

Sir:

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26/

I have the honor to attach hereto a number of excerpts taken from the MOSCOW DAILY NEWS, the Soviet English-language newspaper, and translations of articles published in other Soviet newspapers, relating to the Conference which has recently taken place at Montreux regarding the rearmament by Turkey of the Dardanelles.

It is assumed that the Department has already been informed in detail with regard to the proceedings of the Conference by its observers in Switzerland and

that

that it is therefore thoroughly conversant with the Soviet views expressed at the Conference as well as Mr. Litvinov's activities during the progress of the Conference. It is believed, however, that since the Soviet press directly reflects the views of the Government in discussing international affairs, the enclosures may be helpful in furnishing the reader with information regarding the Soviet attitude towards the rearmament of the Dardanelles which can not be gained from an examination of the proceedings of the Conference.

Such information as the Embassy has been able to obtain from Soviet sources and from diplomatic representatives in Moscow of several of the interested Powers, indicates that the request made last April by Turkey for a revision of the Treaty of Lausanne which would permit it to rearm the Dardanelles was most unwelcome to the Soviet Union. It is understood that on several occasions during the preceding twelve months the Soviet Government had responded in a far from encouraging manner when Turkish diplomatists had intimated that their Government was considering the feasibility of demanding the right to rearm the Dardanelles. According to this Embassy's information Turkish statesmen brought the matter up as late as February or March of this year and the Soviet Government endeavored to convince them that it would be most inopportune at the present time to strengthen the hands of the revisionist Powers by putting forth such a demand. The Soviet Union was therefore surprised and annoyed when Turkey, in spite

of

of such advice, requested in April a revision of the Lausanne Treaty. In view of the attitude which the Soviet Union has assumed during recent years of being the "closest friend" of Turkey, it could not, however, refuse to support Turkey's request.

Statements made to me by a fairly reliable Soviet official tend to confirm those made in diplomatic circles in Moscow to the effect that the opposition of the Soviet Government to the matter of the revision of the Lausanne Treaty being raised by Turkey at this time was due not only to its fear that such action would strengthen the revisionist movement in general, but also to anxiety lest an immediate attempt to settle the thorny problem of the Straits might result in Soviet-British friction at a time when the Soviet Government was particularly anxious to obtain all the British support which it could muster for the Soviet European collective security program. The official in question also pointed out that the Soviet Government would have preferred a postponement of negotiations with respect to the future status of the Straits until a further crystallization of the general European situation would indicate more precisely where each Power would stand in the eventuality of the outbreak of a European war.

Although the Soviet Government may have preferred to settle problems relating to the Straits at a later date, it nevertheless did not hesitate, when it ascertained that negotiations looking forward to the revision

of

of the Lausanne Treaty were to take place, to strive for an agreement which would strengthen Soviet power and prestige in the Near East and at the same time advance Soviet policies with respect to collective security. Nor did it hesitate, when endeavoring to attain its aims, to clash openly at Montreux with Great Britain and even severely to criticize Turkey.

The Soviet Union with its enormous resources and excellent harbors can with little difficulty maintain in the Black Sea a fleet much stronger than one which can be built and supported by any other Black Sea Power. If, therefore, warships of the other Great Powers could be excluded from the Black Sea, that sea could be dominated by the Soviet Union. In view of the above it is readily understandable why the Soviet Government adopted the thesis which served as the basis of its diplomacy in Montreux, namely, that the Black Sea should be considered as a closed body of water from which the warships of all non-Black Sea Powers should be excluded and that the Dardanelles should be regarded not as an international waterway, but merely as an entrance to a closed sea.

The British Government naturally was not enthusiastic about the idea of handing over to the Soviet Union the complete mastery of a body of water possessing such strategic importance in case of a war in the Mediterranean or of a conflict involving the safety of British routes to India. It is easy to understand, therefore, why it should advance against the Soviet thesis its own thesis

which

which it has defended for many years, namely, that the Dardanelles is an international waterway leading to an open sea with respect to the use of which all Powers with as few reservations as possible should have equal rights.

The Soviet representatives at the Montreux conference apparently realized, however, that if they should succeed in prevailing upon the other Powers to adopt a convention providing for the exclusion from the Black Sea of the warships and auxiliaries of non-Black Sea Powers, the Soviet Union in case of an attack by Germany might be unable to obtain through the Black Sea much needed assistance from France or other Powers with which it might have mutual assistance pacts. They, therefore, qualified their demand that all the warships of non-Black Sea Powers be excluded from the Black Sea by suggesting that such Powers be permitted to send warships and auxiliaries into the Black Sea for the purpose of carrying out their obligations arising from the Covenant of the League of Nations or from pacts fitting within the framework of the League. They felt that the adoption of such a suggestion would (1) permit the Soviet Union to receive help from its allies of the West - if attacked by Germany; (2) constitute a recognition by the signers of the Convention of the Soviet-French mutual assistance pact and of the authority of the League of Nations, thus adding to the significance of the pact and strengthening the cause of collective security which at present is in full consonance with Soviet European policies.

policies. The British Government, however, which apparently has not made up its mind with respect to the degree of support which it should give to the Covenant of the League in the future and to the principles laid down in the Soviet-French pact, opposed the Soviet plan, which in a certain way would mean the conversion of the Straits into a weapon for the enforcement of the Covenant and for the carrying out of the pact.

Thus the two main divergencies as developed at Montreux between the views of the Soviet and British Governments appeared to arise from the questions as to whether the Black Sea was to be considered as closed or open and as to whether or not the Convention should be based on the principles of collective security as advocated by the Soviet Government. In bridging these divergencies for the purpose of arriving at an agreement both Governments found themselves deadlocked with respect to a number of minor points and both were compelled to make considerable concessions.

With respect to the right of commercial vessels to visit the Black Sea, there was little dispute. Both sides agreed that in time of peace and of war (not involving Turkey) there should be free passage of such vessels through the Straits. They also agreed with little argument that during the period of a war in which Turkey was a belligerent commercial vessels not belonging to the countries at war with Turkey may pass freely through the Straits so long as they were not assisting the enemy.

Soviet-British differences became more marked during

the

the discussions regarding the rights of warships to enter or leave the Black Sea. The Soviet representatives took the attitude that if it was impossible to obtain an agreement based on the thesis that the Black Sea was a closed sea, any agreement reached should at least recognize that the Black Sea Powers, particularly the Soviet Union which bordered on seas other than the Black Sea, were in a special position and were entitled to special privileges in the use of the Straits. The British representatives, however, at every point in the negotiations showed reluctance to agree that special treatment be accorded to Black Sea Powers.

The negotiations relating to the rules under which warships and auxiliaries were to pass back and forth through the Dardanelles fell naturally under three main headings, namely (1) the regime to be in force in time of peace; (2) the regime to be in force in time of war, Turkey being a neutral; (3) the regime to be in force in time of war, Turkey being a belligerent, or at a time when Turkey should feel itself to be threatened with an attack.

Litvinov in the early stages of the Conference insisted that in time of peace the Black Sea Powers should be able freely to send naval vessels in and out of the Black Sea through the Straits but that the warships of non-Black Sea Powers should be excluded entirely from the Black Sea. He was willing, however, to make the concession that visits of courtesy may be made from time to time under certain stipulated conditions

to

to Black Sea ports by the warships of non-Black Sea Powers.

The Soviet delegation dwelt particularly upon the necessity of the Soviet Union being able to send its war vessels without constraint back and forth between its Black Sea ports and its ports of the Baltic, Arctic, and Pacific. It was in this connection that the Soviet press showed a surprising amount of bitterness in criticizing the attitude displayed by Turkey. It appears that the proposed draft of the Convention submitted by Turkey provided that the warships of the Black Sea Powers should be restricted by the same limit of 15,000 tons which had been established for the warships of non-Black Sea Powers entering the Black Sea and that individual war vessels of the Black Sea Powers should leave the Black Sea only upon receipt of special permission from the Turkish Government. The Soviet Government apparently keenly resented what it considered to be an endeavor on the part of Turkey to gain the right to control the movement of Soviet naval vessels in and out of the Black Sea during time of peace. The Soviet press in the course of its attacks on Turkey insinuated that the Turkish Government was unmindful of the support which the Soviet Union had rendered to Turkey in the past when the latter was engaged in struggling against the encroachments of the great Western European Powers and charged that the Turkish Government had given way to pressure on the part of influences (apparently German and Japanese) hostile to the Soviet Union.*

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* In this connection attention is called to Enclosures No. 9, 10, and 11 of this despatch.

When Litvinov became convinced that it would not be possible to obtain full satisfaction of his demands with respect to the regime to be applied in time of peace to the movement of warships through the Straits, he did his utmost to obtain as much freedom of movement as possible for Soviet naval vessels and as limited a freedom as possible of movement for the vessels of non-Black Sea Powers. It will be observed from an examination of the summary of the Convention as adopted (See Enclosure No. 24) that he succeeded to the following extent:

(In Time of Peace)

(1) Non-Black Sea Powers may not send vessels larger than 15,000 tons through the Straits whereas Black Sea Powers may do so provided they go through singly;

(2) Black Sea Powers should warn the Turkish Government eight days in advance of the intended passage of warships, whereas the non-Black Sea Powers should give notice fifteen days in advance;

(3) Non-Black Sea Powers may not have in the Black Sea at any one time an aggregate of more than 30,000 tons of warships unless the strongest Black Sea fleet (a euphonious way of referring to the Soviet fleet) should be increased to an extent of 10,000 tons greater than it now is, in which case the size of the aggregate fleet of the non-Black Sea Powers may be increased by a corresponding amount up to a maximum limit of 45,000 tons;

(4) No non-Black Sea Power may have in the Black Sea more than two-thirds of the total non-Black Sea tonnage allowed in that sea at any one time;

(5) Non-Black Sea Powers may send to the Black Sea for humanitarian purposes additional warships up to a maximum amount of 8,000 tons for all states taken together in addition to the limits mentioned above, provided the Black Sea Powers raise no objection to such a visit (this clause was introduced by Great Britain and was opposed by the Soviet Union; the proviso attached to the end of it rendered it so innocuous that Soviet objections to it were withdrawn);

(6) The period of stay of ships of non-Black Sea Powers for any purposes whatsoever may not exceed 21 days;

(7) Submarines of non-Black Sea Powers may not pass through the Straits but Black Sea Powers may send into the Black Sea in the daytime, on the surface and singly, submarines acquired or built outside the Black Sea, and out of the Black Sea, under same conditions, submarines which have been in the Black Sea and are in need of repair.

(8) In spite of the tonnage limitations on visits to the Black Sea of warships of non-Black Sea Powers, naval squadrons of such Powers may visit Turkish ports on the invitation of the Turkish Government for short courtesy calls.

(This

(This provision was apparently disagreeable to the Soviet Government since in case of a dispute between the Soviet Union and other Powers, Turkey, if sympathetic to the other Powers, could offset Soviet naval pressure by inviting the warships of such Powers to pay visits of courtesy to Turkish ports in the Black Sea. The Soviet Government was not in a position vigorously to oppose its adoption, however, without raising questions with regard to Turkey's good faith and without admitting the possibility of a future estrangement between Turkey and the Soviet Union.)

On June 25, comparatively early in the negotiations,* Mr. Litvinov proposed that the following regime should prevail in time of war, Turkey not being a belligerent:

> "In time of war, if none of the Black Sea states is a belligerent, warships and auxiliary vessels enjoy free passage through the Straits on the conditions provided for by the preceding articles (that is, the articles stipulating conditions of passage during time of peace). However, entrance to the Black Sea should be forbidden to any ship of the belligerent Powers. If any Black Sea state except Turkey is a belligerent, entry to the Black Sea should be forbidden to all warships of non-Black Sea states. The points specified in the present article should not, however, serve as an obstacle either to the passage of warships in fulfillment of commitments on assistance under the League of Nations Covenant or agreements concluded within the framework of the League, or to the passage through the Straits of warships of the state which is given assistance."

This proposal, if adopted, would have permitted France or any other Power with which the Soviet Union might have a mutual assistance pact "in the framework of

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* See Enclosure No. 5.

of the League" to send naval vessels into the Black Sea for the purpose of assisting the Soviet Union in case the latter should be attacked by Germany and would have enabled the Soviet Union to send vessels out of the Black Sea to assist France (or any other co-signer of a mutual assistance pact) in case the latter should be attacked by Germany. On the other hand, Germany or any other Power, for instance Japan or Italy, would not have had the right during the course of a war in which it had been branded as the aggressor to send naval vessels into the Black Sea. Such a proposal would also have strengthened the authority of the League of Nations and widened the sphere of the Soviet-French pact.

It is indicative of the Soviet desire to have a minimum amount of friction with Great Britain at the present time that the Soviet press showed unusual restraint in discussing the British opposition to Mr. Litvinov's proposal. Most Soviet press articles limited themselves to factual discussions of the position adopted by the British delegation, and to statements that Great Britain was "doing everything possible to facilitate the entrance to the Black Sea of vessels belonging to non-Black Sea Powers, especially her own vessels," and was displaying a tendency "to regard the League of Nations as something of secondary importance" and disregarding completely regional pacts of mutual assistance.* Such critical comment of the British policies in Montreux as appeared in the Soviet press were for the most part articles

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* See Enclosure No. 17.

articles quoting statements which had been published in the foreign press. For instance, the MOSCOW DAILY NEWS quoted criticisms of British policies published in French, British, and American newspapers.*

The provisions finally adopted governing the regime to be operative in the Straits during time of war, Turkey being a neutral, were a compromise between the Soviet and British views, although the British delegates conceded more apparently than the Soviet. Judging from the Soviet press, the main points were as follows:

(In Time of War in Which Turkey is Neutral)

(1) Warships of other than the belligerents shall have the same rights of passage through the Straits as they would have in time of peace;

(2) Warships of belligerent countries shall not be permitted to enter the Straits unless

(a) they do so in conformity with rights and duties resulting from the Covenant of the League of Nations;

(b) they do so in rendering aid to a state which is the victim of an aggression in accordance with obligations assumed by a mutual aid pact to which Turkey is a party;

(c) there are special circumstances as, for instance, when the ships of a belligerent which happen to have been cut off from their bases desire to return to them.

It would appear from the foregoing that France or the Soviet Union would not be permitted to send naval vessels through the Straits to assist each other, in case one of them should be attacked by Germany, except under one of the following conditions:

(1)

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* See Enclosures No. 16, 19, 20, 21, and 22.

(1) Turkey should be persuaded to become a party to the Soviet-French mutual assistance pact;

(2) The League of Nations should find Germany to be the aggressor;

(3) Differences should arise in the Council of the League of Nations as to what country is the aggressor and the League should grant freedom of action to the members of the League in accordance with article 15 of the Covenant, in which case Turkey itself may decide that Germany is the aggressor (it will be noted that during a discussion of this subject Politis, the Greek representative at the Conference, stated that Turkey as a member of the Balkan Entente, and in view of her participation in the convention on the determination of the aggressor, would decide this question neither independently nor without taking into account the circumstances of the conflict*).

There was little discussion in the Soviet press regarding the regime with respect to the movement of warships which should operate in the Straits during a war in which Turkey was a belligerent. The Soviet Union, like Great Britain, apparently felt that it could not very gracefully attempt to dictate to Turkey the manner in which it could control movements of warships at a time when the Turkish nation would perhaps be struggling for its national existence. All parties therefore

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* See Enclosure No. 17.

therefore agreed without argument that in case Turkey should become involved in a war it would be free to regulate the passage of foreign war vessels at its discretion.

The question of the right of Turkey to close the Straits to warships of a foreign country in case it should believe itself to be in danger of an attack was, however, the subject of a certain amount of discussion at Montreux. The Soviet press showed little interest in this question and reported without comment the final decision of the Conference to the effect that in case Turkey should feel that it was threatened with a war it might act in the same manner as though already engaged in a war, but that it should inform the League of Nations of its decision and should revoke any measures which it might have taken to place the Straits on a war footing if the Council of the League by a two-thirds majority should feel that such measures were unjustified.

The Soviet press has remained almost totally silent concerning the attitude of the Soviet Government with respect to the dispute which arose at the Conference between Turkey and Great Britain as to whether or not the International Straits Commission was to continue to function. Nevertheless, most competent observers in Moscow have the impression that the Soviet Government sympathized with the views of Turkey that the Commission should be abolished and that it favored the assumption by the League of Nations of certain supervisory and statistical duties of that Commission. It is believed, therefore,

that

that the Soviet Government was not displeased with the provisions of the draft as adopted stipulating that the functions of the Commission be turned over to the Turkish Government and that copies of the annual reports of the Turkish Government on the movements of ships through the Straits be forwarded to the General Secretary of the League of Nations.

Following the reaching of an agreement with respect to the provisions of the agreement the Soviet press has adopted a friendly tone towards the other Powers represented at Montreux, particularly towards Turkey, and expressed gratification that the Conference has ended not only with an agreement but with cordial feelings on all sides. Much space has been given to Mr. Litvinov's final speech (See Enclosure No. 26) in which he stated:

> "The Soviet delegation can state with tremendous satisfaction that though not fully, it has in extremely large measure achieved its objects, and I express thanks to all my colleagues for their cooperation in creating an atmosphere of mutual understanding and reconciliation, which was particularly evident during the closing stages of the Conference. It seems to me that all the participants in the Conference have received satisfaction and there are no dissatisfied among us. And neither did the Conference give grounds for dissatisfaction to those other states, which are absent from the Conference, and whose peaceful interests are fully insured.
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> "I want to hope that the convention which has been signed, by harmonizing the interests of the signatories with the solution of a particular problem, will create the ground for a further general improvement in the relations between them.
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> * * * * * * * *
>
> "The results of this Conference permit us to hope that international life will soon move for good

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and all out of the narrow straits of fruitless discussions and disputes to the wide sea of international collaboration and reach ultimately the haven where is written 'universal peace and security of all nations.'"

The Moscow PRAVDA (See Enclosure No. 25) remarked:

"The diplomatic success of the Soviet Union at Montreux has its profound causes. This success, just as the other successes of our country, is a result of the wise policy of our Party which, under the leadership of great Stalin, has created the unprecedented economic, cultural, military and international might of the U.S.S.R.

"All impartial observers of the Conference will have to acknowledge that the U.S.S.R., in defending its interests at Montreux, at the same time was taking into the fullest consideration the interests of the other Powers represented at the Conference, as well as the interest of preserving that universal peace of which mankind is so much in need."

In order apparently to soothe any injured feelings which Turkey may have sustained as a result of the bitter remarks aimed at that country by the Soviet press during the progress of the negotiations, practically all daily Soviet newspapers have been carrying articles during the last ten days emphasizing the importance of Soviet-Turkish friendship and expressing confidence that this friendship is now more than ever before of a permanent character.

Respectfully yours,

Loy W. Henderson

Loy W. Henderson
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

List of enclosures:
No. 1 - Clipping "Litvinov Addresses Closed Session at Montreux," from the MOSCOW DAILY NEWS, June 24, 1936.

List of enclosures (cont'd):

No. 2 - Clipping "Litvinov Defines Soviet Position on Straits Convention," from the MOSCOW DAILY NEWS, June 24, 1936.

3 - Clipping "Conference on Fortification of Dardanelles - British---Nazi Relations - U.S. Elections," from the MOSCOW DAILY NEWS, June 24, 1936.

4 - Clipping "London Denies any Friction with U.S.S.R.," from the MOSCOW DAILY NEWS, June 26, 1936.

5 - Clipping "Closed Session Discusses Terms of Straits Pact," from the MOSCOW DAILY NEWS, June 26, 1936.

6 - Clipping "Litvinov's Statement of Soviet Position on Use of Straits," from the MOSCOW DAILY NEWS, June 26, 1936.

7 - Clipping "London Press Now Confident of Agreement on Straits," from the MOSCOW DAILY NEWS, June 27, 1936.

8 - Translation "The Montreux Conference," from the LE JOURNAL DE MOSCOU, June 30, 1936.

9 - Translation "The Regime of the Straits and the Interests of Peace," from the Moscow PRAVDA, July 1, 1936.

10 - Translation "The U.S.S.R. and the Revision of the Question of the Straits," from the Moscow IZVESTIYA, July 2, 1936.

11 - Translation "The Resumption of the Work of the Montreux Conference," from LE JOURNAL DE MOSCOU, July 7, 1936.

12 - Translation "The English Project of the Convention Concerning the Straits," from the Moscow PRAVDA, July 8, 1936.

13 - Clipping "British Seek More Liberties in the Straits," from the MOSCOW DAILY NEWS, July 9, 1936.

14 - Translation "Discussion of English Proposals at Montreux," from the Moscow IZVESTIYA, July 9, 1936.

15 - Clipping "Montreux Conference Still Debating Terms of Straits Convention," from the MOSCOW DAILY NEWS, July 9, 1936.

16 - Clipping "British Draft of Convention on Straits Discussed in Detail at Montreux," from the MOSCOW DAILY NEWS, July 10, 1936.

17 - Clipping "Litvinov Explains the Soviet Position on Straits at Montreux, Emphasizing USSR Stands Squarely With League," from the MOSCOW DAILY NEWS, July 11, 1936.

18 - Clipping "British and Soviet Viewpoints on Straits Convention - British Gov't Defeat in By-Election," from the MOSCOW DAILY NEWS, July 12, 1936.

List of enclosures (cont'd):

No. 19 - Clipping "Turkey Rejects Reservations To Montreux Convention," from the MOSCOW DAILY NEWS, July 14, 1936.

20 - Clipping "Turks See Dangers in British Proposals at Montreux," from the MOSCOW DAILY NEWS, July 14, 1936.

21 - Clipping "Britain Maneuvers Against USSR, Says U.S. Paper," from the MOSCOW DAILY NEWS, July 14, 1936.

22 - Clipping "'Guardian' Criticizes British Stand at Montreux," from the MOSCOW DAILY NEWS, July 15, 1936.

23 - Translation "Conference on the Regime of the Straits," from the Moscow IZVESTIYA, July 20, 1936.

24 - Translation "The Signature of the Straits Convention," from LE JOURNAL DE MOSCOU, July 21, 1936.

25 - Translation "Results of the Straits Conference," from the Moscow PRAVDA, July 21, 1936.

26 - Clipping "Litvinov Addresses Straits Conference as Convention is Signed," from the MOSCOW DAILY NEWS, July 22, 1936.

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LWH/hla

Original and four copies to Department.
One copy to Embassy, Istanbul.
One copy to Legation, Riga.
One copy to Consulate, Geneva.

Enclosure No. 1, to despatch
No. , of , 193
from the American Embassy,
U S S R

Litvinov Defines Soviet Position On Straits Convention

MONTREUX, June 23.

THE CONFERENCE on the question of fortifying the Straits opened here yesterday under the chairmanship of Motta, with delegations from the nations who signed the Lausanne convention in 1923 concerning the Straits, present. Italy did not send a delegation.

In his presidential address, Motta [illegible] the example of loyalty to international obligations which had been shown by the Turkish Government.

The first to speak was Tewfik Rushti Aras, the Turkish foreign minister, who pointed out that the question involved was [illegible] one which concerned the sovereignty of Turkey. The latter, however, desires to establish international cooperation, and even, to a certain extent, disregards the interests of her own national defense, since [illegible] permits neutral commercial vessels to [illegible] the Straits in the event of Turkey participating in a war.

Requirements of Self-Defense

The 1923 convention was concluded in entirely other conditions, and the demilitarization of the Straits in the absence of the collective guarantee provided for under the Lausanne convention, conflicts with the elementary requirements of self-defense. The Turkish minister also pointed out the necessity of restricting the free passage of warships through the Straits.

Titulescu, the Rumanian foreign minister, declared that "everything which concerns the security of Turkey equally concerns the security of Rumania." If the Straits are the heart of Turkey, then they are the lungs of Rumania. He declared that the Balkan Entente is in full accord with Turkey, and congratulated the latter on observing her international obligations, which is all the more valuable the rarer [illegible]."

[illegible] Simonope, speaking for Britain, expressed his government's satisfaction at the [illegible] of Turkey to her obligations. This [illegible] also stressed by Paul-Boncour, the [illegible] delegate, who compared Turkey's [illegible] with the "brutal and [illegible] of certain other nations [illegible] the correlation of [illegible] security with the interests of [illegible] an infinitely complicated [illegible]

M. M. LITVINOV

Speech of M. M. Litvinov

[illegible] to take the floor was M. M. [illegible] Commissar of Foreign [illegible] U.S.S.R.

[illegible] "Government," said Litvinov, [illegible] in responding to the note [illegible] Turkish Government of April 11 [illegible] reconsideration of the Lausanne [illegible] on the Straits, and in its reply [illegible] April 18 it declared its "readiness [illegible] in negotiations for introducing [illegible] the Straits to accord with the [illegible] of Turkish security and the guaranteeing of peace and tranquility in this [illegible]."

The Soviet Government is represented [illegible] today not only as a participant of the Lausanne conference of 1923, but also as one of the Black Sea powers, whose interests are directly bound up with one or [illegible] of the question of the [illegible]. To this should be added the special interests of the Soviet Union arising out of its geographical situation and the [illegible] of the seas surrounding it. In the form of expression used by M. Titulescu, the Straits are the heart of Turkey and the lungs of Rumania, then to the Soviet Union they are the vital nerve, connecting various parts of its body.

"I note with satisfaction that other participants in the Lausanne conference have also accepted the proposal of the Turkish Republic, by which is recognized the justice and timeliness of a revision of the Lausanne convention.

Complete Chaos Then

"The Lausanne conference took place at a time when the international situation was marked by complete chaos, brought about by the world war, when the European states had only begun to reorganize themselves in their political relations, the direction and aims of their foreign policy had not yet been determined, and in certain instances, there even existed incorrect ideas about them. At that time there was a strong pacifist movement with its idea that the world war was the last war. Not a single government then resolved to come out openly propagating aggression, imperialist expansion and the glorification of war.

"The 13 years which have since elapsed, have brought about tremendous changes in this situation. The powerful pacifist stream lessened in volume and broke up into separate small, weak springs. International antagonisms again become very acute, and those forces which from the middle ages to more recent times, right up to the world war, drove nations to bloody conflicts, have again had [illegible] raised their heads in certain countries and openly, without any reserve, are not only propagating but are also preparing war. And even wars themselves were not avoided.

Foreign Policies Now Refined

On the other hand during this time, the foreign political dispositions of nearly all countries have been defined. It can now be stated almost without error which of them are striving for the guaranteeing of peace in one or another degree, and which, on the contrary, are constructing the whole of their policy to violate it.

"It is impossible not to take into account all these changes and new factors in solving the problem confronting us at this conference."

"In this respect, we should particularly take into account the fact that the Turkish Republic during the period separating us from the Lausanne conference, has given sufficient convincing proof of its love for peace.

"The peace-abiding Turkey should be, in my view, the deciding consideration in our attitude towards her proposal to re-establish her unrestricted right to defend her own territory. The right to defense cannot be regarded abstractly. This right should be in accord with the general interests of peace. Quite another attitude towards this right is required when there is a fear that it is intended to use this right to violate the interests of other nations and for the purposes of aggression.

Revision of Treaty

"The same can be said about the revision of treaties. There is one attitude towards it when this revision fully fits into the framework of the preservation, and still more, the strengthening of peace, and another attitude when its realization may give rise to political perturbations, violate international tranquility and peace, or lead to the violation by force of the interests of other nations. Thus, it seems to me, that the question of a revision of the Lausanne convention can be, with the good will of all the peace-loving participants of the conference, settled by satisfying the just demands of Turkey, by observing the interests of all the Black Sea powers, and also the interests of strengthening and guaranteeing peace in the basin of the Black Sea, in this way helping to strengthen universal peace.

"In the spirit of these considerations, the Soviet delegation will be glad to cooperate with the other delegations at this conference."

The Japanese Viewpoint

The Japanese delegate, Sato, stated that the Japanese delegation "regards with sympathy the general features of the Turkish proposals," but as Japan is now outside the League of Nations, she can no longer cooperate in world politics in the same way as she did in the past.

Politis, for Greece, said that his government considers Turkey's demands to be just, and, like Rumania, regards the guaranteeing of Turkish security as the guaranteeing of its own security. The delegates of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria both supported Turkey's proposal.

The conference was adjourned until today, when there will be a closed session for a general discussion.

standing Stakhanovites.

There is only one question on the agenda of the coming session of the Council: How are the decisions of the December (1935) plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR, on the development of the Stakhanov movement, being fulfilled? The session will hear the reports of the coal, oil, non-ferrous metallurgical, chemical, building and machine industries.

Heavy industry had been working very intensively of late in perparation for this session of the Council. At production meetings, gatherings of Stakhanovites, and in the pages of the press, a discussion has been under way on how best to master new technical norms, how to organize exchange of technical experience, how to increase economy in metal and raw materials, how to inculcate Stakhanovite methods of work on a wider scale.

Rail, Coal and Metal Figures

On June 22, railways throughout the country loaded 88,410 cars (101.6 per cent of plan) and unloaded 86,722 cars (98.6 per cent).

In the lead were the Azov-Black Sea, October, North Caucasus and Transcaucasian railways.

On June 21 the metallurgical plants of the Soviet Union smelted 39,598 tons of pig iron 96.6 per cent of plan); 43,129 tons of steel (93.8 per cent) and rolled 34,968 tons of steel (97.2 per cent).

On that same day 816,481 tons of coal were mined in the counrty (83.3 per cent of the plan), including 192,738 tons of coal in the Donbas, which fulfilled 88.7 per cent of its plan.

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PIONEERS MEET WRIT



KORNEI CHUKOVSKY, writer of children's books, at the
Pioneers and Octoberites. *Photo by M. M*

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch
No. 1164 of AUG 3 1936
from the American Embassy,
Moscow.

SOURCE: MOSCOW DAILY NEWS, No. 144 (1,247)
Wednesday June 24, 1936, Moscow.
Page 1.

LITVINOV ADDRESSES CLOSED SESSION AT MONTREUX.

Montreux, June 23.

At today's closed session of the conference on the Straits, Tewfik Rushtu Aras, the Turkish delegate read a note from the Italian Government pointing out that Italy cannot take part in the conference "until there is greater clarity in the international situation".

Following speeches by the British and Japanese delegates, who expressed with certain reservations their agreement with the draft convention submitted by Turkey, the conference was addressed by M. M. Litvinov.

"First of all", he said, "I wish to congratulate the Turkish Government on this remarkable document, the draft convention, which is permeated with a spirit of impartiality and broad understanding which induced the authors of the document to take into account not only the interests of the security of the Turkish Republic but also the interests of other countries, especially the countries situated on the shores of the Black Sea.

"We should not forget that in this draft convention, Turkey has retreated from a very old principle to which the Ottoman Empire adhered for a long time, the principle

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of completely closing the Straits to warships. This in itself reveals the spirit of the draft to which I referred.

"We all know that the Straits in question - the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus - have a special character and cannot be compared with other international canals and straits inasmuch as they lead only to the Black Sea, a closed sea, which cannot be used for transit to other countries. In view of this circumstance, many European statesmen, including for example Lord Palmerston and Wellington, permitted time and again during the 19th century the closing of the Straits.

"The closing of the Straits is of extraordinary significance not only for the security of Turkey but also for all the other Black Sea states. Of course, this security would be best guaranteed by completely closing the Straits to all warships of non-Black Sea states.

Nevertheless, my government is ready not to insist on their closing and to support the Turkish proposal to open the Straits to ships of all countries for a definite purpose and with certain restrictions.

"With complete freedom of passage through the Straits for merchant ships, not a single state, it seems to me, can be interested - from a practical point of view - in sending its warships to the Black Sea, from where there is no outlet and where it has no naval bases. However, in international practice it is an accepted custom to send warships on visits of

courtesy,

courtesy, and the Turkish Government took this into account, proposing to permit the entrance of warships through the Black Sea for such purposes. We of course do not wish to deprive states of this privilege. However, certain limits should be established so that dangers and threats should not arise for the Black Sea states. The more we limit the tonnage and the number of ships entering the Black Sea, the greater will be the guarantee of security in this part of Europe and Asia, while in creating security in this part of the world we are doing much for general security.

"However, there are no grounds why the Black Sea states should not have complete freedom of passage for their warships through the Straits in the direction of the great international waterways and oceans.

"The Soviet Union, which has on its borders seas that are not connected, is in a special position. Naturally it seems necessary that our naval forces could freely communicate with our different naval bases and ports, and I am sure that in the spirit of justice we shall not be denied this right. We have shipbuilding works on the Black Sea and there are no reasons whatever why our ships, built in these works, should not be permitted to sail to the other naval bases for which they are intended. On the other hand, we have shipbuilding works in other seas and ports and there are no reasons whatever why ships built there should not be included in our Black Sea Navy. In the light of these considerations I declare our readiness to accept

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the Turkish draft convention as a basis for discussion, although possibly it may be necessary to introduce some slight amendments on a number of points. In connection with one point - the point concerning the interests of Black Sea states - I must make a special reservation.

" I do not wish to discuss the question of the remilitarization of the Straits; it seems to me that on this point there is no need of discussion, as we all recognize the right of Turkey to complete freedom to defend her own shores and the territories of her republic. In participating in this conference on revision of the Lausanne convention, on the basis of the Turkish proposals, we all recognize that the time has come to annul those articles of the convention which concern the remilitarization of the Straits. In this matter I make no reservations and accept the corresponding articles of the draft in the form in which they are proposed.

In conclusion I wish to remind the conference that we should not forget about the League of Nations. The League is not dead, it continues to exist, and will, I trust, come out of its difficulties healthier and stronger than before. For this reason we should ensure its interests and provide for the possibility of warships entering the Black Sea and leaving it in fulfillment of the demands of the League of Nations which grants victims of aggression the possibility of utilizing support and assistance. The authors of the draft convention had this circumstance in view, but I should like to see it expressed in the convention in a more concrete form."

Litvinov

Litvinov was followed by Paul-Boncour, the French delegate, who also agreed to accept the draft as a basis, adding that he had certain reservations to make on a number of points. He stressed the importance of Litvinov's statement on commitments under the League Covenant, adding that this also applied to commitments under regional pacts. The decisive factor, Paul-Boncour said, was the opinion of the draft held by the Black Sea states.

Speaches were then made by the Rumanian, Greek and Yugoslavian delegates, who also agreed with the proposal to accept the draft as a basis for discussion.

The Bulgarian delegate said that a number of points should be cleared up, especially in the first chapter of the convention. In the discussion on the draft, the Bulgarian delegation would be guided principally by the interests of the security of their own country.

The conference then decided to discuss the draft article by article.

During the course of the day, Litvinov received Paul-Boncour and Lord Stanhope.

(For an account of the previous session see page two. The draft of the new-convention is given on page four.)

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Moscow Daily News
June 24, 1936.

Enclosure No. 3, to despatch
No. 1764 of AUG 3 1936, 193.
From the American Embassy,
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

Conference on Fortification Of Dardanelles—British-Nazi Relations—U.S. Elections

By OBSERVER

ON JUNE 22 there opened in Montreux, Switzerland, a conference to discuss Turkey's demand to fortify the Straits—the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmora and the Dardanelles. As is known, the Turkish government sent a note to the powers concerned, pointing out that the decisions of the Lausanne conference of 1923 on the demilitarization of the Straits directly menace the security of Turkey under the conditions now obtaining, and demanding their revision. This new situation referred to in Turkey's note is due to the growing war danger and the ineffectiveness of the collective guarantee in the Lausanne convention backed up by Britain, France, Italy and Japan. In contrast to Germany and Austria, Turkey, pursuing her policy of peace, did not abrogate the convention by a unilateral act, but proposed the calling of a conference to reconsider the regime of the Straits.

Turkey's demand is supported by the Balkan Entente—Greece, Rumania and Yugoslavia. It is also supported by the Soviet Union which, even at the Lausanne conference in 1922-23, favored Turkey being granted full sovereignty in the Straits, and today regards Turkey's demand in the light of the latter's undoubted desire for peace. This latter circumstance was stressed by M. M. Litvinov at the opening of the conference in Montreux; he pointed out in his speech that the right to defend one's own territory should not be regarded abstractly, but should be in accord with the general interests of peace.

France in general sympathizes with Turkey's aspirations. Britain evidently does not intend to oppose Turkey's demand in principle, but is mainly interested in the freedom of the Straits being insured for merchant vessels of all countries during peace time and of neutral countries in time of war. The problem of establishing a new regime for the Straits is a complicated one, but Turkey's request for the right to fortify them will undoubtedly be satisfied.

At the same time there are many signs to indicate that the conference in Montreux will be utilized by British diplomacy for negotiations, even though they may be of an informal character, on a number of questions of a wider political range, connected in particular with the danger of war threatening from Italy in the Mediterranean. In any case, this conference is, as the "Wiener Zeitung" points out, a sort of introduction to the forthcoming international gatherings in Geneva, where the British government will try to regain the initiative and prestige it lost as a result of the collapse of sanctions and Italy's victory in Abyssinia.

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THE DIFFERENCES in foreign policy between Britain and France on the one hand, and the opposition within Britain itself to the policy of the British government as ial-political demands, advanced in the process of the struggle against Bolshevism, "have no longer any actual significance." In other words, instead of a straight answer to the question put earlier by the British government, and now mitigated by the Conservative press, the fascist unofficial diplomat gets away with a more than equivocal phrase, which in essence means nothing. It does not bind the fascists in any way and aims only at facilitating the task of their allies in the camp of the British Conservatives.

Deceit Is Obvious

But in the eyes of the whole world Rosenberg's statement—or rather the impression which he would like to produce by his statement—is refuted by glaring facts such as the feverish preparations of Germany for war both in the east and in the west, and the unceasing calumnies against the Soviet Union in the fascist press, which are simply political preparations for future acts of German aggression. In reality, statements such as that made by Rosenberg can deceive only those who want to be deceived at any cost.

Incidentally, German fascism is openly revealing its aggressive aims not only with regard to the USSR. German activities in the Balkans—the latest and the most "legal" manifestation of which was the recent trip of Schacht, the German minister of economy—are arousing serious alarm in the British and French press. The situation in Austria, notwithstanding the temporary breathing space, remains extremely grave. The fascist press is once again openly threatening Lithuania. In Danzig, the fascists are cynically violating the constitution of this "free city," guaranteed by the League of Nations, intensifying their persecution of the opposition, organizing sanguinary attacks on their political opponents. Arising out of the evident growth of anti-fascist feelings among the population of Danzig, the German fascists are quite evidently preparing an armed invasion of this city. The "National Zeitung," the fascist organ published in Essen, said in this connection that "thousands of brown and black-shirt columns are standing ready for action and are only awaiting the word of command."

Expression of German Aggression

But the most glaring expression of this German aggression is the recently concluded trial in Kattowitz of 119 members of a secret Hitlerite organization in Upper Silesia, which belongs to Poland, and is the latter's main coal and metal base. This organization, composed in the mass of Polish unemployed, bought over by German gold and promises, began its activities very soon after the conclusion of the Polish-German pact in 1934. This pact did not prevent it from placing as its official aim the severance by force of Upper Silesia from Poland. The organization was a kind of storm troop detachment, its aim being to bring about an insurrection on Polish territory and to support it until aid came from Germany. The meetings of the members of the organization took place on German territory under the leadership of fascist officials and under the protection of the fascist secret police. Its archives and membership cards were also kept on German soil

likely to become still more acute as a result of the latter's desire to reach agreement with Germany, completely overlooking all Germany's treaty violations. In his last speech, Anthony Eden, the British foreign secretary, called upon Germany to recognize and observe the existing territorial situation in Europe, while the German fascists quite openly place in the center of their program the abolition of this status quo by any means, and the conquest of other lands.

Hitler speaks of peace and Britain wants to take him at his word, said Stanley Baldwin, the British premier, recently. The latter is in favor of an Anglo-French-German agreement, and links up reform of the League of Nations with the entry of Germany, and also of the USA and Japan. The "Times" is still more frank, having declared in a recent editorial that "the opportunity is now in British and in German hands," and demanding the early calling of an Anglo-German conference which, it claims, "alone can prove whether or not there is fundamental opposition between British and German purposes in the world." All, it adds, that British opinion expects of Germany is that "it shall open the door of the conference room."

At the present time London is awaiting Germany's reply to the famous British questionnaire, and is expecting not real but apparent concessions. Conceding to these modest desires, the fascists, in the person of Alfred Rosenberg, Nazi chief of foreign affairs, are trying, clumsily enough, to "reassure" the British. Rosenberg declared recently that, in view of the fact that "Bolshevism has been [illegible]come in Germany," her former territor-

The members of the organization swore blind submission to Hitler and were at the same time used by the German intelligence service. The court, at which all these revelations were made, sentenced them to varying terms of imprisonment.

But the affair does not end with this, for, firstly, it is to be assumed that similar organizations are active on the territory of the Polish corridor separating East Prussia from the rest of Germany, and secondly, the trial of the 119, exposing the subversive activities of German fascism in Poland, cannot but produce a profound impression on Polish public opinion. It revealed the real character of German-Polish "friendship," showing that this "friendship" in no way hinders fascist Germany from regarding Poland as one of the earliest victims of her aggressive policy, and has still further compromised the suicidal pro-German policy of Colonel Beck, the Polish foreign minister, in the eyes of Polish public opinion.

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Moscow Daily News
June 26, 1936.

Enclosure No. 4, to despatch
No. 1764 of AUG 3 1936, 193,
From the American Embassy,
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

London Denies Any Friction With USSR

26.6

LONDON, June 25.

Official circles here today energetically deny any friction between the British and Soviet delegations at the Montreux conference, declares the diplomatic correspondent of Reuter. There is evidently a clear desire in Whitehall that the improved relations between Britain and the USSR should not be spoiled by a difference of opinion on the question of the Straits, he adds.

Lord Stanhope, head of the British delegation at Montreux, it is explained in official circles, could not put the British viewpoint on Turkey's project since the British government has not had time to examine it. Instructions will be sent to Lord Stanhope, but this may take a few days, the correspondent adds.

At today's meeting of the cabinet, the first question discussed was the Montreux conference, and Lord Stanhope's request for new instructions with regard to Article 6 of the Turkish draft convention, in which the USSR desires to introduce amendments, says Reuter.

The press here points to the difference between the Soviet and British delegations at the conference, comments in the government newspapers criticizing the arguments advanced by the Soviet delegation. The special correspondent of the "Times" declares that the great powers consider that their vital interests are at stake, and that they are carefully examining every line of the Turkish project. All newspapers comment particularly on the solidarity between the USSR and France at the conference.

It is pointed out in some newspapers that no great success can be expected on the question of the Straits until the end of the League of Nations assembly. The "News Chronicle" raises the question of whether the British delegation is not dragging out the Montreux conference in expectation of securing the support of Italy. It is generally agreed that Britain will oppose Turkey's desire to abolish the International Straits Committee.

Japan's Position On the Straits Convention

TOKYO, June 25.

A conference at the naval ministry established Japan's position on the question of the Straits to be as follows, according to the Domei Tsushin Agency:

1. Japan sympathizes with Turkey's desire to amend the Lausanne Treaty. 2. However, Japan notes with regret that the Black Sea fleet of the USSR is granted "without any grounds," privileges of passage through the Straits, and Japan therefore desires that similar passage be granted by the Turkish government to all interested powers. 3. Together with this, the conference should take into consideration that Japan, no longer being a member of the League of Nations, will in the future not be in a position to share responsibility with other powers for the security of the Straits.

France Supports Soviet Position

PARIS, June 25.

The Soviet Union, supported by the Balkan states, is striving to obtain a free outlet through the Black Sea for the Soviet fleet in order to have the possibility of fulfilling its international obligations, says the special correspondent of the "Populaire" in Montreux. France supports the Soviet Union and insists on the free passage through the Straits of the fleets of those countries, which, in fulfillment of international agreements, have to render aid to members of the League of Nations.

Moscow Daily News
June 26, 1936.

Enclosure No. 5, to despatch
No. 1764, of AUG 3 1936, 193 .
From the American Embassy,
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

Closed Session Discusses Terms of Straits Pact

266

MONTREUX, June 25.

The draft convention on the passage of warships through the Straits was discussed yesterday at a closed meeting of the conference called on Turkey's initiative.

Litvinov suggested that Article 6, which deals with the conditions for the passage of warships, should apply only to the vessels of non-Black Sea states and that aircraft carriers as well as submarines should be forbidden to enter the sea.

Lord Stanhope, the British delegate said that it seemed to him that Litvinov's proposals meant renouncing the principles of the Lausanne convention.

To this Litvinov replied that the suggested amendments in no way involved renouncing the Lausanne convention, which recognizes the principle of limiting the rights of entrance to the Black Sea for warships of non-Black Sea powers, as well as the principle of unlimited right of exit for ships of Black Sea states. Litvinov also pointed out that non-Black Sea powers could send warships to the Black Sea only for purposes that come under the League of Nations Covenant or for the purpose of courtesy visits for which the proposed new convention provides.

Lord Stanhope said that there might arise a need of carrying out police functions in the Black Sea.

Replying to the Japanese representative, who said that he agreed to accept the restrictions on warships bound for the Black Sea provided that the same restrictions are applied to ships leaving it, Litvinov stressed the special character of the Black Sea and pointed out that it is impossible to extend the restrictions as had been suggested. Litvinov referred to the position of the Soviet Union, which has to send ships from the Black Sea to other USSR ports.

Among other points discussed yesterday was the Turkish government's proposal on a tonnage limit for ships belonging to non-Black Sea states which pass through the Straits. Lord Stanhope said that he agreed in principle but reserved the right to suggest a higher limit than 14,000 tons.

Litvinov expressed his agreement with the principle of tonnage limitation in view of the presence in the article on this point of a proviso on the special position of the Black Sea states.

Paul-Boncour stated that the tonnage limit should not apply to ships passing through the Straits in fulfillment of League commitments.

Litvinov proposed that Article 7 of the draft should be amended as follows: "In time of war, if none of the Black Sea states is a belligerent, warships and auxiliary vessels enjoy free passage through the Straits on the conditions provided for by the preceding articles. However, entrance to the Black Sea should be forbidden to any ship of the belligerent powers. If any Black Sea state except Turkey is a belligerent, entry to the Black Sea should be forbidden to all warships of non-Black Sea states. The points specified in the present article should not, however, serve as an obstacle either to the passage of warships in fulfillment of commitments on assistance under the League of Nations Covenant or agreements concluded within the framework of the League, or to passage through the Straits of warships of the state which is given assistance."

Paul-Boncour said that while reserving the right to make a closer study of Litvinov's proposals he considered that it met his wishes in regard to fulfillment of commitments.

Tewfik Rushti Aras stated that there could be no doubt that Turkey would fulfill all her commitments under the League Covenant and suggested that this question should be the subject of a special article.

The chairman of the conference pointed out that the discussion was only a preliminary one. The conference was then adjourned.

Litvinov left today for Geneva. The Soviet experts are remaining in Montreux to take part in the work of the technical and editorial committees.

Moscow Daily News
June 26, 1936.

Enclosure No. 6, to despatch
No. 1764 of AUG 3 1936, 193 .
From the American Embassy,
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

Litvinov's Statement of Soviet Position on Use of Straits

26.6

MONTREUX, June 25.

M. M. Litvinov, Peoples Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, gave the following statement to press representatives here in view of incorrect interpretations of the position of the Soviet delegation to the Straits conference appearing in certain newspapers:

"The Soviet Government is striving at nothing more than that the principle of limiting the tonnage of non-Black Sea powers in the Black Sea, adopted by the Lausanne convention, should be developed to such a degree which would not create a menace to the Black Sea powers and require them considerably to increase their naval forces in the Black Sea.

"At the same time the Soviet delegation cannot but oppose the attempts to restrict the passage of warships of the Black Sea powers through the Straits, a restriction which does not exist according to the Lausanne convention at the present time. To the Soviet Union free passage is necessary for visits of [illegible] for communication between its naval [illegible] various seas, and for nothing else. Together with this the Soviet delegation puts forward the principle of the free passage of warships through the Straits for all nations also in such cases when it is necessary for rendering aid to the victims of aggression in fulfillment of the League of Nations pact.

"Thus the proposals of the Soviet delegation do not aim at violating the principles of the Lausanne convention, but are rather directed at their extension in accordance with those very changes in the international situation which have required a revision of the Lausanne convention. Putting forward demands by the Black Sea states for greater security of their shores does not infringe the interests of other states, which are granted free passage in the Black Sea within reasonable limits for peaceful aims."

Moscow Daily News
June 27, 1936.

Enclosure No. 7, to despatch
No. 1764, of AUG 3 1936, 193
From the American Embassy,
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

London Press Now Confident Of Agreement on Straits

27.6

LONDON, June 26.

There is a marked change in the tone of comments in the press here today on the position of the Soviet Union at the Montreux conference, which has been discussing Turkey's demand to remilitarize the Straits. The majority of newspapers, in order to correct earlier biased statements of their correspondents, have published Livtinov's statement to press correspondents in Montreux. In general, it is pointed out that the Anglo-Soviet differences can be smoothed out.

The possibilities of agreement being reached at Montreux have increased, declares the Geneva correspondent of the "Morning Post," adding that the attempts in various circles to drive a wedge between Britain and the Soviet Union on the question of the passage of ships in the Black Sea have failed.

Following yesterday's meeting of the cabinet, supplementary instructions were sent to the British delegation in Montreux, says the diplomatic correspondent of the "Daily Telegraph," who adds that the divergence in the viewpoints of Britain and the USSR is not regarded in London as a serious difficulty. There is a feeling of assurance that the question will be settled during the process of further negotiations, he says.

There is no reason to believe that the conference in Montreux has in any way reached a deadlock because of the Soviet demands, says the diplomatic correspondent of the "News Chronicle." The correspondent expresses approval of Litvinov's statement to the press in Montreux.

Foreign Press Favorable to Turkey

Foreign press comments on the Montreux conference are generally favorable to Turkey's demands.

The conference commands particularly great attention, of course, in the Turkish press. "The problem of the Straits is the problem of the Black Sea," says the newspaper, "Cumhuriyet," in commenting on the discussion about the right of ships to enter the Black Sea.

Referring to the position of Italy, this newspaper says that she demanded the postponement of the conference and made a number of extremely categorical reservations in regard to all the questions facing the conference. This means in diplomatic language that Italy wants it to be understood that she will not agree with the decisions of the conference.

The "Adeverul," a Rumanian newspaper close to Titulescu, writes with approval of the way Turkey has acted in submitting the question of the Straits, which was covered by a post-war agreement, to an international conference.

"Turkey's way of acting," the newspaper adds, "gives support to the position of the Little and Balkan Ententes, as well as of Britain, France and the USSR. The position of these states is that none of the international agreements in operation at the present time can be altered without the consent of all the interested states."

The "Novosti," a Zagreb newspaper close to the Yugoslavian government, says that the conference may prove an important stage towards the signing of a Mediterranean pact.

Britain's initiative in favor of ending sanctions will be supported by other members of the League.

Amended Version Being Drawn Up of Straits Convention

MONTREUX, June 26.

The first reading of the draft convention on the rights of passage through the Straits was finished at yesterday's closed meeting of the Straits conference. An editorial committee was entrusted to draw up an amended version of the proposed convention. The general assembly of the conference was adjourned until the editorial and technical committees will have sufficiently advanced their work. It is thought that the assembly will be reconvened about July 6, as the League of Nations Assembly will be in session until July 4.

Enclosure No 8 to despatch
No 1764 of AUG 3 1936
from American Embassy, Moscow.

(Translation)

SOURCE: LE JOURNAL DE MOSCOU No. 26 (114), June 30, 1936.

Editorial. Moscow, June 29, 1936.

THE MONTREUX CONFERENCE.

The conference of the powers which in 1923 signed the Lausanne convention on the regime of the Straits, which was convened at Montreux on the initiative of the Government of the Turkish Republic, has finished the first part, the principal part, of its work. The general discussion of the draft of the new convention, elaborated by the Turkish Government, has come to a close and the conference has taken up the discussion of the articles. It is too soon, of course, at the present time, to anticipate events and predict the final result of this conference. It should be stated, nevertheless, that in contrast to the numerous international conferences which have preceded it and in which questions relative to the revision of existing treaties have been considered, the Montreux conference is being conducted in an atmosphere of practical work and one senses the prevalence there of a general desire to find a solution acceptable to all those participating therein.

It is certain that the principal reason for this atmosphere, so rare these days in conferences, is that the question of the Straits between the Black and Mediterranean Seas has now, in large measure, lost its

importance

importance. This importance was formerly due to the conflict between the imperialist aims of Tsarist Russia and Great Britain,a conflict which lasted for a century. In this conflict the Ottoman Empire, of course, played an important role but one which was none the less purely passive, for it was but a pawn in the hands of the imperialist powers. At the present time, however, the situation in this section of Europe, has radically changed. Tsarist Russia with its imperialist lusts no longer exists. In its place has been founded the Soviet Union which, in the first days of its existence, annulled all the secret treaties, among which were those which provided for the satisfaction of the appetites of Tsarist imperialism at the expense of Turkey.

On the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, in the struggle for national independence, has been born a Turkish Republic which is strong precisely because it aspires to complete independence, an aspiration which can be found at the base of the Turkish Republic's whole program of action.

Between the Soviet Union and the Turkish Republic solid relations of amity have been established based upon the common desire to safeguard peace, and upon complete reciprocal confidence.

Finally, important changes have taken place recently in the position of Great Britain - changes which have been dictated by her recent experiences in the Mediterranean basin. The region of the Sea of Marmora so far as England is concerned, has lost a large measure of the importance which that country attributed to it in the recent past.

Besides

Besides these noteworthy changes in the political situation, the tactics adopted by the Turkish Government in the question under discussion have played a considerable role in the establishment of the favorable atmosphere at the Montreux Conference. At the time when the Turkish Government's note was sent to the interested powers, only a month had passed since the German Government, by a unilateral act, had broken the engagements to which she was bound by the Locarno Pact, and sent her troops into the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland. The Turkish Government has not followed the example of Germany. She did not desire to place a fait accompli before the world. Desiring to bring about a change in the dispositions made at Lausanne thirteen years ago, dispositions which limit the sovereign rights of the Turkish Government in the Straits, it preferred to return to the normal methods of international relations and proposed to the interested powers that her claims be examined in the course of a conference called specifically for this purpose. It is unnecessary to show that tactics so loyal on the part of the Turkish Government should create an atmosphere extremely favorable both for the conference itself and for the claims presented at this conference by the Turkish Government.

The claims of the Turkish Government boil down in effect to two, namely, the abolition of the demilitarization of the Straits zone, and the establishment of a new regime for the passage through the Straits of ships of war.

The position of the Soviet Union as regards these two questions is absolutely clear, and this position has invariably been defended by the Soviet Government

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from the time when these questions were first placed upon the agenda of international relations. At the Lausanne Conference the Soviet delegation had lent complete support to the demand that all dispositions in any way limiting the sovereignty of the Turkish Republic be excluded from the Convention. This concerned primarily the dispositions establishing the demilitarization of the Straits zone. Now the representative of the Soviet Union, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, M. Litvinov, has again declared in the name of the Soviet Government, that he upholds the Turkish Government completely in its claim to the restitution of its unlimited right to defend its own territory.

This claim is all the more just in the light of events of recent years which have shown with undisputable force the growing danger of war, which can threaten the Turkish Republic not less than it can threaten any other country. And as M. Litvinov has rightly pointed out, it is absolutely necessary to take into consideration the invariably pacific policy of the new Turkey when examining concretely the question of the right of the Turkish Republic to defend its entire territory.

The position of the Soviet Government is equally clear on the other question submitted for examination and for decision at the Montreux Conference. The question of the regime of the Straits and of the role of these Straits as the only waterway connecting the littoral powers of the sea with the rest of the world was exposed with complete clarity by Mr. Litvinov in his speech at the Conference. The Soviet Union does not demand for itself

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any privilege which might in any way restrict the sovereign rights of Turkey or menace the security of her territory. The Soviet Union merely proposes that, in the solution which is reached, account be taken of the special situation of the powers bordering on the Black Sea for which the Straits are the sole outlet from the Black Sea to the international maritime highways.

Partial account of this special situation of the littoral powers was taken in the initial project submitted by the Turkish Government which, as the discussion of this project at the Conference itself showed, does not consider it incompatible with the interests of the Turkish Republic to go further in this direction. The objections to this extension of the rights of the powers touching upon the Black Sea came from other (non-littoral*) powers. But it is to be hoped that these objections will be abandoned in the course of the negotiations in view of the soundness and the persuasive force of the Soviet delegation's argumentation.

It is, therefore, to be hoped that the Montreux Conference, which has commenced in quite a favorable atmosphere, will attain a positive result in giving satisfaction to the Turkish Republic, in re-establishing its complete sovereignty upon all its territory, and in guaranteeing at the same time the vital interests of the powers touching upon the Black Sea interests which are not prejudicial to this sovereignty.

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* Translator's insertion.

CWT:is

Enclosure No. 9 to despatch
No. 1764 of AUG 3 1936
from the American Embassy,
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

(FULL TRANSLATION.)

SOURCE: "PRAVDA," No. 179, Moscow, July 1, 1936.
(Organ of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)).

THE REGIME OF THE STRAITS AND THE INTERESTS OF PEACE.

(Editorial).

The Conference of the Black Sea Powers and the Powers which signed the Lausanne agreement of July 24, 1923, for the purpose of revising this agreement opened June 22 at Montreux (Switzerland). The Lausanne agreement, which has never been ratified by the Soviet Government, obliged Turkey not to keep any military forces within a twenty kilometer zone on both sides of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus and not to fortify these zones. Besides, control of the adherence to this agreement was entrusted to the International Commission for the Straits.

Turkey signed this agreement because, though it had been the victor in the war with Greece, it was very much weakened by the wars it had to conduct almost continuously since 1911. Turkey was afraid that the Western European Powers might answer its refusal to satisfy their demands with a war.

As the

As the facts and the documents which were later made public (i.e., in the biography of Lord Curzon written by his secretary, Harold Nickolson) have shown, the appraisal of the situation as given by Turkish diplomacy was incorrect, while the assertion of Soviet diplomacy that the Western European Powers were incapable of starting a war on account of the Straits, was correct.

During the thirteen years which have elapsed since the Lausanne Conference, the situation has seriously altered. Turkey has become stronger. The Soviet Union has become the strongest world Power, with the interests of which the other great States cannot help reckoning. Besides, the danger threatening Turkey as a result of the present situation in the Straits has become evident after recent events. These events have shown that neither the League of Nations Covenant nor the Kellogg Pact is a safeguard against war and that the force of pacts retreats even more and more before brute force. Proceeding from this changed situation, Turkey placed before the Powers concerned the question of the revision of the Lausanne agreement. Evaluating in principle the favorable reply of the Powers to the demand for a revision of the pact concerning the Straits, Rear-Admiral Gadow wrote:

> "...The general 'preliminary' consent of the Powers participating in the Conference is hardly surprising, if the careful preliminary preparation of the question and the support rendered according to its

strength

> strength by the U.S.S.R. to Turkey be considered...Everyone can realize 'what chances for success the correctness of Turkey would have without the might of the U.S.S.R. which is backing it, and Turkey's own strength'." DEUTSCHE ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG of June 25.

There are two possible principle solutions of the question of the Straits. Either the Black Sea is declared a closed sea in which there may be warships of the Black Sea Powers only. In that case access to the Black Sea may not be permitted to the warships of any other Powers. Or the Black Sea is declared open. The Black Sea Powers in that event should be given the unrestricted right to take out and to return their warships through the Straits.

If the Powers--participants in the Conference at Montreux--declare the Black Sea a closed sea, the Soviet Union is right in demanding the unrestricted, unlimited right for the Black Sea Powers to free passage for their warships through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.

It is unusually characteristic that Japan, which is also a participant in the Conference at Montreux, has taken a particularly sharply defined position in respect of the demand of the U.S.S.R. for granting the Black Sea Powers the unrestricted right to send in and take out their war vessels through the Straits. The JAPANESE CHRONICLE, the English newspaper published in Tokyo, has justly called the Japanese position "manifestly egotistical and even to an ugly degree."

Actually,

Actually, Japan, as is known, has no interest in the Black Sea, and its position is obviously dictated by the general anti-Soviet course of its policy. However, the said newspaper, while passing sober and sound judgment on the question of the Straits, improperly refers to the matter as though the Soviet Union were demanding "special rights for the Black Sea countries." In fact, it is not a question of any "special rights" but of the self-evident natural right of the Black Sea Powers. Is it, then, necessary to prove that the Black Sea Powers first of all are interested in the Black Sea and, consequently, in the right to leave it and to return freely? Is it, then, not clear that the masters of the Black Sea first of all should be the Black Sea Powers and no one else?

It is necessary to observe that these truths are unclear not only to Japan but also to others among the participants in the Conference at Montreux. Unfortunately, even Turkey has not taken a perfectly clear and definite position on the question of the rights of the Black Sea Powers. In the project submitted by it to the Conference, it proposes to restrict the right of exit of the warships of the Black Sea Powers by the same limit of 15,000 tons which it recommends to establish for the warships of the non-Black Sea Powers entering the Black Sea and desirous of paying visits to the Black Sea Powers.

It is true, the Turkish project still admits of a

possibility

possibility of the outward passage of individual war vessels of the Black Sea Powers, but it conditions this on the receipt of special permission from Turkey. Thus, for the taking out of the Black Sea of war vessels of the Soviet Union with a view to transferring them to the Baltic Sea and to the Arctic or the Pacific Ocean, i.e., with a view to reënforcing the defense of the other parts of the U.S.S.R., the permission of Turkey is required, but no permission is required for visits of the non-Black Sea Powers. It is perfectly evident that the putting of the Black Sea Powers on the same level with the non-Black Sea Powers in questions affecting the Black Sea, does not withstand criticism. It is impossible to put the vital interests of the Black Sea Powers on the same level with those of the non-Black Sea Powers which consist of....paying visits in the Black Sea.

It is clear that the Turkish proposal does not reckon in a sufficient measure with the interests of the U.S.S.R., which is in friendly relations with Turkey, and has always been taking into consideration its interests. It is no less clear that pressure upon Turkish policy on the part of the influences which are hostile toward the U.S.S.R. finds expression in this. It must be observed with regret that the position of Turkey at the Conference at Montreux is not as friendly toward the U.S.S.R., as may have been expected on the basis of the existing friendly

relations

relations of many years' standing between these States.

If Turkey is aiming at the settlement of the question by compromise, for which Comrade Litvinov expressed a readiness by consenting to accept the Turkish proposal as a basis for a discussion, the compromise should take into consideration the following:

(1) the interests of the security of Turkey, which the U.S.S.R. is ready to take into account to the full extent;

(2) the security of the Black Sea Powers, one of which, namely the U.S.S.R., is compelled to defend its security not only in the Black Sea;

(3) the League of Nations Covenant, which may require that assistance be rendered the non-Black Sea Powers by the Black Sea Powers beyond the Black Sea or that assistance be rendered the Black Sea Powers by the non-Black Sea Powers in the Black Sea.

The U.S.S.R. has proved by its policy that it not only does not set off the defense of its security against the defense of the security of Turkey, and also does not set off the defense of its interests against the defense of universal peace. The demand for a receptive and friendly attitude toward the interests of the defense of the security of the frontiers of the U.S.S.R. is a demand arising from the interests of maintaining universal peace.

ALS:pbg

Enclosure No. 10 to despatch
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FULL TRANSLATION.

SOURCE: "IZVESTIYA," No. 152, Moscow,
July 2, 1936.
(Organ of the U.S.S.R. Central
Executive Committee).

THE U.S.S.R. AND THE REVISION OF THE QUESTION OF THE STRAITS.

(Editorial).

At the Conference at Montreux (Switzerland), which began June 22, the Lausanne agreement of 1923, which "settled" the question of the Straits in favor of the Western European powers, must be revised. Under this agreement Turkey assumed the obligation to demilitarize the twenty-kilometer zone on both sides of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, to remove its military forces from this zone, and to consent to free passage into the Black Sea of the fleets of the non-Black Sea powers, when these fleets are not larger than the most powerful Black Sea fleet. This put Constantinople in danger of being seized by the fleets of imperialist powers and threatened peace in the Black Sea.

Thus was the dispute temporarily settled, which in the course of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries was going on between Tsarist Russia and Great Britain supported by France. Tsarist Russia aspired to a division of Turkey and demanded therefore that Turkey be forbidden to take measures for the

protection

protection of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Fearing for its positions in the eastern section of the Mediterranean Sea, Great Britain had aspired to full freedom of passage for the British fleet into the Black Sea in order to be able to deliver there a decisive blow at Russia. After the defeat of the latter in the Crimean war, England and France were even successful in compelling Russia to disarm its Black Sea fleet. When the Russo-British contradictions were moved to the background by the Anglo-German contradictions, when the Tsarist and British Governments concluded an alliance, England, in the accord of 1915, agreed to recompense Tsarist Russia, for its participation in the War with Constantinople.

From the beginning of the February Revolution, the British and French Governments tried to persuade the representatives of the Provisional Government, Tereshchenko and Kerenski, to renounce the aim, which the Russian bourgeoisie had proved too weak to achieve. After crushing Turkey in the World War the Allies forced upon it the Lausanne agreement which, while leaving Constantinople to the Turks, placed it under a constant menace of the imperialist attacks.

At the moment of the victory of the October Revolution, the Soviet Government put an end to the aspirations of Russian imperialism for a division of Turkey. As soon as the victories of the Red Army in the civil war swept Denikin and other dirt out of the Caucasus and the Soviet Republic became a neighbor of

Turkey,

Turkey, the Soviet Government established the most friendly relations with the Turkish people and the Kemalist Government and supported the liberating struggle of the Kemalist Government. In Lausanne the Soviet delegation fought stubbornly for the right of the Turkish people to have full freedom to defend the Straits against attack on the part of the fleets of powers pursuing ends hostile to Turkey. The Soviet-Turkish friendship has been a mighty factor, depending on which Turkey has been able to organize its forces and to become a serious stronghold of peace in the Near East. This strengthening of Turkey has enabled it, in the face of the increasing war menace, of which the Mediterranean Sea has become one of the hotbeds, to put the question of a revision of the Lausanne pact in the order of the day. The Soviet Government has readily supported the initiative of Turkey.

The project for a new pact concerning the Straits, proposed by the Turkish delegation cannot, unfortunately, be considered friendly toward the U.S.S.R., for it does not take into account most lawful interests of our country. The frontiers of the Soviet Union are located not only in the Black Sea but also in the Baltic Sea and in the Pacific and Arctic Oceans. Hence it follows that defense interests of the U.S.S.R. require that it have an opportunity to transfer its fleet, when necessary, from one sea to another. This is not in conflict with the interests of the security of Turkey, because, first, Turkey knows that one of the principles of Soviet foreign

policy is not only the renunciation of conquest but also friendship with precisely those people which in the past have been and which may again become objects of imperialist policy. Besides, the Soviet Union recognizes unreservedly the rights of Turkey to such arming of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus as meets the interests of the security of Turkey. The establishment of any obstacles whatsoever to the passage of the Soviet warships from one sea to another has nothing in common with the interests of the defense of Turkey's security. These obstacles are only in the interests of the imperialist Powers which are hostile to the U.S.S.R. This has been frankly demonstrated at the Montreux Conference by the delegate from Japan which, while having no special interests in the Black and the Mediterranean Seas, has come out against the lawful rights of the U.S.S.R. to shift its fleets from one sea to another. This is also demonstrated by the German imperialist press which states that the U.S.S.R. is demanding privileges for itself in the Black Sea. The position of Turkey, incomprehensible from the viewpoint of the interests of the defense of Turkey itself, can be understood only as a reflection of the pressure of forces hostile to the U.S.S.R. In this connection it is worth while to point out that, as we know from reports we have received, one of the imperialist powers has already received from Turkey an order for the construction of fortifications in the Straits, which indicates a strengthening of the

influence of that State upon Turkey.

Only the presence of such influences can explain the attempt to place the U.S.S.R. and its interests in the Black Sea on a level with the interests of the non-Black Sea powers. What interests of the non-Black Sea powers does Turkey wish to take into account by providing in its project identically the same tonnage for the warships of non-Black Sea powers, entering the Black Sea, as for Soviet warships leaving it? For the Soviet Union it is a question of the security of its frontiers. By mentioning the non-Black Sea powers the Turkish project has in view the so-called "visits of courtesy." We are very much in favor of courtesy in international relations, but how can the sign of equality be put between matters so different as courtesy and security? Here we shall not raise the disagreeable question of just whither and to what ports the lovers of courtesy aspire. One has but to look at this "equation" to realize that it is here a matter not of courtesy but of something entirely different.

Certain imperialist newspapers, i.e., the London DAILY EXPRESS, assert that the Turkish proposal means a great victory for the U.S.S.R. The assertion has for its aim to throw dust into our eyes. The Soviet government considers that the Turkish proposal by no means satisfies its interests. The question of the Straits may be solved by declaring the Black Sea either a closed or an open sea. In the former case no non-Black Sea power may enjoy the right to take its vessels

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into the Black Sea. In the latter case the right to send a fleet into the Black Sea should be accorded also to the non-Black Sea powers. Then it is impossible to refuse to the Black Sea powers the right to move their fleets out of the Black Sea and into it. This can be done in complete consideration both of the interests of Turkey's security and of those of the execution of the League Covenant in so far as it concerns mutual assistance among the members of the League of Nations in the event of aggression.

The French press and a part of the English press admit this. It is sufficient to point out that one of the organs of the English Conservatives, THE MORNING POST, wrote on June 25: "It is easy to understand the desire of the U.S.S.R. to have the right to move its Black Sea naval forces. Our country is not interested in the objections to this demand." This position of the English conservative newspaper is based upon a realization of the fact that the U.S.S.R., in struggling for its interests, is struggling for the maintenance of universal peace. If this is realized by all factors, the policy of which will determine the outcome of the new attempt to settle the question of the Straits, an agreement will easily be reached, insuring the security of all non-Black Sea powers and meeting the interests of universal peace. The attainment of such a result will best correspond to Turkey's own interests which, in our opinion, are closely associated with the strengthening of universal peace.

ALS:bpg

Enclosure No. // to despatch
No. 1764 of AUG 3 1936
from the American Embassy,
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

SOURCE: LE JOURNAL DE MOSCOU,
JULY 7, 1936.

THE RESUMPTION OF THE WORK OF THE MONTREUX CONFERENCE.

The plenary sessions of the Montreux Conference are soon to be resumed. The question of the new regime of the Straits and their reinforcement enters into its final, conclusive phase. The decisions which are to be taken at the Montreux Conference must create new conditions in the region of the Black Sea, conditions which must, to an equal degree, take into account the interests of the security of the Turkish Republic which, justifiably, seeks to obtain the re-establishment of its complete sovereignty on its own territory--and of the interests of the security of the littoral powers of the Black Sea, for which the Straits are the single artery joining the Black Sea with the great maritime routes.

We are deeply convinced that between interests of Turkey and the interests of the littoral powers of the Black Sea there is no conflict inasmuch as the security of all these countries is concerned. That is why we continue to be of the opinion that the claims presented by the littoral powers of the Black Sea are perfectly compatible and do not in any way injure either the sovereignty of Turkey or its security. We continue to believe that it is perfectly possible and attainable to find for

these

these questions solutions entirely acceptable to the Turkish Republic as well as to the littoral powers of the Black Sea.

But, in order that such results may be obtained at Montreux, two conditions are necessary.

First of all, in order to solve the questions which are the order of the day at the conference, it is necessary to proceed solely from the point of view of the interests of general peace, taking into account only the specific interests of the Turkish Republic and the littoral powers of the Black Sea, and of no one else.

Secondly, it is necessary that all countries which have an immediate interest in the specified questions, should examine them in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and with a desire to solve in a friendly way all the questions which arise in daily practice in an atmosphere which has always characterized the relations of the Soviet Union and the Turkish Republic.

It may be stated, regretfully, that it is impossible at the present moment to state that these conditions exist at Montreux.

The draft of the new conference of the regime of the Straits proposed by the Turkish Government not only does not take into account the interests of the littoral powers of the Black Sea but actually goes contrary to these interests. And if anyone could have any doubts in this respect, these doubts should vanish after the debates which took place at Montreux during the first period of the conference. The Turkish draft has found full support

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on the part of Japan, whose interests in the Black Sea, after one studies the question in a more minute fashion, amount exactly to this: to limit the capacity of defense of the Soviet Union outside of the Black Sea. The Turkish draft has found no less support in Germany, for similar reasons.

This fact in itself sufficiently demonstrates that the claims presented by the Turkish Republic do not take into account the interests of the Soviet Union but, on the contrary, correspond to the interests of the powers named above whose feelings against the Soviet Union are known.

It is for this reason, despite the hostile declarations against the Soviet Union which the German press and the Japanese press contain, that the Soviet Union does not seek to obtain any privileges for itself. The Soviet claims, in so far as the freedom of movement for its war fleet is concerned, follow logically from the fact that the frontiers which may require defending by the naval force of the Soviet Union, are not only located on the Black Sea. Quite as much as on the Black Sea and quite as likely, the Soviet Union must take care of the defense of its frontiers on the Baltic Sea, on the Arctic Ocean and on the Pacific. No one can deny this fact.

And if one admits the principle that the Black Sea is not a closed sea and that the Straits are not closed to the passage of any war vessels whatever, it is on the other hand impossible to put on an equal footing the rights of the littoral powers of the Black Sea, who have a vital interest in the Straits, and the rights of non-littoral powers, for whom the passage of vessels through the Straits

in accordance with the Turkish draft, is confined to questions dictated by the requirements of international courtesy.

To place these rights on an equal footing is to prejudice the vital interests of the littoral powers of the Black Sea. It is impossible to place on the same level questions of international courtesy and the security of a country. And that is precisely what the Turkish draft does in proposing to limit the passage of war ships of the littoral powers of the Black Sea, as well as those of non-littoral powers, to a uniform tonnage of 15,000 tons.

This Turkish claim does not prove that the Turkish Republic desires to solve the problem of the Straits in a manner friendly towards the Soviet Union.

The Soviet-Turkish friendship is supported not only upon a strict observation, on both sides, of the treaties which bind Turkey and the Soviet Union, but in invariably taking into account the mutual interests of both parties; and this friendship has been until lately a solid basis upon which has been developed with success the common struggle of the two states for peace--in particular for the strengthening of peace in the region of the Black Sea. The friendly relations between the two countries have withstood the test of many years and have shown that they were extremely useful for the two countries and for the guarantee of peace in general. They have permitted the Turkish Republic, moreover, to strengthen and to fortify its role in international relations. It is characteristic that a witness having so little sympathy for our country as the

German Admiral Gadow, actually stated recently, in the DEUTSCHE ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, that it is strangely due to the support of the Soviet Government that it is possible, in a general way, to bring up the question of revising the standards established at Lausanne.

We mention this fact not in order to arouse or to increase the sentiments of gratitude of Turkey. Politics ignore sentiments. We consider, meanwhile, that the Soviet Union has the right to demand that Turkey take into account the interests of the security of the Soviet Union in the same degree in which the U.S.S.R. takes into account the security of Turkey.

This is an entirely legitimate claim and we are deeply convinced that it is not in the interest of Turkey to refuse us the guarantee of this right.

In the solution of the question of the Straits, it is necessary, moreover, to take another important factor into account. At the meeting of the League of Nations some days ago, Mr. Litvinov, again and with his usual force of conviction, dwelt on the question of the principle of the indivisibility of peace which is one of the essential points upon which, under present conditions, the struggle for peace is based. This principle inexorably involves the following thesis: It is impossible to guarantee peace in a given section of Europe if the conditions which guarantee security in that section weaken security and strengthen the danger of war in the other regions of the world. And that would be the result of the application of the principles upon which the Turkish draft is based.

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As recent events have shown, the interests of Turkey demand the immediate reinforcement of the conditions of security. And not only does the Soviet Union not question this in any way, but it entirely supports all the claims of the Turkish Republic looking to the strengthening of its security.

In this respect the Soviet Union is inspired by the direct interests of Turkey and the principle of the indivisibility of peace.

These are the principles which have likewise dictated the position of the Soviet delegation at the Montreux Conference. We do not doubt that the representatives of the Turkish Republic at this conference understand in a precice way this position of the Soviet Union and are assisting in solving the questions which are before the conference in a feeling corresponding to the interests of general peace as well as to the interests of the ultimate strengthening of Soviet-Turkish relations.

BPG:bpg

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FULL TRANSLATION

SOURCE: "PRAVDA," No. 186, Moscow,
July 8, 1936.
(Organ of the Central Committee
of the All-Union Communist
Party (of Bolsheviks)).

THE ENGLISH PROJECT OF THE CONVENTION CONCERNING THE STRAITS.

MONTREUX, July 7. (By the TASS Special Correspondent). A new project of the Convention concerning the Straits which has been prepared by the English delegation has been distributed among the participants in the Conference. The project contains essential differences from the Turkish project on a number of questions.

Of the greatest importance are the rules in the new project relative to warships. In peace time, warships and auxiliary vessels, excepting submarines, irrespective of whether they belong to the Black Sea of other Powers, should enjoy the right to unhindered passage through the Straits in daytime on condition:

1. Of preliminary 15 days' notice (the Turkish project proposes one month's notice);

2. That the commanding officer, on approaching the Dardanelles or the Bosphorus, signal to the coast station full information as to his forces; and

3. That the total tonnage of the naval forces passing through the Straits shall at no time exceed half of the Turkish tonnage in line at the moment, or 15,000 tons if

half

half of the tonnage of the Turkish fleet is less than this figure. (The Turkish project proposes a fixed maximum of 14,000 tons, while the Lausanne Convention which is in effect does not establish any limitation in general, providing for full freedom of passage through the Straits).

The warships of any foreign state arriving by permission of Turkey for a visit in a Turkish port in the Straits will not be included in these figures.

In no case must any ships passing through the Straits use aircraft on board, and no ship shall linger in the Straits, unless it has sufferred damage or been detained by a storm. Not a single one of these rules shall be made use of for hindering a visit by foreign naval forces of any tonnage to a Turkish port if they are invited by the Turkish government, providing they depart quickly from Turkish waters by the same route when the visit is over. (This is a new British article).

In time of peace, the total tonnage of foreign warships which may at one time be in the Black Sea is 30,000 tons (the Turkish project proposes 28,000 tons). However, if the tonnage of the strongest Black Sea fleet ever exceeds the present tonnage of the Soviet fleet by more than 10 percent, this figure of 30,000 tons must be increased by a corresponding figure and within a maximum of 45,000 tons.

No state shall keep in the Black Sea over three-fourths of the total figure of 30,000 tons and up to 45,000 tons. Thus, even in case the maximum tonnage is

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in the Black Sea, a state desirous of sending naval forces to the Black Sea for "humanitarian reason" (manifestly a somewhat cloudy expression referring to earthquakes and other elemental calamities) may by permission of Turkey send ships with a total tonnage of 10,000 tons.

In time of war, if Turkey remains neutral, warships are to enjoy the right to free transit and navigation on the same conditions as stated above. However, these conditions will not apply to a belligerent country to the prejudice of its rights as a belligerent country. (This is a very important amendment calculated to insure the rights of belligerent countries to pursue the enemy and to afford them an opportunity of not being detained at the entrance to the Straits on the ground that warships must pass only one at a time; if this is introduced into the final text of the Convention, England, for instance, will have the right in time of war in which it participates, while Turkey maintains neutrality, to send to the Black Sea via the Straits as many warships as it may deem necessary).

In time of a war in which Turkey participates, the conditions of transit and navigation for warships will be established "wholly at the discretion of the Turkish government" (an insignificant amendment amounting to a polite recognition of an unquestionable fact); and this right to establish the conditions at its discretion will be vested in Turkey also in case it thinks that war threatens it. However, in the latter case it must notify the participants in the Convention and the Council of the

League of Nations, and should the Council of the League of Nations decide by a majority of two-thirds of the votes that the measures taken by Turkey were unwarranted, it must repeal these conditions. (This is another British amendment. In the Turkish project it is proposed that Turkey should only inform the League of Nations and the participants in the Convention concerning any measures taken by it.)

The right of Turkey to regulate the flight over its territory and territorial waters of foreign aircraft, military and civilian, is recognized. The British project, however, adds that Turkey itself must create the necessary conditions for the safe flying of civilian aircraft without regard to their origin and nationality, between Europe and Asia or between the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea. The International Commission on Straits at Stambul is to continue to carry out its functions, and in particular to collect satistical data and information concerning the strength of the Soviet and Turkish fleets which are necessary in connection with the limitations of the tonnage of warships: 1) passing through the straits, 2) assembling in the Black Sea. (The Turkish project proposed to abolish the Commission.)

The sovereignty of Turkey over its territory and territorial waters is specifically recognized.

Lastly, the British project proposes that the new Convention remain in force for fifty years from the date of exchange of letters of ratification.

Thus, the British project has departed from the fundamental principle of the Lausanne Convention which

limited

limited the right of taking the fleets of non-Black Sea Powers into the Black Sea.

At the closed plenary session of July 6 the conference resolved to discuss the English project jointly with the Turkish project. After a reading of clause after clause, the conference adopted, with a number of reservations and amendments the first six clauses of the English project, which refer to the question of the passage of merchantmen through the Straits.

ALS:bpg

Moscow Daily News
July 9, 1936.

Enclosure No. 13, to despatch
No. 1764, of AUG 3 1936, 193 .
From the American Embassy,
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

British Seek More Liberties In the Straits

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MONTREUX, July 7.

THE BRITISH delegation to the conference on the Straits has submitted a draft convention which differs vitally from the Turkish draft on a number of points.

Most outstanding in the British draft are the rules relating to warships. In peace time, warships and auxiliary ships, with the exception of submarines, irrespective of whether they belong to Black Sea or other powers, should have the right of unhampered passage through the Straits during the day under the following conditions: 1. 15 days' notice (the Turkish draft proposes a month's notice); 2. on approaching the Dardanelles or the Bosphorus the command signal full information of its forces to the coastguard station; 3. the total tonnage of naval forces passing through the Straits at one time not exceed half of the Turkish tonnage in service at that moment. or 15,000 tons should half the tonnage of the Turkish fleet be less. (The Turkish draft proposes a maximum of 14,000 tons, while the Lausanne convention established no limitation, allowing full freedom of passage through the Straits.)

Warships of any foreign nation arriving on a visit to a Turkish port in the Straits with the permission of Turkey would not be included in these figures.

All ships passing through the Straits should in no circumstances use any flying equipment on board, and no warship should remain in the Straits if it has not been damaged or is detained by storm. None of these rules should be applied to prevent the visit of foreign naval forces of any tonnage to a Turkish port, if invited by the Turkish government, on condition that they quickly leave Turkish waters by the same route when the visit is at an end. (This is a new point.)

Tonnage in Black Sea

In peace time the total tonnage of foreign warships allowed in the Black Sea at one time should be 30,000 tons (the Turkish draft proposes 28,000 tons). However, should the tonnage of the strongest Black Sea fleet exceed at any time the present tonnage of the Soviet fleet by more than 10 per cent, this figure of 30,000 tons is to be increased to a corresponding figure, the maximum being 45,000 tons.

Not a single nation should retain in the Black Sea more than three-fourths of the total figure of 30,000 tons or up to 45,000 tons. In the event of the maximum tonnage being already in the Black Sea, a nation desiring to send naval forces to the Black Sea for "humanitarian purposes" (evidently, a somewhat vague expression which should relate to earthquakes or to other natural calamities) may, with the permission of Turkey, send ships of a total tonnage up to 10,000 tons.

In war time, should Turkey remain neutral, warships should have the right of free transit and sailing under the conditions shown above. These conditions, however, will not be extended to a belligerent country at the expense of its rights as a belligerent country. (This is an important amendment, aiming at guaranteeing the right of belligerent states to pursue the enemy and giving them the possibility of not being detained at the entrance to the Straits on the ground that warships should enter only singly; if this is introduced in the final text of the convention, then Britain, for example, will posses the right in a war in which she is taking part and in which Turkey is neutral, to send as many ships through the Straits into the Black Sea as she deems necessary.)

When Turkey Is at War

During a war in which Turkey takes part, the conditions of transit and sailing for warships will be established entirely at the judgment of the Turkish government (a slight amendment tantamount to a polite recognition of an indisputable fact) and this right of Turkey to establish conditions at her judgment will be granted also in the event of her considering that she is menaced by war. However, in the latter case, she should inform the participants of the convention and the League of Nations Council, and if the League Council decides by a two-thirds' majority that the measures taken by Turkey were not justified, she would have to cancel these conditions. (Another British amendment—the Turkish draft proposes that Turkey should only inform the League of Nations and the participants of the convention of any steps taken by her.)

The right of Turkey to regulate the flight over her territory and territorial waters of foreign flying machines, military and civil, is recognized. The British draft adds, however, that Turkey should herself create the necessary conditions for safeguarding the flight of civil flying machines, irrespective of origin and nationality, between Europe and Asia or between the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea. The Straits International Committee in Istanbul should continue to carry out its functions and, in particular, gather statistics and information on the strength of the Soviet and Turkish fleets, essential in connection with the limitation of tonnage for warships: 1. passing through the Straits; 2. accumulating in the Black Sea (the Turkish draft proposes the dissolution of the committee).

The sovereignty of Turkey over her territory and territorial waters is recognized separately.

Finally, the British draft proposes that the new convention should remain in force for a period of 50 years from the moment of its ratification.

Thus, the British draft departs from the main principle of the Lausanne convention, which limited the right of the fleets of non-Black Sea powers to enter the Black Sea.

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FULL TRANSLATION

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(Organ of the U.S.S.R. Central Executive Committee).

DISCUSSION OF ENGLISH PROPOSALS AT MONTREUX.

MONTREUX, July 8. (By the Special TASS Correspondent). Further discussion of the Turkish amendment to Article 11 of the English project of the Convention for the regime of the Straits took place at last evening's session of the conference concerning the Straits. This amendment relates to the permission granted to the Black Sea powers to take their vessels out of the Black Sea and to return them without limitation of the tonnage which is in the Straits. The English delegation was ready to consent to the amendment, provided the latter affected the existing fleets (among which only one ship exceeds the general norm of 15,000 tons). However, in the absence of instructions relative to the application of this principle to new vessels, the English delegation made a reservation to the effect that it retained the right to determine its attitude toward this question. The Editing Committee still has to clarify a number of points of this article of the English project.

Articles 12, and 13 of the English project have in the main been adopted. (Article 12 prohibits vessels passing through the Straits to use airplanes, and Article

13 forbids

13 forbids warships to linger in the Straits).

Article 14, which relates to the right of Turkey to invite for a visit to its ports, a fleet of another power of any composition and any tonnage regardless of the general norm, has been made precise: this should refer to visits of courtesy for a brief period, and the Turkish port to which the visit is paid must be located in the Straits.

The speech of the head of the Soviet delegation, Comrade Litvinov, on the substance of Article 14 of the English project, produced a strong impression upon the conference. Comrade Litvinov stated that the Soviet delegation made a reservation to this Article. At the same time, Comrade Litvinov pointed out that in practice this Article was already a digression from the principle of "reciprocity and equality" put forward by the English, in so far as on this ground Turkey might invite a foreign fleet at its choice, and this fleet might thereby receive the right of entrance into the Straits, which was not granted to another fleet.

The special status of Turkey and the Black Sea powers is recognized thereby, Comrade Litvinov pointed out.

According to Article 15 of the English project (this Article defines the maximum tonnage of the non-Black Sea powers admitted into the Black Sea), it was decided to reduce the ratio of the general amount of the tonnage of the non-Black Sea powers in the Black Sea to the share of one power, from three-fourths to two-

thirds

thirds and to shorten the term of sojourn of the vessels of a non-Black Sea power in the Black Sea to three weeks.

Regarding the increase in the maximum tonnage of the warships of the non-Black Sea powers admitted into the Black Sea, in case of an increase in size of the fleets of the Black Sea powers, the Soviet delegation proposed to begin with the time of an increase in the latter by 30 percent instead of 10 percent as proposed by the English project, and to increase the maximum for the non-Black Sea powers by the same percentage as that which the fleets of the Black Sea powers have increased, but not by the same amount of tonnage. Both these proposals will be discussed at another session.

Yesterday there was also an exchange of opinion relative to the so-called "humanitarian purposes" for which the English project is desirous of securing an opportunity for sending to the Black Sea an additional 15,000 tons of the non-Black Sea tonnage. It appeared that in the English circles a possibility was assumed of an earthquake on the coasts of the Black Sea and of a necessity for rendering assistance to English subjects exactly when all 30,000 tons were "taken up" by other powers, and the English fleet, therefore, would have been unable to come to the aid of these English subjects. Notwithstanding this example, however, nobody could understand clearly why in fact this reason would make it necessary to increase the non-Black Sea tonnage in the Black Sea.

Finally,

Finally, it was decided to entrust the Committee on Technicalities with the working up of the proposal of the Chairman of the Conference to the effect that in such an extraordinary case a replacement of a part of the tonnage in the Black Sea by vessels of the State concerned would be arranged.

The French proposal to make precise, in the light of these limitations, the status of the stationary monitors of the International Commission on Navigation in the Danube was postponed.

A private conference between the Soviet and English delegations, with a view possibly to coming to an agreement on the most important reserved provisions, will be held in the near future.

MONTREUX, July 8. (By the Special TASS Correspondent). At this morning's session of the conference the English delegation introduced a new text of the draft of Article 16, which contains the rules of passage through the Straits in time of war.

In the first clause the project repeats the principles of the old project concerning the right of warships to pass through the Straits in time of war also under the conditions provided for in the preceding articles.

The second clause, provides, as did the old project, that these conditions be inapplicable to a belligerent country "to the prejudice of its rights as a warring party."

According to the third clause, Turkey, in case it considers that its security is jeopardized, has the

right

right to forbid passage of vessels of a belligerent country, but on condition that passage is similarly denied to any other belligerent country.

The fourth clause provides that if none of the Black Sea States is a belligerent party passage is closed for the vessels of belligerents.

The fifth clause provides that, in case of application of the preceding two clauses, any vessel of a belligerent power which may be in the Black Sea will be allowed to go out to the Mediterranean.

The sixth clause provides for a similar right of the vessels of the Black Sea powers.

The seventh, eighth, and ninth clauses reproduce the provisions of the original English project relative to forbidding warships to begin hostilities in the Straits, to the rules of supplying warships, and to prohibiting Turkey in case of its neutrality from taking any measures which may hinder passage and navigation in the Straits.

To this project the Soviet delegation introduced an amendment proposing to replace clauses 2,3, and 4 by the following text:

"War and auxilliary vessels of any belligerent power will be forbidden to pass through the Straits in any case excepting in cases provided for in Article 23." (This Article refers to the obligations emerging for Turkey from the League of Nations Covenant.)

As is reported, the head of the Soviet delegation, Comrade Litvinov, pointed out in his speech that the English project could have been composed 30-40 years ago,

when

when there was neither the Briand-Kellogg Pact forbidding war nor the League of Nations Covenant providing for assistance to the victim of aggression. It is now impossible to proceed from the old formula concerning the rights of belligerents which does not take into account the interests of peace and collective security. Besides, it is hardly expedient to empower one State alone to decide the vital question of the closing of the Straits. Regardless of its friendship with Turkey, the U.S.S.R. could not consent to such a proposal. The Soviet delegation therefore proposes an amendment which insures the security of Turkey as well as peace in the Black Sea and admits of a deviation from the rules for the closing of the Black Sea only in case it is permitted by the League of Nations.

On the part of the English delegation an indication followed that if the question is put in that way, it might create serious complications between Turkey and those States which do not enter the League of Nations or which have not signed the Convention of the Straits. To this an answer was given to the effect that the obligations ensuing from the League of Nations Covenant might, of course, entail a certain risk, but that the League of Nations exists just for the reason of insuring collective support to Turkey in cases of this sort. It was pointed out to the English that undoubtedly, after the sad experience of the Italo-Abyssinian conflict, the recognition of the rights of the belligerents and the legalization of war, contrary to the Briand-Kellogg

Pact

Pact and instead of observing the League Covenant, might only strike a new blow at the League of Nations.

The representative of Turkey, Tevfik Rustu Aras, declared that Turkey was ready to assume the necessary responsibility in case the conference resolved to adopt the English project. However, he was more inclined to support the proposal of the Soviet delegation.

Sato, the delegate from Japan, preferring in general the proposal of the Soviet delegation, declared the readiness of the country represented by him to adopt also the converse proposal which provided for free passage for all belligerent powers, on condition, however, that passage is forbidden to submarines which Japan regards as a particularly dangerous and harmful weapon admitting of many abuses.

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As a result of the exchange of opinion a number of the delegates declared that it would be necessary for them to acquaint their governments with both proposals and also with the course of the debates. It was resolved at the conference to resume this question after the delegates had received the proper instructions.

Then an adjournment until the following day was announced.

FEELING IN TURKEY.

ANKARA, July 8. (TASS). The Anatolian Telegraph Agency reports that:

"The

"The new English draft Convention for the Straits has not produced a good impression in Ankara. Anxiety is expressed here on account of the outcome of the conference at Montreux."

ALS:bpg

Moscow Daily News
July 9, 1936.

15

Enclosure No. 15, to despatch No. 1764, of AUG 3 1936, 193 .
From the American Embassy,
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

9.7

Montreux Conference Still Debating Terms of Straits Convention

MONTREUX, July 8.

At yesterday's evening session of the conference at Montreux, Turkey's amendment to article 11 of the British draft convention that ships of the Black-Sea powers should have the right to pass through the Straits without limitation of tonnage was agreed to by the British delegation if it related to existing fleets. But since the British delegation had no instructions with regard to application of the amendment to new ships, it reserved the right to define its attitude on this point later.

The articles in the British draft forbidding ships passing through the Straits from using airplanes, and prohibiting warships from remaining in the Straits were adopted in principle.

A strong impression was made on the conference by Litvinov's speech concerning article 14 of the British draft, which relates to Turkey's right to invite the fleets of other powers, without any limitations, to visit her ports. Declaring that the Soviet delegation makes a reservation to this article, Litvinov showed that in practice the article is a retreat from the principle advanced by Britain of reciprocity and equality, since Turkey may invite a foreign fleet of its choice, this fleet having the right of entrance to the Straits not granted to others.

On the question of increasing the maximum tonnage of warships of non-Black Sea powers allowed in the Black Sea in the event of the size of Black Sea fleets being increased, the Soviet delegation proposed to begin when the latter increase by 30 per cent, and not by 10 per cent, as in the British draft, and to increase the maximum for non-Black Sea powers by the same per cent as the increase of the Black Sea fleets, and not by the same amount of tonnage. Both these questions will be discussed at a further meeting.

At this morning's session the British delegation submitted a new text of article 16 of its draft relating to the rights of warships passing through the Straits in time of war.

The new point 3 of the article gives Turkey the right, if she considers that her security is in danger, to prohibit the passage of ships of a belligerent country, if the same ban is extended to every other belligerent country. The new point 4 proposes that if no Black Sea power is a belligerent, then passage through the Straits is closed to the ships of belligerent powers. Point 5 declares that in the event of the two former points being applied, every ship of a belligerent power already in the Black Sea will be allowed to pass to the Mediterranean Sea. Point 6 gives analogous rights to the ships of the Black Sea powers.

The Soviet delegation moved an amendment to replace points 2, 3 and 4 (point 2 is the same as in the old text, that conditions concerning the right of free transit and sailing of warships during the time of war should not be extended to a belligerent country at the expense of its rights as a belligerent country). The Soviet amendment reads: "In any event, military and auxiliary ships of any belligerent power will be prohibited passage through the Straits except in cases provided for by article 23." (This article relates to obligations which the League of Nations Covenant imposes on Turkey.)

Litvinov pointed out here that the British draft might have been drawn up 30 or 40 years ago when there was no Briand-Kellogg Pact prohibiting war, or the League of Nations Covenant providing aid to the victim of aggression. At the present time it is not possible to proceed from the old formula of the rights of belligerent nations, not taking into account the interests of peace and of collective security.

Furthermore, it is hardly expedient to that fulfilling obligations under the League Covenant may, of course, involve a certain risk, but that the League Covenant guarantees Turkey collective support in such cases. After the sad experience of the Italo-Abyssinian conflict, it was further pointed out to the British, to recognize the rights of belligerent states and to legalize war in spite of the Briand-Kellogg Pact, instead of observing the League Covenant, might only inflict a further blow on the League.

Tewfik Rushti Aras, the Turkish foreign minister, declared that Turkey is ready to assume the necessary responsibility should the conference adopt the British draft. He was, however, more inclined to support the proposal of the Soviet delegation.

The Japanese delegate Sato, showing a general preference for the Soviet proposal, declared that his country is ready to accept also the opposite, providing full freedom of passage for all belligerent powers on condition that submarines are banned.

The meeting was adjourned till the following morning.

A private meeting between the Soviet and British delegations will take place shortly to find means of reaching agreement on important points in dispute.

Rome Will Continue Its Boycott of Montreux

ROME, July 8.

The Italian government will not take part in the Montreux conference on the Straits, according to a statement made by the press ministry to foreign correspondents. In general, "so long as there exists a Mediterranean agreement concluded by Britain and directed, if only theoretically, against us, we have no intention of cooperating in settling Mediterranean problems," it was said.

The Italian government, evidently, regards the forthcoming conference of Locarno powers in another light, since with regard to Italy's participation in this meeting, these same official circles confined themselves to the remark "so far nothing has yet been decided."

Discussing the prospects of this latter conference, "Stampa" declares that the French government would probably not object to Germany taking part in this conference, which would give it the possibility of direct contact with representatives of the German government. In such circumstances, says the newspaper, "the moment would be psychologically favorable for a return to the ideas which gave rise in its time to the draft four-power pact."

Will Stay Away From Locarno Too, Is London Report

LONDON, July 8.

Italy will not take part either in the Montreux conference or in the conference of the Locarno powers, claims the diplomatic correspondent of the "Daily Telegraph" citing reliable sources.

Even if there is a possibility of achieving real cooperation with Germany, it becomes more and more unlikely that it will be possible to achieve slight but real progress in settling the problems of central Europe without the full cooperation of Italy, he adds.

must impose on Turkey.

Litvinov pointed out that the British draft might have been drawn up 30 or 40 years ago when there was no Briand-Kellogg Pact prohibiting war, or the League of Nations Covenant providing aid to the victim of aggression. At the present time it is not possible to proceed from the old formula of the rights of belligerent nations, not taking into account the interests of peace and of collective security.

Furthermore, it is hardly expedient to empower one state alone to decide the responsible question of closing the Straits; the USSR with all its friendship with Turkey could not agree to such a proposal. The Soviet delegation, therefore, proposes its amendment which guarantees both the security of Turkey and tranquility on the Black Sea, and agrees to an exception to the rules of closing the Black Sea only when it is agreed to by the League of Nations.

The British delegation pointed out that this may create serious complications between Turkey and states outside the League of Nations, or who do not sign the Straits convention. It was pointed out in reply

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LITVINOV HAS LONG TALK WITH LORD STANLEY

MONTREUX, July 8.

M. M. Litvinov, Peoples Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, had a long conversation this evening with Lord Stanley, head of the British delegation to the Straits conference. Litvinov later conversed with Titulescu, Rumanian foreign minister, and Paul-Boncour of the French delegation, and then visited Tewfik Rushji Aras, Turkish foreign minister.

Moscow Daily News
July 10, 1936.

Enclosure No. 16, to despatch
No. 1764 of July 3 1936, 193 .
From the American Embassy,
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

British Draft of Convention On Straits Discussed in Detail at Montreux

10.7

MONTREUX, July 9.

The conference on the Straits continued to discuss the British draft convention point by point at its session today.

Article 17 of the draft reserving to Turkey the right to decide on the passage of ships through the Straits in the event of Turkey herself taking part in a war was accepted as a basis.

The USSR and Rumania both moved amendments to article 18 concerning Turkey's right to close the Straits in the event of a danger of war. The Soviet amendment proposes that warships should have the right to pass through the Straits even after they have been closed if they have to return to their own bases. The Rumanian amendment proposes that the warships of those countries not menacing peace should in general be allowed to pass through the Straits. The technical committee was instructed to draw up a formula taking into consideration both amendments.

On the question of guaranteeing freedom of flight for civil airplanes along and across the zone of the Straits, the Turkish delegation stated that it intends to submit a new version, by which such flights will be confined to certain routes keeping outside closed zones. Further discussion of this article was postponed.

A wide divergence of opinion was revealed in the discussion of article 21 on the further existence of the international Straits committee, set up under the Lausanne convention. The Turkish delegation, supported by the Rumanian, demanded the liquidation of this committee, on the ground that the Turkish government is in a position to do everything done by this committee.

The British delegation, with the support of the French, upheld the maintenance of the committee, declaring that without interfering in the process of applying the convention, the committee may help the Turkish government to collect the necessary data. The Yugoslavian delegation proposed a compromise providing for permanent consultation between the Turkish government and the ambassadors or consuls of nations signing the convention. The question was postponed for further consideration.

Soviet Thesis Based on Respect for League, Says Paper

MONTREUX, July 9.

"Two opposing theses, two conceptions of international right" emerged at the Straits conference, declares the "Journal des Nations," commenting on yesterday's discussion on the passage of warships through the Straits in time of war. "The British thesis is based on the right of the pre-war period—the right of belligerent sides, war requirements, neutrality. The Soviet thesis is based on a new right—respect for the League of Nations Covenant."

Moscow Daily News
July II, 1936.

Enclosure No. 17, to despatch
No. 1764, of AUG 3 1936, 193 .
From the American Embassy,
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

Litvinov Explains the Soviet Position On Straits at Montreux, Emphasizing USSR Stands Squarely With League

MONTREUX, July 10.

A Soviet amendment to article 23 of the British draft convention on the Straits was the subject of a protracted discussion at yesterday's session of the conference.

Article 23 of the British draft establishes that no provision of the convention infringes the rights or obligations provided by the League of Nations Covenant for Turkey or any other signatory of the convention. The Soviet delegation proposed the following new version of this article:

"Inasmuch as the commitments of the present convention cannot diminish the rights and obligations applying, under the League of Nations Pact (Covenant), to the contracting sides—members of the League—or in any way limit the right of the latter really to insure the security of nations, it is self-evident that the result of the aforesaid commitments, and, in particular, of those contained in articles 5, 9, and 16, can in no way limit the possible adoption of measures provided by the Pact against an aggressor, or prevent the passage through the Straits of war vessels fulfilling commitments of mutual assistance, assumed or capable of being assumed in the future by states signing the present convention in virtue of agreements supplementing the League of Nations Pact, or the passage of the vessels of the state, to which this assistance is rendered."

Litvinov Answers Questions

Litvinov was asked a number of questions on the proposed version of article 23, to which he replied at length. After a brief exchange of opinions, several delegations stated that they would need to make a thorough study of the Soviet proposal and receive appropriate instructions from their governments.

The Japanese delegate asked the Soviet delegation what is implied by obligations of League members, what is the significance of pacts of mutual assistance, and what is the attitude of League members to these pacts.

The Turkish delegate and several other delegates asked what the Soviet delegation considered Turkish obligations to be, and how Turkey should act in the absence of a decision of the League of Nations, or when differences exist in the League; further, what will be Turkey's position if she is endangered as a result of the application of the convention. The British delegation expressed concern as to Turkey's position if, in fulfilling obligations arising out of article 23, she comes up against the aggressor.

Obligations of League Members

Litvinov explained in his reply that, without going into detail on the importance of the League Covenant, its defects and unclarities, the questions of the Japanese delegate can be answered briefly by showing that in the widest sense of the word, the obligations of League members can be summed up as not encouraging the aggressor, preventing the preparation of aggression, and if aggression nevertheless begins, to go then to the aid of the victim of aggression. In a more narrow sense, the obligations of League members demand the carrying out of decisions of the League and its organs.

In reply to the question of the Turkish and certain other delegates, Litvinov pointed out that in the event of the League of Nations taking decisions in connection with the said convention, the obligations of Turkey are comparatively simple—to respect and carry out the decisions of the League. As in all cases when the League decides to take action against the aggressor, this entails a certain risk, whether it is a question only of economic sanctions or the more so of military. But, if a member of the League of Nations is subject to danger because it is carrying out the decisions of the League, then the question arises of other members of the League rendering it aid. Not long ago, recalled Litvinov, during the Italo-Abyssinian conflict, certain nations appealed to other members of the League of Nations for assistance should they be subjected to attack by Italy, and this assistance was promised them. Turkey can also quite legitimately raise this question.

Turkey to Be Guided by Convention

Litvinov pointed out further that cases may arise when there will not be a decision of the League of Nations, or when these decisions will not be taken in time, or when differences exist inside the League. In such cases, Litvinov said, Turkey, who is only an executor, will act in accordance with a wider and less formal understanding of the spirit of the League of Nations Covenant. Turkey's task is made easier by the fact that she is a signatory of the convention on the determination of the aggressor, and will be able to be guided by this convention.

If it is asked, continued Litvinov, what is the relation of pacts of mutual assistance to the League of Nations Covenant, and what is the difference between pacts concluded within the framework of the League of Nations, and outside of this framework, then the answer is clear: Every pact of non-aggression and aid to the victims of aggression, in accordance with the League of Nations Covenant and in the spirit of the Covenant, comes within the framework of this Covenant. On the contrary, every agreement on an alliance between two or several nations on assistance in war irrespective of the fact whether it is a question of attack or defense, conflicts with the spirit of the League Covenant.

Members of the League, said Litvinov, should in particular respect pacts where it is specially mentioned that they are concluded on the basis of the League Covenant, or which require a decision of the League in carrying out the provisions of these pacts.

Purpose of Soviet Draft

By its draft of article 23, declared Litvinov, the Soviet delegation establishes certain ideas and rights by which Turkey should be guided in carrying out the convention on the regime of the Straits. The Soviet delegation assumes, said Litvinov, that, as members of the League of Nations, the powers cannot act otherwise.

Paul-Boncour, the French delegate, supporting the Soviet draft of article 23, declared that France cannot consent to agreements on mutual assistance, concluded by her within the framework of the League of Nations Covenant, being reduced to nought.

The British delegate advanced the argument that Turkey may be a member of the League of Nations Council which will have to consider a complaint of aggression by a nation which had signed a pact of mutual assistance. Turkey may not agree with this complaint, and differences may arise in the Council, after which, in accordance with Article 15 of the League Covenant, League members may receive freedom of action. Then, said the British delegate, the pact of mutual assistance comes into effect, and Turkey, being against its application, will in such an event, be in a very difficult situation.

British Supposition Refuted

Politis (Greece) immediately destroyed this skillful supposition by pointing out that Turkey, as a member of the Balkan Entente, and in view of her participation in the convention on the determination of the aggressor, will decide this question neither independently nor without taking into account the circumstances of the conflict.

Titulescu, Rumanian delegate, strongly supported the proposal of the Soviet delegation. He saw in the questions of the British delegation, opposition to regional pacts in general. Rumania, said Titulescu, will never give up the assistance to which she has the right, and which she hopes to receive from France.

The British delegate remarked here that, for considerations of courtesy, the statement of Titulescu will be taken into account. Titulescu retorted sharply that it is not a question of courtesy, but of the real vital interests of the Rumanian people, and that the British in Geneva agree with regional pacts, while here they come out against them and try to sabotage their operation.

In view of the declaration of a number of delegations on the need to consult their governments, further discussion of article 23 was postponed.

British Stand on Regional Pacts

British circles yesterday evening expressed dissatisfaction with the statement of Titulescu, declaring that the British delegation did not come out against regional pacts, but simply asked questions in order to ascertain the significance of these pacts. British circles consider, however, that regional pacts should not be mentioned in the convention on the regime of the Straits since the latter, in their opinion, ought to be a document which should lead to no trouble. The League Covenant, it is said in these circles, is "an old document," and it can, therefore, be mentioned without danger, but "new documents," such as regional pacts, should not be mentioned.

As on July 8, when the Soviet draft of article 16 on banning the warships of belligerent nations from passing through the Straits was discussed, British circles show great concern about the position of states who are not members of the League of Nations, and about possible complications by the latter should the League of Nations, or regional pacts within the framework of its Covenant be too closely bound up with the solution of questions arising from the Straits convention.

The next meeting of the conference will be held only on July 13 or 14, by which time it is hoped, a number of delegations, including the British, will have received instructions from their governments on outstanding questions.

Enclosure No. 18, to despatch
No. 1764 of AUG 3 1936, 193 .
From the American Embassy,
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

Moscow Daily News
July 12, 1936.

British and Soviet Viewpoints On Straits Convention—British 12.7 Gov't Defeat in By-Election

Maneuvers Aimed at Breaking the People's Front in France—15 Years of MPR

THE CONFERENCE in Montreux has finished the first reading of the British draft of the Straits convention. Although the viewpoints of Britain and the USSR have drawn closer as a result of the meetings between the chief delegates of the two countries, there remain a number of vital differences, partly on questions of principle.

On the one hand, Britain is doing everything to make it possible to facilitate the entrance to the Black Sea of vessels belonging to non-Black Sea powers, especially her own vessels. With this object in view, she proposes that each of these powers have the right of sending to the Black Sea warships with a displacement of up to 10,000 tons, over and above the established maximum tonnage, for some kind of "humanitarian" purposes; it is absolutely unclear what purposes these can be, in spite of what the British delegates said about assisting victims of earthquakes.

On the other hand, Britain, who herself enjoys complete freedom to transfer her vessels from one port to another, has attempted to limit the rights of the USSR in this respect. The British draft provides that Soviet ships could leave the Black Sea only by giving 15 days warning to Turkey, and places obstacles to the egress of vessels of large tonnage.

Clash of Conceptions

But of greater importance is the fact that in Montreux there is in effect a clash between two different conceptions, between the old and the new conceptions of international law. The British draft makes formal reference to the League of Nations, but, as Pertinax said in "Echo de Paris," it discloses a tendency to regard the League of Nations as something of secondary importance and disregards completely regional pacts of mutual assistance.

According to this draft, a situation would be created in which mutual assistance pacts could be rendered null owing to the closing of the Straits to warships dispatched to fulfill commitments under such pacts. The Soviet Union has proposed an amendment that would link up the Straits convention with the system of collective security, of which a most important instrument is the system of regional pacts concluded within the framework of the League Covenant. The Soviet amendment was supported by France and the states in the Balkan entente.

The position adopted by the Soviet Union at Montreux is that of a loyal participant in the collective system. In Montreux, as in Geneva, the USSR is at the head of an active struggle for peace and collective security. The position of the British government, on the contrary, is more than equivocal. Her reference to dangers threatening Turkey of a possible clash with an aggressor are altogether unconvincing, as the collective system implies of necessity a certain risk, against which a country is insured by a collective guarantee of security. Equally unconvincing is Britain's point about Turkey's difficulties in the event of differences of opinion within the League of Nations Council.

Britain Has Germany in Mind

Though the British delegation has much

and then retreated, that nobody knew where the country stood today. If they returned Noel Baker, it would not merely be a victory for peace in Derby, but his return itself would give new heart to the people struggling for peace.

Noel Baker's victory is certainly indicative of the changing mood of the British people and their dissatisfaction with the government's foreign policy.

* * *

IT IS clear from the tactics of the French reactionaries that they are attempting to disrupt the People's Front from within. During the recent big weaver's strikes, the fascists dispatched provacateurs, who attempted, but quite in vain, to induce the workers to take unorganized action.

At the same time in parliament and at meetings the reactionaries tried to present the people's front government as a dictatorship of the Communist Party. It called upon the Radicals to return to sanity and save the situation before it is too late. Although these crude tactics have met with no success, the reactionaries continue to pursue this line. In the Senate, the Right group, which has a majority, demanded an assurance from the government that it would not permit in the future workers on strike to occupy the premises of factories and institutions. Salengro, the minister of the interior, gave this assurance in a form which could be interpreted as directed against the working class. The Right camp rejoiced. After conferring with Leon Blum, the French premier, however, Salengro explained that he had in mind influencing strikers through the trade unions and acting jointly with the latter, and that in any case the police will not be allowed to use arms.

Salengro's explanation was unanimously approved at a delegate meeting of parties comprising the people's front. At this meeting the question was also raised of the anti-Communist campaign of certain Radical newspapers, which, it is known, are being financed by the enemies of the people's front. The Communist Party on this occasion again confirmed its loyalty towards the people's front. The question of strikes and of strikers occupying factory premises is still to be discussed. There can be no doubt that the reactionaries will again try to take advantage of the internal contradictions of the people's front but there is every reason to believe that this attempt will be no more successful than earlier ones.

* * *

YESTERDAY marked 15 years of the existence of the Mongolian People's Republic as an independent state—15 years since the day when the capital of Mongolia, now known as Ulan-Bator was freed from the whiteguard bands of Baron Ungern, the tool of the Japanese interventionists.

During these 15 years a successful struggle has been waged against the domination of feudalism, resulting in tremendous economic and cultural victories.

The previous lands of the corrupt feudal princes, of the Chinese usurers and imperialists have become a rapidly developing, free, independent state.

The Mongolian People's Republic, of course, has not yet started out on the road of developing socialism. It is only uprooting feudalism and preparing the ground to avert the advent of capitalist exploitation. The

threatening Turkey of a possible clash with an aggressor are altogether unconvincing, as the collective system implies of necessity a certain risk, against which a country is insured by a collective guarantee of security. Equally unconvincing is Britain's point about Turkey's difficulties in the event of differences of opinion within the League of Nations Council.

Britain Has Germany in Mind

Though the British delegation has much to say about Turkey, it is Germany that she has in mind. The position taken by Britain at Montreux reflects the persistent attempts of the British cabinet to come to an agreement with Germany, for there are some among the British ruling circles who would be ready to sacrifice even collective security itself for such an agreement. Extremely significant is the "Times" editorial for July 6, which, on the one hand attacks the Franco-Soviet Pact ("which is not regarded here as a helpful diplomatic achievement") and, on the other, points out that "the plain truth about the reform of the League is that proposals to perfect the application of the principles of the Covenant are almost meaningless so long as a number of the strongest powers of the world are outside it, or have deliberately flouted it, and there is no stable nucleus here from which to extend a system of peace."

Britain's position at Montreux evoked a sharp attack from the Rumanian delegation, which accused Britain of renouncing the very principle of regional pacts. Britain's stand has undoubtedly isolated her at the conference. It may be for this very reason that the British government hastens to draw Italy into the work of the conference, preparing the way for this by withdrawing part of her fleet from the Mediterranean. Cooperation with Italy interests Britain also in connection with the forthcoming conference of the Locarno powers.

According to the latest reports, the British delegation has informed the French that it is ready to regard the Soviet amendment for linking up the Straits convention with regional pacts of mutual assistance in a favorable light. But no answer can yet be given to the question, the question of whether Britain will line up with the League of Nations and the countries supporting it, which stand for the collective organization of peace, or with the German fascists, whose principal object is to disrupt the organization of peace and prepare the way for future aggression.

* * *

IN CONNECTION with this basic question and with the vacillations and the struggle taking place around it in Britain, special interest attaches to the defeat inflicted on the British government at the by-elections in Derby, where Noel Baker, the Labor candidate, was elected by a majority of nearly 3,000. (At the general election last fall J. H. Thomas, who was forced to resign, had a majority of 12,529 over his Labor rival.) In Derby there developed something in the nature of a people's front, as the Labor candidate was supported by the Communists and the Liberals. Noel Baker stressed as one of his cardinal points that the government's foreign policy "leaves the machinery of the League of Nations unused while aggression is prepared."

Lloyd George, who spoke at one of the election meetings, said that he regarded this election as important not merely for the people of Derby but for the British nation as a whole. The world wanted to know where Britain stood. The government, he continued, had wobbled so much, vacillated so much, hesitated so much, advanced

gle has been waged against the domination of feudalism, resulting in tremendous economic and cultural victories.

The previous lands of the corrupt feudal princes, of the Chinese usurers and imperialists have become a rapidly developing, free, independent state.

The Mongolian People's Republic, of course, has not yet started out on the road of developing socialism. It is only uprooting feudalism and preparing the ground to avert the advent of capitalist exploitation. The process of development taking place in the republic is pointing the way to the entire Mongolian people, who can only build up a new life by overcoming feudalism.

While Inner Mongolia is being stifled under the yoke of the feudal lords and is helpless under the onslaught of the Japanese imperialists, the attempts of the latter to violate the borders of the Mongolian People's Republic have met with determined resistance of its people's-revolutionary army.

The Mongolian People's Republic has concluded with the Soviet Union a protocol of mutual assistance, guaranteeing it powerful support in its struggle for independence. The Mongolian people are bound up with the peoples of the Soviet Union, which has no predatory or exploitationist aspirations, by a firm and unbreakable friendship.

Enclosure No. 19, to despatch
No. 1764, of AUG 3 1936, 193.
From the American Embassy,
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

Moscow Daily News
July 14, 1936.

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Turkey Rejects Reservations To Montreux Convention

MONTREUX, July 13.

At the plenary meeting of the Straits conference today, the Turkish Foreign Minister Tewfik Rushti Aras replied to a question raised by the Rumanian delegation in the technical commission. Aras referred to the possibility of states signing or joining the convention after the conclusion of the present conference, declaring that there is no need for leaving the convention open for such a purpose. The convention must come into force immediately upon being signed, since the Lausanne Convention of 1923 is already out of date, just as the 1871 treaty had been before it.

Turkey does not consider it possible to agree to this making of any special appeal to any power and sees no need for concluding bilateral agreements on questions discussed at the conference, Aras said. He reserved Turkey's right, however, as a sovereign state, to conclude, if necessary, with those states whom she should choose, identical agreements within the framework of the rules which will be operating at the given moment.

This statement is regarded at the conference as a reply to the Italian note which came at the beginning of the conference and reserved the rights of the Italian government on the question of the Straits convention to be concluded, including Italy's right to attach her signature in the future.

British Make Slight Concession

The conference then proceeded to discuss the text prepared by the editing commission. The British delegation made some concession in the introductory part of the convention, agreeing to mention the security of the Black Sea powers instead of the security of Turkey alone (as was the case in the British project) as the reason for calling the conference.

The first article of the convention will be subjected to further discussion (in this article the powers "recognize and affirm the principle of freedom of passage and navigation in the Straits").

The second article, which states that the term "commercial vessels" applies to all vessels not included in the second part of the Turkish draft (on warships), was referred, to the technical commission.

Articles three to six were passed with some changes. (These articles govern the passage through the Straits of commercial vessels in peace and war time, with Turkey either neutral or one of the belligerents.)

British Plan Criticized by Turkish Press

ISTANBUL, July 12.

The Turkish press is devoting ever increasing space and attention to criticism of the British project. In yesterday's issue of the "Cumhuriyet," Abiddin Daver in an article entitled "We Shall Never Be Able to Accept the British Proposals," subjects the latter to criticism from a technical point of view, emphasizing the unfriendly character of a number of these proposals. Referring to the British demand on the question of the naval tonnage which is to pass through the Straits in peace time, the author emphasizes particularly the unacceptability for Turkey of the formula which fixes the tonnage of this fleet at half the tonnage of the Turkish fleet. Discussing the British proposal regarding the passage of warships through the Straits during a war in which Turkey is neutral, the author regards this proposal as highly dangerous to Turkey.

Commenting on the report of the withdrawal of part of the British navy from the Mediterranean and the rumors of the resumption of the traditional Anglo-Italian friendship, Abiddin Daver further states that there may be two explanations for this fact. It either means that Britain has kneeled before Italy who won the Abyssinian crown, or this may be connected with the Montreux conference and is a demonstration against Turkey, whom Britain wants to intimidate by the threat of reconciliation with Italy so as to force her (Turkey) to accept the British draft of the Straits Convention.

Junus Nadj in editorials published in today's "Cumhuriyet" and "Republique" exposes the political significance of certain clauses of the British draft and their aggressive character. Emphasizing the absurdity of the British thesis which proposes greater freedom for the passage of warships through the Straits in time of war in which Turkey is neutral than in peace time, Junus Nadi regards this as incompatible with Turkish security. He likewise considers as a threat to Turkish security the British proposal dealing with the regime of the Straits in time of war in which Turkey is neutral.

Enclosure No. 20, to despatch
No. 1764 of AUG 3 1936, 193 .
From the American Embassy.
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

Moscow Daily News
July 14, 1936.

Turks See Dangers In British Proposals At Montreux

14.7

ISTANBUL, July 13.

The British delegation sprang their draft Straits convention so unexpectedly on the Montreux conference that the Turks "did not even have time to be surprised, and they could only wait and see what would be the outcome of this unexpected proposal," says the editor of the newspaper "Cumhuriyet."

"We soon declared, however," he continues, "that this draft contains intentions which might make the conference a failure. In the situation which had arisen, first of all should be strongly criticized the tactlessness of the British in putting forward their draft against the Turkish, and the tactfulness of the Turkish delegation in agreeing to it being discussed."

In view of the fact that the question of the Straits is of prime importance to Turkey, she has the right to bring forward the main draft, while other delegations could safeguard their interests through amendments and additions, he says.

"The British delegation, cleverly considering that it would be inconvenient to bring forward their ill-disposed intentions one by one, which might undermine the basis of our legitimate security, and afraid that such action might shock others, preferred to combine all her intentions in a separate counter-draft," continues the editor. "This she succeeded in doing because her tactlessness was met by the tact of the Turkish delegation."

Pointing out that the British draft in many respects endangers Turkey's security, he declares that the Turkish draft aims at the restrictions in the Straits not infringing the interests of other nations, the position of the Black Sea powers, naturally, holding a special place in the convention. Britain, over the head of Turkey, is trying to deliver a blow at the Black Sea powers as well, he declares.

"British aggressive psychology is what is hindering a solution of the tasks of the conference in Montreux. And if Britain will persist in this psychology, then there is nothing else left to Turkey, but to guarantee her own security," the editor says in conclusion.

Enclosure No. 21, to despatch
No. 1764, of AUG 3 1936, 193 .
From the American Embassy,
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

Moscow Daily News
July 14, 1936.

Britain Maneuvers Against USSR, Says U.S. Paper

NEW YORK, July 10.

The "Baltimore Sun" has published an article by the British journalist Brailsford, who, in commenting on the Montreux conference, states that the British maneuvers apparently aim at interfering with the defense of the Soviet Union. According to Brailsford, the British government still hopes to drive a wedge between France and the Soviet Union and dreams of organizing peace in the west while refusing to condemn war in the east. Britain is hostile to the League of Nations because, although it is weak, it still marks indivisibility of peace. Brailsford believes that the British government's strategy must fail.

Brailsford further states that the left government of France cannot depart from the Soviet Union. What will Britain then do? Neither Britain nor anybody else knows. This is the worst aspect of the danger threatening Europe. Britain's policy, he says is undefined, less defined than in 1914, and is, in addition, in weak hands.

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Enclosure No. 22, to despatch
No. 1764 of AUG 3 1936, 193,
From the American Embassy,
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

Moscow Daily News
July 15, 1936.

'Guardian' Criticizes British Stand At Montreux

15.7

LONDON, July 14.

It is easy to appreciate why the Soviet delegation insists on a point which would give the vessels of the Black Sea countries the right of free passage through the Straits in peace time, writes the Geneva correspondent of the "Manchester Guardian." The British proposal aims at applying to the Soviet warships headed for the Mediterranean the same limitations as to the warships of non-Black Sea countries headed for the Black Sea. This is not a measure of equality, but on the contrary puts the Soviet Union at a serious disadvantage, says the correspondent.

It means that communication between one Soviet port and another must be limited. The best Soviet shipyards are at the present located on the Black Sea coast, and it cannot be denied that the Soviet Union has the right to build ships in the Black Sea and send them to other ports.

The correspondent believes that the position adopted by the British government on this question will serve as a test of its position towards Germany. The claims of the German press that shold Soviet vessels be allowed free passage through the Straits in peace time Germany may demand a revision of the Anglo-German naval agreement, are totally unfounded since the Soviet vessels enjoy the right of free passage through the Straits in accordance with an existing treaty which still remains in force. The German argument that the USSR will build ships in the Black Sea and send them into the Baltic is absurd since the USSR can easily build ships in the Baltic.

The correspondent concludes by stating that Germany's threat to demand a revision of the naval treaty appears to have influenced the policy of Britain if the British policy itself did not suggest beforhand to Germany the thought of resorting to this threat.

In a special article on the Montreux Conference the "Manchester Guardian" criticises the position of the British delegation in Montreux as one that can hardly be explained, adding that what can be explained in it is not worthy of praise.

Enclosure No. 23 to despatch
No. 1764 of AUG 3 1936
from the American Embassy,
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

SOURCE: IZVESTIYA No. 167 (6024)
Moscow, U.S.S.R.,
July 20, 1936.

(Translation)

CONFERENCE ON THE REGIME OF THE STRAITS.

Montreux, July 18 (Special correspondent of TASS).

The final text of the Straits Convention which will be published today at the plenum of the Conference at Montreux consists of twenty-nine articles with four annexes. A protocol is attached to the text.

Nine states are mentioned in the introductory section as signatories of the Convention--Bulgaria, France, Great Britain, Greece, Japan, Rumania, Turkey, the U.S.S.R., and Yugoslavia. The aim of the Convention is defined as the control of the passage and navigation in the Straits "in such a way as to guarantee within the framework of the security of Turkey and of the security in the Black Sea of the Black Sea powers, the principle established by Article 23 of the Peace Treaty signed in Lausanne on July 24, 1923."

In Article 1 the principle of freedom of passage through the Straits is recognized and it is stated that the use of this freedom is henceforth regulated by the present Convention.

The first section includes Articles 2 to 7 inclusive and regulates conditions for commercial ships.

Article 2 establishes the complete freedom of passage through the Straits for commercial ships day and night in

time

time of peace. For the collection of ordinary dues named in the first supplement of the Convention, ships will inform the Turkish sanitary officials set up at the entrance of the Straits concerning the basic facts about the vessel.

Article 3 establishes rules for the sanitary control which are considered necessary with regard to various diseases and which must be carried out without any delay to the vessel.

Article 4 establishes the fact that in war time during the neutrality of Turkey, commercial vessels will make use of free passage under the above-mentioned conditions without variation in their application.

According to Article 5, in the event that Turkey is one of the belligerent states, commercial vessels, not belonging to countries at war with Turkey will make use of freedom of passage in the day time by a route established by Turkish authorities on condition that they will in no way aid the enemy.

In Article 6, if Turkey considers that she is under immediate threat of war, the conditions of Article 2 remain in force with the exception that the passage of ships through the Straits shall be carried out under the conditions established in Article 5.

Article 7 establishes the fact that the term "commercial vessels" applies to all vessels not provided for in the second section of the Convention.

The second section of the Convention relates to warships and includes Articles 8 to 22 inclusive.

Article 8 provides that the definition of the term

"warship" is as contained in the second supplement to the Convention.

Article 9 provides that auxiliary vessels adapted to the transportation of fuel are freed from the rules concerning the forewarning of the Turkish authorities, and are not included in the amount of tonnage permitted in the Straits, on condition that they pass through singly and have only minimum armament of stipulated size.

Article 10 establishes the right of freedom of passage in day time, in time of peace, for light surface vessels under conditions established by Article 13 and following Articles.

Article 11 permits Black Sea Powers to send through the Straits their battleships of greater than 15,000 tons displacement on condition that they pass through singly and accompanied by not more than two torpedo boats.

Article 12 permits Black Sea Powers to send through the Straits in the day time, singly, and on the surface, their submarines acquired or built outside the Black Sea or being sent from the Black Sea for repairs on condition of advance notice to the Turkish Government.

Article 13 provides that advance notice of intended passage of warships to the Turkish Government be given eight days previously. However, it is deemed advisable in this Article that non-Black Sea Powers forewarn the Turkish Government 15 days in advance. The order of passage is also provided for.

Article 14 establishes a maximum of 15,000 tons for all foreign military tonnage at any one time in the Straits with the exception of cases foreseen by Article 11 and

supplement

supplement 3 to the Convention. In any case not more than nine vessels shall pass through at the same time. In this maximum are not included vessels making visits to Turkish ports in the Straits in the manner foreseen by Article 17, or vessels suffering damages during the time of their passage through the Straits.

Article 15 forbids vessels passing through the Straits from making use of any airplanes they may have on board.

Article 16 forbids vessels passing through the Straits from delaying in the Straits with the exception of cases of collision or bad weather, et cetera.

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Article 17 permits, notwithstanding the said limitations, the entry of any naval squadron to a Turkish port on the invitation of the Turkish Government for a short courtesy call, and such squadron must leave the Straits by the same route by which it came, except in cases when it may be directed further through the Straits, in accordance with Articles 10, 14 and 18.

Article 18 establishes the following limitations on the tonnage of non-Black-Sea Powers, which may be in the Black Sea in time of peace.

Paragraph A. Except in cases provided in the next paragraph such maximum shall be 30,000 tons.

Paragraph B. In case the tonnage of the strongest Black Sea fleet exceeds by 10,000 tons the tonnage of the strongest fleet at the time of the signing of the Convention, the maximum tonnage provided by paragraph A

shall

shall be raised by a corresponding amount until it reaches the maximum of 45,000 tons. With this object in view each Black Sea Government shall inform the Turkish Government twice a year--on January 1 and on July 1--of the amount of its tonnage in the Black Sea, and the Turkish Government shall forward that information to the signatories of the Convention and to the Secretary General of the League of Nations.

Paragraph C. The maximum tonnage which may be permitted in the Black Sea to any of the non-Black Sea states is limited to two-thirds of the total tonnage provided in the preceding paragraphs.

Paragraph D. Non-Black Sea Powers may send to the Black Sea for humanitarian purposes additional ships up to a maximum total of 8,000 tons for all states taken together, above the maximum laid down by paragraphs A and B, provided the Black Sea Powers raise no objections to such a course.

Paragraph E. The period of stay of the ships of non-Black Sea Powers for any purposes whatsoever may not exceed 21 days.

Article 19 provides that in time of a war, in which Turkey does not take part, warships shall have full right of passage through the Straits under the conditions provided by Articles 10-18.

However, warships of belligerent countries shall be excluded, except in cases provided by article 25 of the present convention (i.e., by the Covenant of the League of Nations) and except in case aid is being rendered to a state which is the victim of an aggression by virtue of a mutual aid treaty in which Turkey takes part and which is within the scope of the League of Nations and registered

and

and published in accordance with Article 18 of that statute (i.e., the Covenant of the League of Nations). In exceptional cases the restrictions provided by Articles 10-18 shall not apply. Ships of belligerents, which happen to be cut off from their bases have a right to return to their bases. However, all military actions in the Straits are forbidden.

In accordance with Article 20, if Turkey takes part in the war, Articles 10-18 do not apply and the passage of warships shall be regulated entirely at the discretion of the Turkish Government.

In accordance with Article 21, if Turkey is of the opinion that it is under an immediate threat of war, it shall enjoy the right stated in Article 20. The return to their bases of ships cut off by the Straits shall be permitted, with the exception, however, of the ships of "that State the behavior of which caused the application of the present Article". In case of application of this Article by the Turkish Government, the latter shall inform the contracting parties and the Secretary General of the League of Nations thereof. In case the Council of the League by a two-thirds majority vote should hold that the measures taken by Turkey are not justified, and if such should also be the opinion of the majority of States which have signed the Convention, the Turkish Government undertakes to annul these measures as well as those which have been applied by virtue of Article 6.

Article 22 lays down rules for the sanitary control of warships.

The third part of the Convention consists of a single Article 23, which provides that the Turkish Government

shall

shall indicate the routes to be followed by civil aviation between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. The Turkish Government must be previously notified before such routes are used. The permission of the Turkish Government, moreover, is required for the flights of civil aviation through the Straits between Europe and Asia (i.e., through the fortified zones of the Straits), such permission indicating periodically the corresponding route.

The fourth section covers Articles 24 and 25. In accordance with Article 24 the functions of the International Straits Commission created in 1923 by the Lausanne Convention are turned over to the Turkish Government. The latter undertakes to gather the necessary statistical data, and supervise the observance of the rules laid down by the present Convention, to inform the representatives of the contracting parties in Ankara of the forthcoming passing of foreign maritime squadrons through the Straits and to present a yearly report on the movement of ships in the Straits, et cetera, such information to be furnished both to the Secretary General of the League of Nations and to the contracting parties.

Article 25 provides that no provision of the present Convention may curtail the rights and duties resulting from the Covenant of the League of Nations either of Turkey or of some other contracting party.

Section five covers Articles 26-29.

Article 26 establishes the method of ratification, the acts relating to which shall be kept in the archives of the French Republic. The Japanese Government is granted the right to send notice of its ratification through its

Ambassador in Paris and to send letters of ratification subsequently, but within the shortest possible period. Upon the receipt of six acts of ratification, including the Turkish one, a protocol shall be drawn up and from that moment the Convention shall be regarded as having come into force.

In accordance with Article 27, from the moment the Convention comes into force any state which has signed the Lausanne Convention may join the Convention. The contracting parties shall be notified of such joining through diplomatic channels, by the French Government.

By virtue of Article 28 the Convention remains in force for twenty years. If, two years prior to the expiration of that period, none of the contracting parties declares to the French Governments its desire to denounce the convention, the latter shall remain in force until such declaration shall be received and for two years thereafter. In case the Convention is denounced, the contracting parties shall call a conference in order to work out a new convention.

Article 29 provides the right of any of the contracting parties to propose amendments to the Convention upon the expiration of every five-year period. Aprpposal to amend Articles 14 and 18 must be supported by a second contracting party. Any other amendment must be supported by two other contracting powers. Such amendments are examined either through diplomatic channels or, failing an agreement, by a special conference. For the passing of such amendments unanimity is required, except those affecting Articles 14 and 18, for the passing of which amendments a majority

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of three-fourths of the contracting parties and three-fourths of the Black Sea Powers is required.

The first annex of the Convention establishes the method of levying fees and the amount of fees to be levied on ships passing through the Straits.

The second annex defines the category of ships passing through the Straits in accordance with the London Naval Treaty of March 25, 1936.

The third annex establishes special rules for the passing through the Straits of three out-of-date Japanese training ships.

The fourth annex establishes four categories of warships, the tonnage of which must be taken into account when computing the tonnage of Black Sea Powers in accordance with Article 18, namely: ships of the line of two categories, plane carriers of two categories, light ships of three categories, and submarines.

The protocol which is to be signed simultaneously with the Convention shall state the following:

> "At the moment of signing the Convention bearing the present date, we, the undersigned, plenipotentiary representatives, binding thereby our governments, have agreed to the following: (1) Turkey may immediately rearm the zone of the Straits defined in the preamble to the Convention; (2) Beginning from August 15, 1936, the Turkish Government shall provisionally apply the regime, established by the Convention; and (3) The present protocol shall enter into force beginning today".

CWT:RB:bpg

Enclosure No. 24 to despatch
No. 1764 of AUG 3 1936
from the American Embassy,
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

(TRANSLATION.)

SOURCE: LE JOURNAL DE MOSCOU,
July 21, 1936.

THE SIGNATURE OF THE STRAITS CONVENTION.

Editorial.

Moscow, July 20, 1936.

After a month of intensive work, the Montreux Conference was ended by the signing of the Straits Convention.

The historians of the post-war years cannot complain of scarcity of international conferences; during this period they have been called very often and for the most varied reasons.

But among them it is difficult to recall a conference at which have been present a greater number of Powers--Powers whose interests are very different and, at first sight, difficult to reconcile--and which nevertheless has ended with an agreement on a question for which European diplomats have vainly sought to find a solution for entire centuries. It is the first time in history that the question of the Straits was solved, not by violence, but by friendly agreement which satisfies all countries signing the new Convention on the regime of the Straits (with perhaps one exception). It is

impossible

impossible to say that the regime of the Straits established by the Convention of Lausanne in 1923, was accepted absolutely in good grace, since Turkey, at the time of Lausanne, was coerced into certain capitulations as a result of the occupation of the Straits and of the European part of its territory by enemy troops.

The U.S.S.R. at that time had not yet emerged from the state of factual blockade, and the Soviet Government did not have normal relations with the greater part of the Powers taking part af the Lausanne Convention. Many of her claims were refused, for which reason the Soviet Government was obliged to abstain from ratifying the Lausanne Convention.

The Montreux Conference took place under entirely different conditions. There can be no question of discrimination for any one of the participants. Convoked on the initiative of Turkey, the principle country interested in the modification of the previous regime of the Straits, this Conference took place in an atmosphere in which it may be said the principle Powers gathered together mutually gave proof of their regard for each other's interests. As a result of this, the important disagreements, which at the beginning were manifested in a number of essential points, could be liquidated.

By the

By the terms of the new Convention, Turkey obtains the abolition of the prohibition against fortifying the Straits, a prohibition which was humiliating to her dignity and which menaced her national defense. It has been possible to give this satisfaction to the legitimate claims of Turkey without compromising the real and well understood interests of other countries. Freedom of passage through the Straits for commercial vessels remains in force. With relation to the passage of ships of war, the interests of defense of all countries are equally safe guarded to a sufficient degree. The non-littoral Powers have the right to have their fleets enter the Straits to make visits of courtesy and for humanitarian ends for a limited time and with a limited tonnage. During a war in which Turkey does not take part, passage is closed to the ships of war of belligerant countries. This restriction is not applied when, under the obligations of a pact of mutual assistance concluded in the framework of the League of Nations, the question arises of rendering aid to a State which is a victim of aggression, and, in general, in all cases where the passage of vessels takes place by virtue of obligations which, for any particular country arises from the Covenant of the League of Nations.

The littoral Powers of the Black Sea enjoy the right of free passage for their ships in both

directions

directions without tonnage restrictions. Thus the U.S.S.R. has the guarantee of the possibility of intercommunication with other bodies of water where her fleets are to be found--a possibility which all maritime powers enjoy which have fleets in several seas. It is perfectly evident that all these points, like the Convention itself in its entirety, guarantee in a sufficient degree the interests of a party which might be the victim of aggression, since they give the complete possibility to all members of the League of Nations to lend it aid foreseen by the Covenant.

It is perfectly evident that only a State which is dreaming of aggression can be dissatisfied with the new Convention, and either refuses to sign it or signs it with reservations, which will weaken its importance.

The Convention, in its essential characteristics, is an instrument of peace and, since it is such, all countries which desire peace must rejoice at its conclusion.

To a certain extent, it permits the true nature of countries which it concerns to be revealed by aiding once again in unmasking the eventual aggressor.

Besides its immediate import, the Convention is also important because it bears practical proof, that in an atmosphere of loyalty to existing

treaties,

treaties, no matter how hard they may be, and to the Covenant of the League of Nations, those points of the old treaties which really are unjust under present conditions can be peacefully and successfully revised.

As early as 1923, the limitations imposed upon Turkey in the Straits were contradictory to the idea of national sovereignty. These limitations took on a still more intolerable aspect as a result of events of recent years during which in various parts of the world aggression of strong countries against weak countries has been produced--aggression which ended with the seizure of all or an important part of the territory of the weaker country. There also came about a whole series of other violations and in the first place the remilitarisation of Germany, which was brought about by a fait accompli, a remilitarisation which in essence indirectly effects the security of Turkey.

Account has been taken by the signatory powers of the Lausanne Convention of the menacing character of these precedents and in a large majority these have facilitated things for Turkey which proposed the modification of this Convention.

It is unnecessary to dwell on the great importance in principle of such an act which destroys with evidence the arguments of those who hold

that

that a modification of a treaty can be accompanied only by tearing it up or by having recourse to a fait accompli.

If, at the beginning, the Conference at Montreux took place in an atmosphere where quite important differences were manifested between several of the participants and among them the U.S.S.R., Turkey, and England, this only emphasized the importance of the results obtained.

Granting that the Conference took place on the whole in an atmosphere of mutual confidence and a desire for peace, the conciliation of those divergencies which were manifested was fully possible.

In particular, the U.S.S.R. obtained recognition of her principle claims both from her friend Turkey and from England. The statesmen of these two countries did not fail to misunderstand that opposition to the absolutely legitimate and comprehensible claims of Russia would only have been playing the game of the eventual war makers and that it would detract from the authority of the League of Nations. The importance of the U.S.S.R. as a factor of peace has been recognized in a striking manner.

The new Convention based on the respect of the Covenant of the League of Nations must reinforce the authority of this institution disturbed

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by the precedents of recent months.

The new Convention is an instrument of peace and, as such, will be hailed by all those who are sincerely devoted to the cause of peace and who are ready to struggle actively against the threatening war.

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Enclosure No. 25 to despatch
No. 1764 of AUG 3 1936
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Moscow, U.S.S.R.

SOURCE: PRAVDA No. 199 (6805), Moscow, July 21, 1936.
(Organ of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)).

(FULL TRANSLATION.)

RESULTS OF THE STRAITS CONFERENCE.

The Montreux Conference, convoked at the initiative of Turkey to revise the Lausanne Straits Convention, has terminated its work. On the twentieth of July a convention regarding the regime of the Straits and a protocol regarding their remilitarization were signed--documents the great international significance of which far exceeds the limits of the so-called Straits question.

In his opening speech at the conference, Comrade Litvinov emphasized the fact that the Soviet Government had not delayed in replying to the Turkish Government's note of April 11 concerning a revision of the Lausanne Straits Convention and had expressed its "readiness to take part in negotiations toward the establishment of a Strait's regime which would be in accord with the interests of the security of Turkey and of the preservation of peace and calm in this zone."

The documents signed at Montreux, as Comrade Litvinov said, should "serve the security of peace on the Black Sea and the protection from aggression both of our own Black Sea coast and the coasts of friendly

Turkey and our Black Sea neighbors. With the consistency and clarity which characterize Soviet diplomacy our delegation at Montreux stood for just such a broad conception of principle of the tasks which stood before the conference.

It is to be observed with satisfaction that the Soviet delegation attained the signature at Montreux of documents which in regulating the regime of the Straits, assure the sovereignty and security of Turkey as well as the security of the other Black Sea powers, and at the same time limit the freedom of action of possible aggressors. To the tendency to reduce the whole affair to modest alterations of the regime established by the Lausanne Conference, the Soviet delegation, from the very start of the discussion, counterposed the idea of a settlement of the question which would really correspond to the vital interests of the Black Sea powers and at the same time tend to assure peace in this zone.

The documents signed at Montreux, particularly the protocol relating to the remilitarization of the Straits, are of historical significance for Turkey. As we know, the Lausanne Convention imposed upon Turkey heavy obligations limiting her capacity for defence, such, for example, as that of demilitarizing specifically described zones on both sides of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorous, that of demilitarizing islands of the Sea of Marmara and certain islands of the Aegean Sea, as well as that of limiting the

garrison

garrison of Istanbul to 12,000 men.

Having disarmed the Straits, the authors of the Lausanne Conference, by way of compensation, agreed to "guarantee" the security of the Straits. Though Turkey was ready to reconcile herself to this sort of a situation at the time of the signature of the Lausanne Convention, now, when international differences have again become very acute, when the provocators of war have insolently raised their heads, Turkey has justly demanded the restoration of her complete sovereignty over the Straits. The protocol signed at Montreux fully reestablishes the sovereignty of Turkey in this zone. From now on Turkey is guarantor of the security of the Straits and of their use exclusively in the interests of peace.

The raising by Turkey of the question of the remilitarization of the Straits, and the signature at Montreux of a corresponding protocol are irrefutable proof that the tactic of the fait accompli and the policy of the mailed fist are not, as the apologists of war maintain, the only means for satisfying genuine vital interests of one or another state. One of the most important political lessons of the conference is that to attain such satisfaction it is not necessary to break international obligations and resort to a policy of "blood and steel".

The convention concerning the regime of the Straits, of great significance for Turkey, is at the same time a document of primary importance for the

other

other Black Sea powers, for the U.S.S.R. It is sufficient to say that the Lausanne Convention provided for the free passage through the Straits of foreign warships, in time of war as in time of peace, with the one condition that "the maximum forces which any power can move through the Straits in the direction of the Black Sea will not exceed those of the strongest fleet of the powers littoral to the Black Sea." The Lausanne Conference gave non-Black Sea powers the right freely to introduce into the Black Sea, in time of war and in time of peace, war fleets of such dimensions that security in the Black Sea was completely out of the question. The new convention regulating the status of the Straits puts an end to this situation.

Article 18 of the convention, which puts a number of limitations on the tonnage of fleets of non-Black Sea powers, provides that the total tonnage of the fleets on non-Black Sea powers, located at a given time in the Black Sea, shall not exceed 30,000 tons. However, in case of an increase of 10,000 tons in the strongest Black Sea fleet, the maximum tonnage permitted non-Black Sea powers increases accordingly, but in no case can the latter exceed 45,000 tons.

Point "C"* of Article 18 establishes that the maximum tonnage which any one non-Black Sea power may maintain in the Black Sea at a given time is limited to two-thirds of the total tonnage allowed non-Black Sea powers in the Black Sea.

Another

* "V" in Russian.

Another question dealt with at the Montreux Conference, a question of great importance to the U.S.S.R. as a Black Sea power, was that of free passage of our Black Sea fleet through the Straits to other naval bases of the U.S.S.R. As we know this natural right of the U.S.S.R. to move its fleet from one sea into another, when circumstances demand this, did not find expression in the projects put before the Montreux Conference. Of course the Soviet delegation could not make concessions on so vital a question for the U.S.S.R. The interests of our security and ability to defend ourselves were at stake. The attempt to lock our Black Sea fleet in the Black Sea was therefore condemned to failure in advance. It is to be observed with great satisfaction that the Powers represented at the Montreux Conference, in the process, it is true, of a prolonged discussion, acknowledged the demands of the U.S.S.R. to be just. The basis for an accord on this question was thus created.

The purpose of Articles 19 and 25 of the new Convention on the status of the Straits is to guarantee the obligations arising out of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the rendering of assistance to the victim of an aggressor in conformity with mutual assistance pacts.

In one of his speeches at Montreux Comrade Litvinov made special reference to the League of Nations. He said:

"The League

"The League of Nations is not dead, it continues to exist, and will, I trust, come out of its difficulties healthier and stronger than before. For this reason we should ensure its interests and provide for the possibility of warships entering the Black Sea and leaving it in fulfillment of the demands of the League of Nations which grants the possibility of utilizing support and assistance."

This thought found concrete expression in the above-mentioned Articles of the convention. In the presence of the ever growing menace of war, and coming as it does after the recent failures of the League, the document just signed acquires particular significance. It is proof of the fact that the forces interested in the preservation of peace are continuing to work toward the fortification of international solidarity within the framework of the Covenant of the League of Nations, of the pacts of mutual assistance, and of collective security.

Such, roughly speaking, are the most important points of the documents just signed at Montreux.

Thirteen years separate the Montreux Conference from the Lausanne Conference. During this period immense changes have taken place in the correlation of forces. The diplomatic success of the Soviet Union at Montreux has its profound causes. This success, just as the other successes of our country, is a result of the wise policy of our Party which, under the leadership of great Stalin, has created the unprecedented economic, cultural, military and

international

international might of the U.S.S.R.

All impartial observers of the conference will have to acknowledge that the U.S.S.R., in defending its interests at Montreux, at the same time was taking into the fullest consideration the interests of the other Powers represented at the conference, as well as the interests of preserving that universal peace of which mankind is so much in need.

AGB:bpg

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Enclosure No. 26 , to despatch
No. 1764 of AUG 3 1936 , 193 .
From the American Embassy,
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

Moscow Daily News
July 22, 1936.

Litvinov Addresses Straits Conference as Convention 22.7 Is Signed

MONTREUX, July 21.

Following the signing of the Straits convention, speeches were made by a number of delegates to the conference. Tewfik Rushti Aras, the Turkish foreign minister, said that he was completely satisfied with the results of the gathering and expressed his thanks to the British delegation for its pliancy and to the Soviet Union for its "friendship shown in any circumstance over a period of 15 years." Lord Stanley, head of the British delegation, said that the conference had shown to the world that satisfactory results could be achieved by observing the customary standards of international relations. Lord Stanley was followed by M. M. Litvinov, who made the following speech:

"We are present today at the final act of a modest conference with only a small number of participants which met at a quiet spot on the shores of Lake Geneva, a conference, however, which is destined to hold an extremely honorable place among international gatherings. The Montreux conference, which was convened for the purpose of revising an international treaty and adjusting it to altered circumstances, fulfilled its task honorably. Taking full cognizance of conditions that had changed, the conference recognized that the guarantees provided by the Lausanne convention for the security of the Straits cannnot but inspire in Turkey a sense of genuine insecurity. The conference drew the necessary conclusions from this.

A New Situation

"The conference did more than this. It reconsidered certain old views which permitted the Straits problem being interpreted as an outworn and age-long dispute between certain powers from which the failure of the conference could be predicted. At the risk of such a failure, the conference had to understand that the place of the decrepit Ottoman empire, an object of diplomacy for the imperialist powers, was taken by the young Turkish Republic, full of hope and energy, which under the leadership of its builder and great reformer, Ataturk, is rapidly advancing along the path of progress and displaying an increasingly independent role in the organization of peace in Europe.

"The conference had to understand that the largest part of the Black Sea coast is no longer occupied by old imperialist Russia, which strove to use the Black Sea as a springboard to participation in the imperialist struggle of the great powers and to new territorial conquests, but by a new, Soviet, socialist state, one of whose first acts was to renounce completely all imperialist aspirations and which since then has consistently and invariably been pursuing a policy of peace, concerned not only about its own security but also the security of all other states, near and far. It had to be admitted that the 15-year long close friendship between these two great renascent states—the Soviet Union and Turkey—is indestructible and is not a mere temporary combination.

"The conference admitted although, it is true, in a degree inadequate as yet, the special rights of the Black Sea powers in the Black Sea and in the Straits, as well as the special geographical position of the Black Sea, to which general concepts about the absolute freedom of the seas should not be applied in their entirety. As regards the rations between the ports in the sea and the ports of other naval basins.

"It strove only to limit the freedom of the military fleets of non-Black-Sea powers both in peacetime and especially in wartime. The Soviet delegation aimed in this way at saving a vast expanse of water and adjacent shores from the flames of a possible future war and at increasing the security of the countries lying along the coast, not one of which can be suspected of aggressive ambitions. In insuring peace and security in such an important part of the world as the meeting place of two continents we, it seems, are doing no slight service in the cause of strengthening world peace. And, finally the Soviet delegation aimed at establishing a connection between the international document which we have framed here and the other existing instruments of peace, namely, the League of Nations and the mutual assistance pacts.

None Dissatisfied

"The Soviet delegation can state with tremendous satisfaction that though not fully, it has in extremely large measure achieved its objects, and I express thanks to all my colleagues for their cooperation in creating an atmosphere of mutual understanding and reconciliation, which was particularly evident during the closing stages of the conference. It seems to me that all the participants in the conference have received satisfaction and that there are no dissatisfied among us. And neither did the conference give grounds for dissatisfaction to those other states, which are absent from the conference, and whose peaceful interests are fully insured.

"I want to hope that the convention which has been signed, by harmonizing the interests of the signatories with the solution of a particular problem, will create the ground for a further general improvement in the relations between them.

"The significance of the conference far transcends the subject which it discussed. It was convened at a time when faith in the reasonableness of government, faith in the possibility of a peaceful and collective solution of international questions was beginning to disappear; at a time, when there was again arising in a most revolting form the ideology which denies progressive forms of intercourse between nations and collective discussion and solution of international disputes, the ideology which for the sake of the victory of brute force proclaims the idea of separate deals among some nations at the expense of the interests of others.

"The successful outcome of our conference deals the first crushing blow at this ideology, which can be seen, if only from the fury with which the spokesmen of this ideology have responded to the results of the conference. The renascence of this ideology has caused a political crisis in international life, has created gloomy, pessimistic moods, akin to despair and fatalism, and amidst all this the first gleam of light is the conference at Montreux. The results of this conference permit us to hope that international life will soon move for good and all out of the narrow straits of fruitless discussions and disputes to the wide sea of genuine international collaboration and reach ultimately the haven where is written 'universal peace and the security of all nations.'"

Following Litvinov, speeches were made by Titulescu, Paul-Boncour and the Yugoslavian delegate, all of whom stressed the importance of the convention for the cause of peace.

MEMORANDUM

The Montreux Conference and the Soviet Union.

In amplification and extension of the Moscow Embassy's despatch No. 1764 of August 3, 1936, concerning the Montreux Conference and the Soviet participation therein, the following comment, based upon an examination of the official publication of the minutes of the Montreux Conference, is submitted for such interest as it may present. The publication under reference is entitled "Actes de la Conférence de Montreux concernant le régime des détroits, 22 juin - 20 juillet 1936", and is published by Editions A. Pedone, 13 rue Soufflot, Paris V^e; it was forwarded to the Department by the Embassy at Istanbul under cover of its despatch No. 209 of February 5, 1937. In this memorandum only those aspects of the Conference, not covered in the despatch from Moscow, are discussed - particularly those relating to the interpolations and arguments of the Soviet delegates during debates in both the plenary sessions of the Conference itself and the in camera meetings of the technical committee.

At the opening session of the Conference (June 22, 1936), Litvinov stated that he was prepared to participate in the negotiations for the purpose of placing the régime of the Straits into harmony with the interests of the security of Turkey and of assuring peace and tranquility to that region. He emphasized that the Soviet Union had a special interest in the problem by reason of its geographical situation and the lack of communication between the seas which bathe its littoral. He traced the

gradual

gradual break-up of the spirit of pacifism which was so characteristic of the immediate post-war period, and pointed to the warlike and aggressive spirit which typifies the present epoch. He intimated that the right of individual defense was not to be observed only in the abstract; one must of necessity adopt a different attitude with regard to this right when there are fears that it will be used deliberately to endanger the interests of other countries and for the purpose of aggression. The attitude to take when the revision of a treaty helps to maintain and reenforce peace is quite different from that which obtains when this revision provokes political perturbations, troubles international peace and tranquility, or ends in the violation by force of the interests of other states. Litvinov concluded with the hope that the Conference would embark upon its work with the interests principally of Turkey and the Black Sea powers at heart.

At the session of June 23, the next day, Litvinov paid homage to the Turkish thesis that the Straits should in principle not be closed to ships of war of all powers. However, he emphasized that the Black Sea should, nevertheless, be considered a closed sea, but should not be compared to the great international canals and straits which connect open and free bodies of water. Apparently not unmindful of regional security he stated, "The more we limit the tonnage and the number of ships entering the Black Sea the greater will be security in this region of Europe and Asia; and if we create security in one part of the world, we will thereby render a great contribution to the general security." However, for the Black Sea powers

he

he asked complete freedom of passage in and out of the Black Sea. The case of the Soviet Union was different, he insisted, in that it was absolutely imperative that unhampered liaison be maintained between the shipyards of the Baltic and Black Seas, and that naval units be transferred at will between them. The remilitarization of the Straits, he insisted, was an incontestable right of Turkey, as was the right of self defense. The League of Nations was not dead, he concluded; it will emerge from its present difficulties stronger than ever. Consequently, the interests of the League must never be forgotten, particularly when it becomes necessary for the League to send ships of war to assist the victim of an aggressor.

At the session of June 24, Litvinov proposed that Article 6 of the Turkish draft proposal (relating to the movement of warships in time of peace) be made applicable only to non-Black Sea powers, and that the prohibition against aircraft carriers be added to that of submarines. This in fact would have reserved complete freedom of action for Black Sea powers and presupposed a series of restrictions against non-Black Sea powers. Lord Stanhope, the British delegate, then interpolated that there were two fundamental principles of note in the Lausanne Treaty, namely freedom of passage through the Straits for the naval forces of all powers, and limitation on the size of fleets of non-Black Sea powers to the tonnage of the fleet of the strongest Black Sea power. There were therefore liberty of entrance into the Black Sea for all powers and security for the Black Sea powers in particular, - a general

reciprocity

reciprocity of principle on both sides. Security was the more certain in that it was elastic. It was now proposed, continued Lord Stanhope, that these principles be discarded. There was to be a pronounced difference of treatment in ingress and egress from the Black Sea for the two categories of powers.

Sato, the Japanese delegate, then interpolated to the effect that Japan was ready to make concessions provided that there were equality of treatment for Black Sea and non-Black Sea powers. In rebuttal Litvinov insisted on special rights for the Soviet Union and for the abolition of aircraft carriers.

Later on, when the subject of security in both the Straits and the Black Sea came up, Litvinov took issue with other delegates, principally the British. The contention of the latter was that there were two questions to be decided: security between the Black and Mediterranean Seas, that is in the Straits, on the one hand, and security in the Black Sea on the other. Litvinov insisted that the two were closely bound together and were component parts of a single problem.

In connection with the notification preliminary to passage through the Straits, Litvinov was prepared to accede to the wishes of the Turkish delegate, provided that this be applicable only to non-Black Sea powers. The show-down between Litvinov and Lord Stanhope then became apparent: Litvinov for discrimination against non-Black Sea powers, Lord Stanhope for absolute equality of treatment. Litvinov maintained resolutely that there was no situation which could arise where a non-Black Sea power would find it

necessary

necessary to send large battleships into the Black Sea, whereas for Black Sea powers it could easily happen that large ships be dispatched from the Black to the Mediterranean Seas. The argument finally settled on Article 6 and particularly on paragraphs (b) and (h) thereof. Under the former, non-Black Sea powers would be limited to 14,000 tons in passing through the Straits, and under the latter the same would apply to Black Sea powers. Litvinov's contention was that the security of the latter was as important a consideration as the security of Turkey, the one as dependent as the other upon the remilitarization of the Straits. To hold Black Sea powers to a fixed maximum in traversing the Straits would be to discriminate against them, and place them at a disadvantage in case of war; Black Sea powers should have full liberty of disposing of their armed forces as they choose.

In the discussion of paragraph (f) of Article 6, relating to the interdiction against the use of airplanes carried aboard warships, Litvinov asked that his original motion prohibiting the passage of aircraft carriers, be kept on the calendar.

In the discussion of Article 7, Litvinov proposed two amendments: first, that vessels of belligerents be forbidden entrance to the Black Sea, in order not to extend to the Black Sea a war which might be raging outside it; second, that if a Black and non-Black Sea power be at war, ships of the latter be forbidden entrance to the Black Sea except on the order of the League of Nations.

In the discussion of Article 13, Litvinov proposed that the whole convention enter into force after ratification by

five

five members, that is one-half of the participants in the Conference.

After the interval of ten days between the Fifth and Sixth Sessions of the Conference, the British delegate, Lord Stanley, presented a new and revised project which was immediately adopted as a basis for discussion. If Litvinov was opposed to this British manoeuvre, he certainly did not show it, but accepted rather gracefully. He did insist that the original Turkish project be considered simultaneously with the new British project.

In the discussions concerning Article 6, Litvinov pretended to find a distinction in the conception of neutrality, that is, that a country could be neutral vis-à-vis Turkey but belligerent to another, hence the necessity for specifying "neutral vis-à-vis Turkey". President Bruce then stated that this could only arise if there should be two simultaneous wars, to which Litvinov responded that that was precisely his idea. The Rumanian delegate then stated that a more exact wording would be necessary to determine the state of war, for a war might be going on far from the Black Sea area, but yet involve it. To this Litvinov proposed that instead of the term "neutral" there be introduced the phraseology "Turkey not being a belligerent". This was accepted by the Turkish delegate. The Rumanian delegate was then assured by the Turkish delegate that, no matter how many wars might be raging, if Turkey were neutral, passage through the Straits would be possible under the terms of the Convention. Article 6 was then adopted with the reserve that Article 23, when edited in final form, make provision for action

arising

arising out of League obligations and commitments.

In the discussion of Article 9, the Rumanian delegate referred to the question of submarines and pointed out the necessity for Rumania to have a free hand in ordering and conditioning submarines outside the Black Sea. Litvinov again brought up the question of the special rights of Black Sea over non-Black Sea powers, and insisted on this difference in favor of the former. Litvinov stated that he desired that the Soviet Union be able to procure or have constructed submarines outside the Black Sea without necessarily purchasing them. In view of the opposition of the British delegate, however, the question of submarines was postponed to a subsequent date. Mr. Rendel, who presented the British argument, stated that his delegation had come to Montreux with instructions to negotiate for a settlement tending to protect the interests of Turkey, but based upon the general principles of Lausanne. In view of this, the British could not see why submarines, which were no more dangerous than a number of other categories of war vessels, should have to be restricted, to say nothing of aireraft carriers.

In the discussion of Article 10, Litvinov reverted to his stubborn insistence on special rights for the Black Sea powers. He contended that preliminary notice of 15 days was not too much, since it would take that much time to ascertain just how much tonnage there was actually in the Black Sea. He then proposed that 15 days be adopted for non-Black Sea and 3 days for Black Sea powers. Lord Stanley took exception and asked that similar treatment be meted out to both categories of powers. The

Turkish

Turkish delegate also took exception to the Soviet proposal, saying that three days was not enough to effect any appraisal of tonnage in the Black Sea, nor to give notice to the various powers signatory to this Conference. Litvinov, in answer to the proposal of the Japanese delegate that Turkey should notify all powers of the composition of all naval forces which pass through the Straits, made violent and sarcastic reply, asking that under such reasoning all powers in all seas should report ship movements for the general interest of mankind. In rebuttal the Japanese delegate* stated that such information as would at all times be in the possession of the Turkish authorities would enable powers to know in advance the situation in the Black Sea, and if it were possible to send ships through the Straits. The Japanese insisted, however, that the same period of time for the preliminary notification be applicable to both Black Sea and non-Black Sea powers. Litvinov argued that 15 days were necessary to ascertain the composition of fleets in the Black Sea, but three days were enough to make provision for the protection of the Straits, that is for egress from the Black Sea. The British delegate then asked that the same period of time be applicable to all, since it was purely an administrative act on the part of Turkey. After discussions among the other delegates, Litvinov made full reservations to Article 10, insisting apparently on a show-down at some point or other as to whether the Soviet Union as a Black Sea power were to be

given

*Mr. Sato, the present Foreign Minister of Japan.

given a favored position, or placed on a par with outside powers.

In the discussions of Article 11 the Soviet Union was insistent that every size ship of a Black Sea power should be able to pass the Straits, and that such ships be allowed escort of their own vessels.

In the discussions of Article 14 Litvinov presented the thesis that, even in visits of courtesy, Turkey should have no greater consideration than Black Sea powers. In other words, in visits of courtesy, where presumably ships in excess of 15,000 tons might be used to convey the head of a state, Black Sea powers should have privileges not less than Turkey. The British delegate, in explanation of this article, stated that the intention was that such ships would not enter the Black Sea, but would merely pay their visit and depart by the same route by which they came. Litvinov then proposed an amendment, accepted by the other delegates, to the effect that visits of courtesy to Turkey, in the Straits, be limited to a certain time, - clearly a derogation of sovereignty by Turkey.

In the discussions of Article 15 Litvinov proposed the figure of 30 percent instead of 10 percent above the standard allowable 30,000 tons above which Black Sea powers would increase their fleets before a proportionate increase be permitted to "outside" fleets which might come into the Black Sea. He further proposed that no nation be permitted more than one-half this tonnage. He conceded that other reasons than courtesy be permitted for ships entering the Black Sea, on condition that this be no excuse for increasing tonnage. He further proposed that ships of non-Black

Sea

Sea powers be limited to "light surface vessels", and that the duration of all visits be limited to fifteen instead of thirty days. A median variant of three weeks was then proposed by Lord Stanley and accepted by Litvinov and the other delegates.

In connection with the definition of "humanitarian" as applied to visits of ships, the British delegate explained that there were many interpretations; famine, revolution, natural disasters such as earthquakes, pursuit of pirate vessels, etc. Litvinov took sarcastic exception to this thesis, and stated that he would agree provided that the period of time for such "humanitarian" visits be reduced and that a time limit be fixed. As to the possibility of a calamity he foresaw such an eventuality "once in a century". The British delegate took exception to Litvinov's statement, and said that every eventuality must be foreseen. As to the tonnage above 30,000 tons allowable for non-Black Sea powers in case of calamity or disaster, it was proposed by the British delegate that provision be made for the dispatch of at least one cruiser of an interested power.

As to the decision to be taken in case of war, to brand a belligerent, Litvinov proposed that such decision be taken by the League, since for Turkey alone to label an aggressor was too great a responsibility. The Turkish delegate said that his country would rather not have to take such a decision in an emergency, but would do so were that the wish of all signatory powers.

In the discussion of Article 18, Litvinov asked that provision be made that, in case of a menace of war, ships

be

be allowed to join their bases immediately before the definitive closing of the Straits. Turkey was not willing to do this, insisting that her position in case of war might be jeopardized thereby. Litvinov countered with the observation that this would constitute a new rule of international law, and that on the basis of such a precedent a country might find a pretext for seizing foreign shipping in its own ports in case of a threat of war.

In the discussion of Article 23, perhaps the most important of the whole Convention, Litvinov submitted a new and separate article. The basic idea incorporated in the new article was that freedom of passage be permitted to those powers who were acting in conformity with obligations arising out of the Pact, or pursuant to accords supplementary to the Pact, which have as their object the rendering of assistance to the victim of an aggressor. Mutual assistance pacts, of course, were the real subject at issue, and considerable opposition was evident from the British side, with particular respect to the "obligations" which Turkey might have as a member of the League to assist in carrying out appropriate measures against an aggressor.

Article 25 concerned ratification. Litvinov proposed that the ratification of five or six participants be sufficient. He also proposed that the duration of the Convention be shortened, and that fifteen years be considered the maximum variant.

In the second reading of Article 10, Litvinov stated that he did not want to insist on special consideration for Black Sea powers. He stated that all he was interested in was a reduction in the period of time necessary for Black

Sea

Sea powers to give appropriate warning, and was willing to accept eight days, which was then adopted by the Conference.

In the second reading of Article 14, Litvinov proposed that submarines be barred from visits of courtesy of foreign fleets to Turkish ports in the Straits, and that such visits be limited to twenty-one days. He stated later that he was willing that this idea be incorporated into a protocol to be added to the Convention wherein it would be stated that the Turkish Government had no intention of inviting submarines to pay visits of courtesy.

In the second reading of Article 15 Litvinov proposed that the definition of "Light Surface V$_e$ssels" be that embodied in the London Naval Treaty of 1936. As to the administrative authority to be notified concerning tonnage in the Black Sea, Litvinov proposed that this be the Secretary General instead of the Council of the League of Nations.

When Article 16 was submitted to its second reading in the British project, Litvinov, in a self-confessed spirit of "conciliation", withdrew his proposed amendment in favor of the French proposal, - but on condition that other concessions be made to him.

When the second reading of Article 18 was finished, the Soviet amendment was adopted. This provided that, in case of a menace of war, ships cut off from their bases be permitted to pass through the Straits to rejoin their fleets, provided they not be of the so-called "menacing power".

At the second reading of Article 21 Litvinov took violent exception to that part of the new proposal which provided that Turkey be required to inform all signatory powers of any movement of ships of war in the Straits. He asked sarcastically if the same information were not germane with respect to the Suez, Kiel and other Canals, as well as international avenues of navigation. He asked that this section be suppressed, except insofar as it applied to the League of Nations, and then only in respect of annual statistics. Later he withdrew his objections, on condition that reports concerning ship movements be made to signatory powers only, at the time of passage.

In connection with Article 25, Litvinov desired that the period of validity for the Convention be shorter than 20 years, but withdrew his objections later.

Article 26, as was to be supposed, caused a great deal of argument. Litvinov favored the Turkish proposal, which provided that if one of the high contracting powers desired to amend the Convention, and if this were impossible in unanimity through diplomatic channels, then a majority of three-fourths, including Turkey, would be sufficient for a revision. After lengthy discussion by the other delegates, this proposition was taken up by the British delegation, - in the face of opposition from Litvinov, who desired that decisions be contingent upon approval of all Black Sea powers. The British argued that this would give Black Sea powers a special right of veto. Turkey, argued the British, should be entitled to a right of veto, but not one of the Black Sea powers. A compromise was ultimately reached whereby, in connection with

Article 11,

Article 11, a three-fourths majority including Turkey was accepted. As for Article 15, a majority of three-fourths, including a majority of three-fourths of the Black Sea powers was accepted.

As to the reservations formulated by the Japanese delegates, Litvinov proposed that the Japanese sign last, so that there be no possibility of supposing that any other power had accepted provisions of the Convention under reserve. After some rather terse comment Litvinov agreed to sign in alphabetical order provided that this did not signify that the Soviet Union accepted in advance the effects or the consequences resulting from the Japanese reserve.

In the public plenary session of July 18, Litvinov, in the same manner as the other delegates, paid homage to Mr. Bruce, the President of the Conference, with more than the usual flattering remarks.

At the final session of the Conference on July 20, Litvinov made a concluding and testimonial speech in which he commended Turkey for the circumstances under which the Conference had been called. He praised the regenerated new Turkish Republic and its leader Ataturk, and boasted somewhat at length about the peaceful intentions of the Soviet Union. He made reference to the long established friendship between Turkey and the Soviet Union. He stated that the Conference had recognized, although not categorically enough, the special interests in the Black Sea of the countries bordering on it. Liberty of the Seas must not be accorded to all powers in the Black Sea, except for ships of commerce. The principal

preoccupation

preoccupation of the Soviet Union during the whole of the proceedings had been admittedly to restrict the movement of ships of war of non-Black Sea powers in that sea. Litvinov also stressed the importance of the new relation between pacts of mutual assistance, the League, and the Montreux Convention. The Soviet Union had received practically all that it had wanted at the Conference, stated Litvinov. In conclusion he praised the action of Turkey in convening and carrying through by peaceful means an international conference, at a time when most of the world had lost faith in peaceful collective action. The Convention was the first ray of light in a uniformly sombre scene.

In connection with the sessions of the Technical Committee and other sub-committees of the Conference, a few remarks might be pertinent. The Soviet Union made no interpellations with respect to taxes and fees to be levied by Turkey in the Straits. The Rumanian delegate was most concerned about this. The Soviet delegates, however, were disturbed over the Danube Treaty of 1856, which permitted each of the three signatory powers to station two light surface vessels at the mouth of the Danube. Soviet delegates in the sub-committees fought tooth and nail to secure recognition of their thesis that ships of Black Sea powers be permitted to move at will to "join their bases."

In the technical committee the Soviet delegates tried hard to have aircraft carriers included with submarines in the category of vessels for which passage through the Straits would be forbidden. The Soviet delegates also attempted to limit the calibres of guns on ships authorized

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EE:BEK:MS:MEB:SS

May 29, 1937.

MEMORANDUM

The Montreux Conference and the Soviet Union.

In amplification and extension of the Moscow Embassy's despatch No. 1764 of August 3, 1936, concerning the Montreux Conference and the Soviet participation therein, the following comment, based upon an examination of the official publication of the minutes of the Montreux Conference, is submitted for such interest as it may present. The publication under reference is entitled "Actes de la Conférence de Montreux concernant le régime des détroits, 22 juin - 20 juillet 1936", and is published by Editions A. Pedone, 13 rue Soufflot, Paris V^e; it was forwarded to the Department by the Embassy at Istanbul under cover of its despatch No. 209 of February 5, 1937. In this memorandum only those aspects of the Conference, not covered in the despatch from Moscow, are discussed - particularly those relating to the interpolations and arguments of the Soviet delegates during debates in both the plenary sessions of the Conference itself and the in camera meetings of the technical committee.

At the opening session of the Conference (June 22, 1936), Litvinov stated that he was prepared to participate in the negotiations for the purpose of placing the régime of the Straits into harmony with the interests of the security of Turkey and of assuring peace and tranquility to that region. He emphasized that the Soviet Union had a special interest in the problem by reason of its geographical situation and the lack of communication between the seas which bathe its littoral. He traced the

gradual

gradual break-up of the spirit of pacifism which was so characteristic of the immediate post-war period, and pointed to the warlike and aggressive spirit which typifies the present epoch. He intimated that the right of individual defense was not to be observed only in the abstract; one must of necessity adopt a different attitude with regard to this right when there are fears that it will be used deliberately to endanger the interests of other countries and for the purpose of aggression. The attitude to take when the revision of a treaty helps to maintain and reenforce peace is quite different from that which obtains when this revision provokes political perturbations, troubles international peace and tranquility or ends in the violation by force of the interests of other states. Litvinov concluded with the hope that the Conference would embark upon its work with the interests principally of Turkey and the Black Sea powers at heart.

At the session of June 23, the next day, Litvinov paid homage to the Turkish thesis that the Straits should in principle not be closed to ships of war of all powers. However, he emphasized that the Black Sea should, nevertheless, be considered a closed sea, but should not be compared to the great international canals and straits which connect open and free bodies of water. Apparently not unmindful of regional security he stated, "The more we limit the tonnage and the number of ships entering the Black Sea the greater will be security in this region of Europe and Asia; and if we create security in one part of the world, we will thereby render a great contribution to the general security." However, for the Black Sea powers

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he asked complete freedom of passage in and out of the Black Sea. The case of the Soviet Union was different, he insisted, in that it was absolutely imperative that unhampered liaison be maintained between the shipyards of the Baltic and Black Seas, and that naval units be transferred at will between them. The remilitarization of the Straits, he insisted, was an incontestable right of Turkey, as was the right of self defense. The League of Nations was not dead, he concluded; it will emerge from its present difficulties stronger than ever. Consequently, the interests of the League must never be forgotten, particularly when it becomes necessary for the League to send ships of war to assist the victim of an aggressor.

At the session of June 24, Litvinov proposed that Article 6 of the Turkish draft proposal (relating to the movement of warships in time of peace) be made applicable only to non-Black Sea powers, and that the prohibition against aircraft carriers be added to that of submarines. This in fact would have reserved complete freedom of action for Black Sea powers and presupposed a series of restrictions against non-Black Sea powers. Lord Stanhope, the British delegate, then interpolated that there were two fundamental principles of note in the Lausanne Treaty, namely freedom of passage through the Straits for the naval forces of all powers, and limitation on the size of fleets of non-Black Sea powers to the tonnage of the fleet of the strongest Black Sea power. There were therefore liberty of entrance into the Black Sea for all powers and security for the Black Sea powers in particular, - a general

reciprocity

reciprocity of principle on both sides. Security was the more certain in that it was elastic. It was now proposed, continued Lord Stanhope, that these principles be discarded. There was to be a pronounced difference of treatment in ingress and egress from the Black Sea for the two categories of powers.

Sato, the Japanese delegate, then interpolated to the effect that Japan was ready to make concessions provided that there were equality of treatment for Black Sea and non-Black Sea powers. In rebuttal Litvinov insisted on special rights for the Soviet Union and for the abolition of aircraft carriers.

Later on, when the subject of security in both the Straits and the Black Sea came up, Litvinov took issue with other delegates, principally the British. The contention of the latter was that there were two questions to be decided: security between the Black and Mediterranean Seas, that is in the Straits, on the one hand, and security in the Black Sea on the other. Litvinov insisted that the two were closely bound together and were component parts of a single problem.

In connection with the notification preliminary to passage through the Straits, Litvinov was prepared to accede to the wishes of the Turkish delegate, provided that this be applicable only to non-Black Sea powers. The show-down between Litvinov and Lord Stanhope then became apparent: Litvinov for discrimination against non-Black Sea powers, Lord Stanhope for absolute equality of treatment. Litvinov maintained resolutely that there was no situation which could arise where a non-Black Sea power would find it

necessary

necessary to send large battleships into the Black Sea, whereas for Black Sea powers it could easily happen that large ships be dispatched from the Black to the Mediterranean Seas. The argument finally settled on Article 6 and particularly on paragraphs (b) and (h) thereof. Under the former, non-Black Sea powers would be limited to 14,000 tons in passing through the Straits, and under the latter the same would apply to Black Sea powers. Litvinov's contention was that the security of the latter was as important a consideration as the security of Turkey, the one as dependent as the other upon the remilitarization of the Straits. To hold Black Sea powers to a fixed maximum in traversing the Straits would be to discriminate against them, and place them at a disadvantage in case of war; Black Sea powers should have full liberty of disposing of their armed forces as they choose.

In the discussion of paragraph (f) of Article 6, relating to the interdiction against the use of airplanes carried aboard warships, Litvinov asked that his original motion prohibiting the passage of aircraft carriers, be kept on the calendar.

In the discussion of Article 7, Litvinov proposed two amendments: first, that vessels of belligerents be forbidden entrance to the Black Sea, in order not to extend to the Black Sea a war which might be raging outside it; second, that if a Black and non-Black Sea power be at war, ships of the latter be forbidden entrance to the Black Sea except on the order of the League of Nations.

In the discussion of Article 13, Litvinov proposed that the whole convention enter into force after ratification by

five

five members, that is one-half of the participants in the Conference.

After the interval of ten days between the Fifth and Sixth Sessions of the Conference, the British delegate, Lord Stanley, presented a new and revised project which was immediately adopted as a basis for discussion. If Litvinov was opposed to this British manoeuvre, he certainly did not show it, but accepted rather gracefully. He did insist that the original Turkish project be considered simultaneously with the new British project.

In the discussions concerning Article 6, Litvinov pretended to find a distinction in the conception of neutrality, that is, that a country could be neutral vis-à-vis Turkey but belligerent to another, hence the necessity for specifying "neutral vis-à-vis Turkey". President Bruce then stated that this could only arise if there should be two simultaneous wars, to which Litvinov responded that that was precisely his idea. The Rumanian delegate then stated that a more exact wording would be necessary to determine the state of war, for a war might be going on far from the Black Sea area, but yet involve it. To this Litvinov proposed that instead of the term "neutral" there be introduced the phraseology "Turkey not being a belligerent". This was accepted by the Turkish delegate. The Rumanian delegate was then assured by the Turkish delegate that, no matter how many wars might be raging, if Turkey were neutral, passage through the Straits would be possible under the terms of the Convention. Article 6 was then adopted with the reserve that Article 23, when edited in final form, make provision for action

arising

arising out of League obligations and commitments.

In the discussion of Article 9, the Rumanian delegate referred to the question of submarines and pointed out the necessity for Rumania to have a free hand in ordering and conditioning submarines outside the Black Sea. Litvinov again brought up the question of the special rights of Black Sea over non-Black Sea powers, and insisted on this difference in favor of the former. Litvinov stated that he desired that the Soviet Union be able to procure or have constructed submarines outside the Black Sea without necessarily purchasing them. In view of the opposition of the British delegate, however, the question of submarines was postponed to a subsequent date. Mr. Rendel, who presented the British argument, stated that his delegation had come to Montreux with instructions to negotiate for a settlement tending to protect the interests of Turkey, but based upon the general principles of Lausanne. In view of this, the British could not see why submarines, which were no more dangerous than a number of other categories of war vessels, should have to be restricted, to say nothing of aircraft carriers.

In the discussion of Article 10, Litvinov reverted to his stubborn insistence on special rights for the Black Sea powers. He contended that preliminary notice of 15 days was not too much, since it would take that much time to ascertain just how much tonnage there was actually in the Black Sea. He then proposed that 15 days be adopted for non-Black Sea and 3 days for Black Sea powers. Lord Stanley took exception and asked that similar treatment be meted out to both categories of powers. The

Turkish

Turkish delegate also took exception to the Soviet proposal, saying that three days was not enough to effect any appraisal of tonnage in the Black Sea, nor to give notice to the various powers signatory to this Conference. Litvinov, in answer to the proposal of the Japanese delegate that Turkey should notify all powers of the composition of all naval forces which pass through the Straits, made violent and sarcastic reply, asking that under such reasoning all powers in all seas should report ship movements for the general interest of mankind. In rebuttal the Japanese delegate* stated that such information as would at all times be in the possession of the Turkish authorities would enable powers to know in advance the situation in the Black Sea, and if it were possible to send ships through the Straits. The Japanese insisted, however, that the same period of time for the preliminary notification be applicable to both Black Sea and non-Black Sea powers. Litvinov argued that 15 days were necessary to ascertain the composition of fleets in the Black Sea, but three days were enough to make provision for the protection of the Straits, that is for egress from the Black Sea. The British delegate then asked that the same period of time be applicable to all, since it was purely an administrative act on the part of Turkey. After discussions among the other delegates, Litvinov made full reservations to Article 10, insisting apparently on a show-down at some point or other as to whether the Soviet Union as a Black Sea power were to be

given

*Mr. Sato, the present Foreign Minister of Japan.

given a favored position, or placed on a par with outside powers.

In the discussions of Article 11 the Soviet Union was insistent that every size ship of a Black Sea power should be able to pass the Straits, and that such ships be allowed escort of their own vessels.

In the discussions of Article 14 Litvinov presented the thesis that, even in visits of courtesy, Turkey should have no greater consideration than Black Sea powers. In other words, in visits of courtesy, where presumably ships in excess of 15,000 tons might be used to convey the head of a state, Black Sea powers should have privileges not less than Turkey. The British delegate, in explanation of this article, stated that the intention was that such ships would not enter the Black Sea, but would merely pay their visit and depart by the same route by which they came. Litvinov then proposed an amendment, accepted by the other delegates, to the effect that visits of courtesy to Turkey, in the Straits, be limited to a certain time, - clearly a derogation of sovereignty by Turkey.

In the discussions of Article 15 Litvinov proposed the figure of 30 percent instead of 10 percent above the standard allowable 30,000 tons above which Black Sea powers would increase their fleets before a proportionate increase be permitted to "outside" fleets which might come into the Black Sea. He further proposed that no nation be permitted more than one-half this tonnage. He conceded that other reasons than courtesy be permitted for ships entering the Black Sea, on condition that this be no excuse for increasing tonnage. He further proposed that ships of non-Black

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Sea powers be limited to "light surface vessels", and that the duration of all visits be limited to fifteen instead of thirty days. A median variant of three weeks was then proposed by Lord Stanley and accepted by Litvinov and the other delegates.

In connection with the definition of "humanitarian" as applied to visits of ships, the British delegate explained that there were many interpretations; famine, revolution, natural disasters such as earthquakes, pursuit of pirate vessels, etc. Litvinov took sarcastic exception to this thesis, and stated that he would agree provided that the period of time for such "humanitarian" visits be reduced and that a time limit be fixed. As to the possibility of a calamity he foresaw such an eventuality "once in a century". The British delegate took exception to Litvinov's statement, and said that every eventuality must be foreseen. As to the tonnage above 30,000 tons allowable for non-Black Sea powers in case of calamity or disaster, it was proposed by the British delegate that provision be made for the dispatch of at least one cruiser of an interested power.

As to the decision to be taken in case of war, to brand a belligerent, Litvinov proposed that such decision be taken by the League, since for Turkey alone to label an aggressor was too great a responsibility. The Turkish delegate said that his country would rather not have to take such a decision in an emergency, but would do so were that the wish of all signatory powers.

In the discussion of Article 18, Litvinov asked that provision be made that, in case of a menace of war, ships

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be allowed to join their bases immediately before the definitive closing of the Straits. Turkey was not willing to do this, insisting that her position in case of war might be jeopardized thereby. Litvinov countered with the observation that this would constitute a new rule of international law, and that on the basis of such a precedent a country might find a pretext for seizing foreign shipping in its own ports in case of a threat of war.

In the discussion of Article 23, perhaps the most important of the whole Convention, Litvinov submitted a new and separate article. The basic idea incorporated in the new article was that freedom of passage be permitted to those powers who were acting in conformity with obligations arising out of the Pact, or pursuant to accords supplementary to the Pact, which have as their object the rendering of assistance to/an aggressor. the victim of Mutual assistance pacts, of course, were the real subject at issue, and considerable opposition was evident from the British side, with particular respect to the "obligations" which Turkey might have as a member of the League to assist in carrying out appropriate measures against an aggressor.

Article 25 concerned ratification. Litvinov proposed that the ratification of five or six participants be sufficient. He also proposed that the duration of the Convention be shortened, and that fifteen years be considered the maximum variant.

In the second reading of Article 10, Litvinov stated that he did not want to insist on special consideration for Black Sea powers. He stated that all he was interested in was a reduction in the period of time necessary for Black

Sea

Sea powers to give appropriate warning, and was willing to accept eight days, which was then adopted by the Conference.

In the second reading of Article 14, Litvinov proposed that submarines be barred from visits of courtesy of foreign fleets to Turkish ports in the Straits, and that such visits be limited to twenty-one days. He stated later that he was willing that this idea be incorporated into a protocol to be added to the Convention wherein it would be stated that the Turkish Government had no intention of inviting submarines to pay visits of courtesy.

In the second reading of Article 15 Litvinov proposed that the definition of "Light Surface V$_e$ssels" be that embodied in the London Naval Treaty of 1936. As to the administrative authority to be notified concerning tonnage in the Black Sea, Litvinov proposed that this be the Secretary General instead of the Council of the League of Nations.

When Article 16 was submitted to its second reading in the British project, Litvinov, in a self-confessed spirit of "conciliation", withdrew his proposed amendment in favor of the French proposal, - but on condition that other concessions be made to him.

When the second reading of Article 18 was finished, the Soviet amendment was adopted. This provided that, in case of a menace of war, ships cut off from their bases be permitted to pass through the Straits to rejoin their fleets, provided they not be of the so-called "menacing power".

At the second reading of Article 21 Litvinov took violent exception to that part of the new proposal which provided that Turkey be required to inform all signatory powers of any movement of ships of war in the Straits. He asked sarcastically if the same information were not germane with respect to the Suez, Kiel and other Canals, as well as international avenues of navigation. He asked that this section be suppressed, except insofar as it applied to the League of Nations, and then only in respect of annual statistics. Later he withdrew his objections, on condition that reports concerning ship movements be made to signatory powers only, at the time of passage.

In connection with Article 25, Litvinov desired that the period of validity for the Convention be shorter that 20 years, but withdrew his objections later.

Article 26, as was to be supposed, caused a great deal of argument. Litvinov favored the Turkish proposal, which provided that if one of the high contracting powers desired to amend the Convention, and if this were impossible in unanimity through diplomatic channels, then a majority of three-fourths, including Turkey, would be sufficient for a revision. After lengthy discussion by the other delegates, this proposition was taken up by the British delegation, - in the face of opposition from Litvinov, who desired that decisions be contingent upon approval of all Black Sea powers. The British argued that this would give Black Sea powers a special right of veto. Turkey, argued the British, should be entitled to a right of veto, but not one of the Black Sea powers. A compromise was ultimately reached whereby, in connection with

Article 11,

Article 11, a three-fourths majority including Turkey was accepted. As for Article 15, a majority of three-fourths, including a majority of three-fourths of the Black Sea powers was accepted.

As to the reservations formulated by the Japanese delegates, Litvinov proposed that the Japanese sign last, so that there be no possibility of supposing that any other power had accepted provisions of the Convention under reserve. After some rather terse comment Litvinov agreed to sign in alphabetical order provided that this did not signify that the Soviet Union accepted in advance the effects or the consequences resulting from the Japanese reserve.

In the public plenary session of July 18, Litvinov, in the same manner as the other delegates, paid homage to Mr. Bruce, the President of the Conference, with more than the usual flattering remarks.

At the final session of the Conference on July 20, Litvinov made a concluding and testimonial speech in which he commended Turkey for the circumstances under which the Conference had been called. He praised the regenerated new Turkish Republic and its leader Ataturk, and boasted somewhat at length about the peaceful intentions of the Soviet Union. He made reference to the long established friendship between Turkey and the Soviet Union. He stated that the Conference had recognized, although not categorically enough, the special interests in the Black Sea of the countries bordering on it. Liberty of the Seas must not be accorded to all powers in the Black Sea, except for ships of commerce. The principal

preoccupation

preoccupation of the Soviet Union during the whole of the proceedings had been admittedly to restrict the movement of ships of war of non-Black Sea powers in that sea. Litvinov also stressed the importance of the new relation between pacts of mutual assistance, the League, and the Montreux Convention. The Soviet Union had received practically all that it had wanted at the Conference, stated Litvinov. In conclusion he praised the action of Turkey in convening and carrying through by peaceful means an international conference, at a time when most of the world had lost faith in peaceful collective action. The Convention was the first ray of light in a uniformly sombre scene.

In connection with the sessions of the Technical Committee and other sub-committees of the Conference, a few remarks might be pertinent. The Soviet Union made no interpellations with respect to taxes and fees to be levied by Turkey in the Straits. The Rumanian delegate was most concerned about this. The Soviet delegates, however, were disturbed over the Danube Treaty of 1856, which permitted each of the three signatory powers to station two light surface vessels at the mouth of the Danube. Soviet delegates in the sub-committees fought tooth and nail to secure recognition of their thesis that ships of Black Sea powers be permitted to move at will to "join their bases."

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EE:BEK;MS:MEB:SS

May 29, 1937.

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